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Procedural Jus Cogens
ANTHONY J. COLANGELO*

Jus cogens are a species of supernorm in international
law. They are universally binding and trump all contrary rules-such as treaties and customary international law. They are typicallyframed in terms of substantive prohibitions: no genocide, no slavery, no
crimes against humanity, etc. This Article seeks to
identify a proceduraljus cogens; namely, the right to
due process of law made up of notice, a hearing, and
an impartialand independent decisionmaker. To do so,
it draws from what are called "generalprinciples of
internationallaw"; that is, principlescommon to legal
systems around the world, which make up a source of
international law.

It argues that a comparative ap-

proach to these principles can reveal an empirically
supported, objective underlying natural law right. In

particular, by looking to the rights that states deem
most important, hierarchically superior, andfoundational to their legal systems as contained in their constitutions, this approachsolves major seemingly intrac-

table jurisprudentialand practical dilemmas for the
internationallaw of jus cogens by providing an alternative to horizontal, consent-basedpositivistic law of
treaties and custom.
To make its argument, this Article examines the 193
member states of the UnitedNations as well as Kosovo,
the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the Vatican City
(Holy See). Diligent research has revealed that virtually all states in the world secure the most basic requirements of due process: notice, a hearing, and an
impartial and independent decisionmaker. More
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Methodist University Dedman School of Law. I would like to thank Evan Criddle and Michael
Moffatt for extremely helpful comments and West Bakke, Joan Gregg, Jacob Mathew, Brandon Ramirez, and William Wolfe for extraordinary research assistance.
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specifically, 189 states provide notice to the accused,
196 states provide for the right to a hearing, and 196
states providefor an impartial and independent decisionmaker. Moreover, the vast majority of these protections are constitutional. The right to notice is pro-

tected in 179 constitutions, the right to a hearing is
protected in 193 constitutions, and the right to an impartialand independent decisionmaker is protected in
193 constitutions. This analysis easily satisfies the recent InternationalLaw Commission criteriathatfor a

norm to qualify as jus cogens it must be accepted by "a
very large majority of states ... across regions, legal
systems and cultures."
Discovering a proceduraljus cogens would be revolutionary in some respects. A procedural jus cogens
norm would expand the concept ofjus cogens because
such a norm would qualitatively differ from a substantive one, given that it is not merely a negative obliga-

tion on a state but imposes a positive duty to provide a
right. Further, the Article's argument holds powerful
implications not just for internationallaw but for domestic U.S. law as well. The Supreme Court long ago
held that internationallaw is partof our law, including
the law ofjus cogens, and mechanisms exist to enforce
that law in U.S. courts.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 379

I.

JUS
A.
B.
C.

COGENS .......................................................................... 389
History and Concept .................................................... 389
Natural Law ................................................................. 393
Positivism.....................................................................398
1. Compelling ............................................................. 400
2. Universal.................................................................402
D. Public Order................................................................. 404
E. Fiduciary Duty ............................................................. 407
F. General Principles........................................................ 408

II.

PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS.................................................... 414

A.
B.

Procedure vs. Substance .............................................. 414
Treaty Law ................................................................... 416

PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

2022]

379

C . C ustom ......................................................................... 4 33
D. General Principles........................................................ 435
DISTILLING THE BASICS ........................................................ 435

III.

A. Notice...........................................................................438
B. Hearing.........................................................................439
C. Impartial and Independent Decisionmaker .................. 440
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 441
APPENDIX I...................................................................................... 446

INTRODUCTION

Jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law, are a
special kind of international law in that they are universally applicable
norms that trump all other sources of international law-such as treaties or custom-irrespective of state consent.1 For instance, if Hitler
and Mussolini entered into a treaty legalizing genocide, jus cogens
would immediately swoop in to invalidate that treaty.2 These norms
are typically framed in terms of substantive prohibitions: no genocide,

1. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT]:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.
See also Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc.
A/74/10, at 142 (2019) [hereinafter Int'l Law Comm'n Rep.] ("Peremptory norms of general
international law (jus cogens) reflect and protect fundamental values of the international community, are hierarchically superior to other rules of international law"); id at 153 cmt. (8), 155
cmt. (12); id. at 14 n.729 (citing Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment
of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) (noting "the universal
character of the condemnation of genocide")); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.
It.; Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 95 (Feb. 3) ("[A]jus cogens rule is
one from which no derogation is permitted."). It should be noted that these norms apply not
just to treaty law but also to customary international law. See infra note 71; IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (3d ed. 1979) ("The major distinguishing feature of such rules is their relative indelibility. They are rules of customary law which cannot
be set aside by treaty or acquiescence.").
2.

VCLT, supra note

1, art.

53.
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no torture, no crimes against humanity, etc. 3 Yet there has recently
been some interest in the possibility of "procedural jus cogens."4
The first question is where such a norm comes from. Treaties
bind only states parties, yet as the example above explained, states cannot contract around jus cogens.5 Custom comprises two elements:
state practice and what is called "opinio juris," or the belief that the
practice arises from a sense of legal obligation or right. 6 Yet states can
generally contract around custom by treaty, in much the same way parties to a civil dispute can contract around a default common law rule.7
But there is another source of international law called general principles of international law'-that is, principles common to legal systems
around the world-from which jus cogens may arise. 9 Unlike treaties
and custom, these do not rely on a positivistic, consent-based model
whereby states consent among one another to be bound by the rule in
question.10 Rather, the relevant consent may be conceptualized as that
of the state to its own laws," which does not so much create but reveals

3.

Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 204-06 cmts. (5)-(10); RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE UNITED STATES

§

702 cmt.

n (AM.

L. INST. 1986)

[here-

inafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
4. See generally S.I. Strong, GeneralPrinciplesofProceduralLaw andProceduralJus
Cogens, 122 PENN ST. L. REv. 347 (2018) (analyzing international arbitration in the civil context to argue for procedural jus cogens); see also LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE
PROCESS 87-140 (2011) (arguing that habeas corpus should be a procedural jus cogens principally because it guarantees visibleness); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 370-71 (2009) (arguing for an emerging due
process jus cogens norm based on a fiduciary theory by which states act as guardians of their
citizens' rights, elaborated at infra notes 163-172 and accompanying text); Jenia Iontcheva
Turner, NationalizingInternational CriminalLaw, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 44 n.253 (2005)
(mentioning "fundamental principles of due process" as peremptory norms); ALEXANDER
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

60

(2006)

(mentioning due

process and the right to a fair trial as peremptory norms).
5.

See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.

6.

See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.

7. See Dan Dubois, The Authority of Peremptory Norms in InternationalLaw: State
Consent or NaturalLaw?, 78 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 133, 138 (2009).
8.

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.

9.

See generally Strong, supra note 4; see also infra Section I.F.

933.
10.

See infra Section I.C.

11. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text. This comports with both the text
of Article 38 ofthe Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)-the accepted touchstone
for the sources of international law-and the methodology for how general principles are recognized. As to the ICJ Statute, Article 38 lists three main sources: "(a) international
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principles derived from legal systems around the world to identify a
source of international law rooted in natural law." That is to say, they

conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) internationalcustom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
[and] (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations[.]" Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (emphasis added). Both (a)
treaties and (b) custom are rules of "international law" governing the relations among states
to which they consent in one form or another. Id. Treaties are obviously consent-based, and
the customary rule component of opiniojuris, or the acknowledgement that a certain practice
has legally binding effect, similarly demonstrates consent to that rule as a matter of "international custom." Id. General principles, by contrast, express no "international" aspect. See id.
They are simply "principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Id Unlike treaties and
custom, these do not rely on an inter se consent-based model whereby states consent among
themselves to be bound by the rule in question. See id. Rather, the relevant consent is that of
the state to its own laws, which are recognized as binding principles derived from legal systems around the world and make up a source of international law. That is, if enough states
recognize the rule in question, it may become recognized as a binding principle of international
law, which leads to the methodological test for discerning general principles: namely, a comparative analysis of states' internal legal systems that searches for a common principle or rule,
not their relations with other states. See infra notes 179-189 (description) and 310-894 (application). Yet it should be noted that the use to which this consent is put is not so much to
create but rather to discover the underlying general principle as a matter of natural or quasinatural law. See infra notes 94-101.
12. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶
10-11 (Apr. 20) (separate opinion by Trindade, J.). Article 38 drafter President Edward
Descamps clearly reasserted his jusnaturalist position, in upholding-besides treaties and custom-the search for:
objective justice . . .under conditions which are calculated to prevent arbitrary decisions ... [O]bjective justice is the natural principle to be applied by the judge ... [and to prevent arbitrariness, Descamps] would allow [the judge] to take into consideration the legal conscience of civilized
nations.

Id. ¶ 10.
Judge Trindade also noted that "[i]n the continuing debates of 3 July 1920, Lord Phillimore
expressed his own view that general principles . . . were those accepted by all nations inforo
domestico." Id. ¶ 11. Similarly, "Albert de Lapradelle, while admitting that such principles
'were also sources of international law', added that they were so if they had obtained 'unanimous or quasi-unanimous support." Id; see also 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 76 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed.,

1970) ("[T]he 'general principles of law' conceived as a source of international law are in
many ways indistinguishable from the law of nature as often applied in the past in that
sphere."); Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role
of State Practice in InternationalNorm Creation,23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 275, 292 (2007)
("According to the drafting history, general principles in the sense of Article 31(1)(c) of the
ICJ Statute were meant to serve as a counterbalanceto legal positivism."); Elena Carpanelli,
GeneralPrinciplesofInternationalLaw: Strugglingwith A Slippery Concept, 46 Ius GENTIUM
125, 140 (2015) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted):
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fundamentally emanate from natural law; however, to figure out what
the principles are requires a comparative analysis of legal systems
around the world.1 3 It is this feature that differentiates general

Article 38(1)(c) ... by failing to require States' consent as a pre-condition to the
recognition of general principles, extends the notion of "source of international
law" beyond legal positivism . .. regardless of whether States uphold or not the
validity of a certain principle, they are nonetheless bound by its rule. In this way
...
international law could have the validity of its foundation extended beyond
the will of States into the sphere of naturallaw and assume an aspect of its supranational and supra-positive character.
See also CHARLES T. KOTUBY JR. & LUKE A. SOBOTA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS:

PRINCIPLES AND NORMS APPLICABLE IN TRANSNATIONAL

DISPUTES 68 (2017) ("[J]udgments rendered without service of process or notice are coram
non iudice and contrary to 'immutable principles of naturaljustice."'); Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: NaturalLaw, InternationalOrderand the Limits ofLegal Positivism, 12 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 269,296 (2001) (The "foundational and pre-positive nature of the general principles
was emphasized by Bin Cheng") (citing BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED
BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 24 (1953) ("This part of international law does
not consist . . . in specific rules formulated for practical purposes, but in general propositions
underlying the various rules of law which express the essential qualities ofjuridicaltruth itself, in short of Law.")). But see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 8-9 (Apr. 20) (separate opinion by Trindade, J.) (elaborating on the more
positivist views of Elihu Root).
13.

MANLEY

O.

HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-

1942: A TREATISE 611 (1943).
[T]he phrase "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" ... empowers the Court to go outside thefield in which States have expressed their will
to accept certain principles of law as governing their relations inter se, and to
draw upon principles common to various systems of municipal law or generally
agreed upon among interpreters of municipal law. It authorizes use to be made
of analogies found in the national law of the various States. It makes possible
the expansion of international law along lines forged by legal thought and legal
philosophy in different parts of the world. It enjoins the Court to consult ajus
gentium before fixing the limits of the droit des gens.

Id. (emphasis added). See CHENG, supra note 12, at 392 ("The comparative method of studying the legal systems of different nations is no doubt a valuable and even conclusive test [of]
whether a given principle represents a general truth."); Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of
"GeneralPrinciples" in the Development of InternationalLaw, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 285
(1963) (emphasis added) (citing H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY AND RESEARCH 70-71 (2d ed. 1949)):

[A] principal object of the invocation of the 'general principles' is to provide
"the judge ... a guide to the exercise of his 'choice of a new principle' and ...
to prevent him from 'blindly following the teaching' of the jurists with which he
is most familiar 'without first carefully weighing the merits and considering
whether a principle of private law does in fact satisfy the demands of justice' if
applied to the particular case before him. In other words . .. comparative law
furnishes [him] with an objective test by which he can measure the justice of a
principle which he believes to be the correct one and proposes to apply to the
facts of a particular case when the existing rules of the law of nations do not
furnish him with the materials for a decision."
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principles from other norms of international law and may place them
on the pedestal ofjus cogens: not as a matter of incoherent positivistic
argument or relativistic natural law reasoning, but rather as an empirically provable fact.
This Article argues that general principles may supply a relatively novel basis for a relatively novel form of jus cogens-namely,
procedural jus cogens. As will be seen, a general principles account
avoids major theoretical and doctrinal obstacles to the existence ofjus
cogens on prevailing consent-based models of international law rooted
in horizontal obligations interse, like treaties and custom-obligations
that fail to explain how certain norms bind all states and become elevated to peremptory within the international system. General principles, by contrast, provide a normative hierarchy through an empirical
survey of domestic laws from which jus cogens may be discerned.
General principles are an empirical phenomenon in that they
rely on the practice of states; yet nobody to date has performed a systematic analysis of state practice regarding what states deem to be a
fundamentally fair procedure through their constitutions and laws. 14
This Article seeks to perform such an analysis by looking to the constitutions and municipal laws of most, if not all, countries in the world
regarding fundamental due process. Indeed, in the recent International
Law Commission (ILC) Report, the Commission published Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of International Law (Jus Cogens),
which suggested that a "detailed and rigorous study" of potential jus
cogens norms" "across regions, legal systems and cultures" may be
necessary for more detailed conclusions. 16 The present study does just
that and relies principally on constitutional provisions. Constitutions
See also id at 290 ("It is with regard to the substantive [general] principles of law ... that the
science of comparative law can render invaluable and indispensable."); supra notes 179-187
and accompanying text.
14. To date, nobody has gathered the constitutional and municipal code provisions of all
the countries in the world (where such information is available) and analyzed and grouped that
data. Oona Hathaway has measured state parties' compliance with the fair trial right contained
in international human rights treaties, but expressly does not focus on the domestic legislative
implementation requirements of those treaties. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1972-74 (2002). Due process specifically has been
argued as a general principle of law. Charles T. Kotubty and Luke A. Sobota argue for general
principles of due process by analyzing select decisions by individual courts and arbitral tribunals. See KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 12, at 157-210. Importantly, their work regards
general principles as definitively including "general principles of due process." Id at 1 (emphasis in original). For the proposition that due process is a general principle, see also Friedmann, supra note 13, at 290.
15.

Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 204 cmt. (1).

16.

Id at 168 cmt. (6).
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supply a perfect resource for measuring the existence of jus cogens
because they represent states' most fundamental ideals, are hierarchically superior to other law, and lay the structural foundations of a given
legal system. It should be noted, however, that even where these due
process features are found only in municipal law, they still contribute
to the general principle of fundamental due process.
A point of clarification before proceeding: General principles
can serve multiple functions in international law. One is as "gap fillers" where an international tribunal decides a case when there is no
extant international law upon which to rely." Another function-and
the one this Article relies upon-views general principles as
standalone norms culled from a supermajority of states' laws from
around the world. Indeed, in updating Bin Cheng's seminal 1953 work
on general principles of international law, Charles T. Kotuby Jr. and
Luke A. Sobota explicitly describe general principles as providing for
"'international due process. "'18 In other words, "international due process deriv[es] from the adjectival norms common to all systems of
law,"19 or "a baseline standard that is accepted by all modern legal regimes [that] reveals an accepted definition of international justice."20
A word on methodology. Examining the 193 member states of
the United Nations as well as Kosovo, the Republic of China (Taiwan),
and the Vatican City (Holy See) has revealed that virtually all states in
the world secure the most basic requirements of due process: notice,
a hearing, and an impartial and independent decisionmaker. 2 1 More

17.

Hall, supra note 12, at 296-97:

[G]eneral principles of law provide a reservoir from which apparent gaps in the
corpus of international law may be filled. They reinforce the view that international law should properly be regarded as a "complete system," i.e. that every
international situation is capable of being determined as a matter of law and that
international tribunals may not pronounce a non liquet.
18.

See KOBUTY & SOBOTA, supra note 12, at 1 (emphasis in original).

19.

Id at 69, 157.

20. Id at 74, 86; see also Friedmann, supra note 13, at 290 ("There may, secondly, be
said to exist a rudimentary code of principles of 'due process,' i.e., certain minimum standards
in the administration ofjustice of such elementary fairness and general application in the legal
systems of the world that they have become international legal standards."). To be clear, it is
not my contention that general principles are the only wayjus cogens may be formed; rather,
my argument is that general principles provide a way to identify procedural jus cogens. Although this involves critiquing other theories of jus cogens, it is not meant to preclude the
existence and development ofjus cogens where, for example, general principles are unavailable as a source of international law due to the nature of the norm. This raises the extraordinarily interesting question of whether different theories may justify different jus cogens.
21.

See infra Part III.
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specifically, 189 states provide notice to the accused,22 196 states provide for the right to a hearing, 2 3 and 196 states provide for an impartial
and independent decisionmaker. 2 4 Moreover, the vast majority of
these protections are constitutional 25 : The right to notice is protected
in 179 constitutions; 26 the right to a hearing is protected in 193 constitutions;27 and the right to an impartial and independent decisionmaker
is protected in 193 constitutions. 2 8 This powerfully overwhelming supermajority of states clearly satisfies the ILC criterion that for a norm
to develop into a jus cogens, the norm must be accepted by "a very
large majority of states 2 9 ... across regions, legal systems and cultures." 30 Furthermore, its comparative law methodology reveals these
natural law rights as concretely and objectively supported.
As to implications, discovering a procedural jus cogens would
be revolutionary in some respects. A procedural jus cogens norm
would expand the concept of jus cogens: Such a norm would qualitatively differ from a substantive one since it is not merely a negative
obligation on a state, but imposes a positive duty to provide a right.
Further, a general principles account of this norm domesticates jus cogens into municipal law, bringing international law closer to the individual.3 1 Finally, the Article's argument holds powerful implications

22.

See infra notes 310-499.

23.

See infra notes 500-695.

24.

See infra notes 696-891.

25. This Article adheres to the citation principles set out in the most recent edition of the
Bluebook. See generally THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia L.
Rev. Ass'n et al. eds., 21st ed. 2020). Thus, all foreign constitutions are cited by name; if the
nature of the document is not otherwise clear from the context, "Constitution" is included in
brackets following the document name. Id at 192. As a result, whether a particular foreign
document is constitutional in nature will be readily discernable to the reader. Some foreign
legal systems, however, contain instruments that are constitutional in dimension yet do not
bear the formal title of "constitution." The reader is therefore given notice that the following
foreign instruments bear the status of constitutional law in the legal systems of their respective
states: Grundgesetz (Germany), Basic Laws (Israel), and Human Rights Act (United Kingdom). See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United States:
A Comparative Study, 58 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1091 n.l (1960); Dalia Doner, Does Israel
Have a Constitution?,43 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1325, 1326 (1999); Douglas W. Vick, The Human
Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329, 361 n.255 (2002).
26.

See infra notes 310-499.

27.

See infra notes 500-695.

28.

See infra notes 696-891.

29.

Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 143.

30. Id at 167-68.
31.

See infra Conclusion.
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not just for international law but for domestic U.S. law as well. The
Supreme Court long ago held that international law is part of our law;3 2
this includes the law of jus cogens.3 3
The Article begins by justifying the existence of a procedural
jus cogens in light of contested theories to see the role that general
principles play. Jus cogens have been criticized on a positivist account
of international law because they purport to regulate states that have
not voluntarily assented to them.3 4 They thus often fall back on natural
law moorings of morality and fundamental justice,3 5 theories that have
largely fallen into desuetude as overbroad, relativistic, and overly subjective; 36 or jus cogens may be justified as being necessary to the international order.37 Jus cogens have also been conceptualized as a species of fiduciary duty the state owes to human beings over whom it has
control. 38 Part I of this Article presents a general principles account of
jus cogens that stands on its own, but also goes far to meet the positivist
objection on its own terms. And its results, if not its theory, align with
the fiduciary duty account. As to the positivist objection, virtually all
states provide fundamental due process rights, and, if states agree that
there exists a minimum level of due process owed to individuals over
whom they assert power, these states will have already accepted the
procedural norm. Nonetheless, general principles are not consentbased like treaties and custom, but instead empirically require a very
large majority of states as objective evidence of a natural law principle
to reveal jus cogens.3 9 A general principles account takes the empirical
data drawn from due process rights around the world not only to justify
the existence of procedural jus cogens, but also to answer the hard jurisprudential question of what elevates a particular norm to jus cogens
by examining what norms domestic legal systems have elevated in
their hierarchical legal orders.
Next, before turning to a comprehensive account of procedural
jus cogens in international law, Part II of this Article offers an account
32.

See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677 (1900).

33.

See infra notes 906-911.

34.

See infra Section I.C.

35.

See infra Section I.B.

36. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 342-43; infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. But see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Jus Cogens: InternationalLaw's HigherEthical
Norms, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (Donald Earl Childress III ed.,
2012) (proposing the use of the positive law of treaties and custom as evidence of natural law).
37.

See infra Section I.D.

38.

See infra Section I.E.

39.

See infra Section I.F.
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of the distinction between substantive and procedural law in order to
define the scope and contours of a procedural right and tie it to certain
substantive rights, like the jus cogens prohibition on arbitrary arrest
and detention. Here, both philosophical and doctrinal sources are useful, such as H.L.A. Hart's distinction between primary rules (rules
governing primary human conduct out in the world) and secondary
rules (rules governing how those primary rules are enacted, adjudicated and enforced),4 0 as well as the Supreme Court's string of cases
starting with Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins. 41 One might also explore
the extent to which a procedural norm blends into substance, for example the primary expectation that some process will adjudicate the
legality of one's conduct in accordance with the Rule of Law. That is
to say, a procedural norm may represent not just a norm in a particular
case, but may also be representative of the legal system to which actors
expect to be subject. 42 It is only from this discussion that we can discern what is procedural and what is substantive for purposes of procedural jus cogens. The Article concludes that while invariably imperfect, Hart's and Erie's tests provide useful heuristics to make this
determination, and fundamental due process rights of notice, a hearing,
and an impartial and independent decisionmaker fall on the procedural
side of the line.
Finally, the Article tours the law of procedural rights in the traditional sources of international law: treaties, custom, and general
principles. More specifically, it looks at major international instruments providing for due process rights, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention
on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples,
the League of Arab States' Charter on Human Rights, the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Geneva
Conventions. 43 While indicative of an emphasis on procedural rights
in international law, because none of these are universally ratified, they
cannot overcome an inter se consent-based model on which they are
grounded. Yet they can be useful for a general principles account
where states incorporate treaties into their domestic laws, including
their constitutions. As to custom, the discussion observes that the treaties listed above may also contribute to the formation of customary
40.

H.L.A.

41.

See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

42.

See MAY, supra note 4, at 48.

43.

See infra Section II.B.

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

81 (3d ed. 2012).

388
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law, but that it is still plagued by its interse consent-based source. The
Article then turns to general principles of international law. As one
scholar has stated, "[i]n order for an international lawyer to argue that
a general principle of law is a binding rule of international law, it
would be necessary to canvass all of the world's great legal systems
for evidence of that principle, and also to reference manifestations of
that principle in the actual domestic law of as many nations as possible." 4 4 That is exactly what this Article does. Indeed, it goes further
and canvasses all of the world's legal systems to demonstrate that virtually all of them provide for the basic due process rights of notice, a
hearing, and an impartial and independent decisionmaker.
The Article concludes less by summarizing its argument and
more by raising questions it provokes. For instance, what about emergencies, or war? To what extent do procedural jus cogens survive such
situations? Some states deem such provisions non-derogable in states
of emergency 45 while others do not.46 International law is somewhat
schizophrenic in this regard: it provides that jus cogens are nonderogable, and yet at the same time contemplates the death of establishedjus cogens norms and the birth of new ones. 47 Ifjus cogens were
truly rigid and absolutely non-derogable, the development of new
norms that displace old ones would be impossible. This is perhaps
why some experts 48 and international bodies like the U.N. Human
Rights Committee 4 9 view jus cogens as not necessarily non-derogable.
Here the relevant established jus cogens would probably be the sovereign right of self-defense in times of emergency. This norm has already been chipped away by human rights-for example, no matter
how dire the threat, states still may not torture. 50 In this connection, I
would happy to cast a procedural jus cogens as an emerging norm of
international law. Indeed, the whole purpose of this Article is to identify and make the case for a burgeoning norm.

44.

DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 14 (2d ed. 2006).

45. See, e.g. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, Sept. 22, 1995, art. 44. Article
44 sets out prohibitions on derogations of certain rights which includes the protections granted
by the right to a fair hearing. Id.
46. See, e.g., K'IWAMI ERITIRA [CONSTITUTION] May 23, 1997, art. 26(3) (Eri). Article
26 excludes the right to notice and the right to a fair hearing from express protection against
derogation. See infra note 554.

1, art.

47.

VCLT, supra note

48.

See infra notes 899-902, 904 and accompanying text.

53.

49.

See infra note 903 and accompanying text.

50. See G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, ¶ 2, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984).
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Furthermore, what are the implications of placing a positive
duty on states to supply a right (as procedural jus cogens do) as opposed to a negative duty not to engage in certain activity (as substantive jus cogens do)? And, is there something special about procedural
jus cogens rights that allows them to be waived? Criminal defendants
waive their trial rights all the time. Finally, what is the potential interaction between procedural jus cogens and U.S. domestic law? As
noted," it has long been held that international law is part of our law.
And U.S. courts have recently shown a willingness to strip foreign
conduct-based immunity and U.S. federal immunity when they conflict with jus cogens," as well as invalidate foreign acts of state under
the Act of State doctrine when they constitute jus cogens violations.53
I. JUS COGENS

A. History and Concept

The history of the concept, if not the name, of jus cogens
stretches back at least to Roman times.4 This lineage provided classical international lawyers with the natural law concept of "necessary
law."" Hugo Grotius, who many consider the father of international
law, put it in the following way:
The law of nature, again, is unchangeable-even in the
sense that it cannot be changed by God. Measureless
as is the power of God, nevertheless it can be said that
there are certain things over which that power does not
51.

See supra note 32.

52.

See infra notes 909-910.

53.

See infra note 911.

54. Elizabeth Santalla Vargas, In Quest of the PracticalValue of Jus Cogens Norms, 46
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 211, 214 n.11 (2016) ("[T]he notion ofjus cogens can be traced back to
Roman Law. While the term (jus cogens) was coined later on, the notion's underlying rationale may be found in the ius publicum of Roman Law from which no derogation was accepted .... "). Indeed, as Cicero stated:
It is wrong to pass laws obviating this [mandatory] law; it is not permitted to
abrogate any of it; it cannot be totally repealed. We cannot be released from this
law by the senate or the people .... There will not be one law at Rome and
another at Athens, and now and another later, but all nations at all times will be
bound by this one eternal and unchangeable law.
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA ET DE LEGIBUS

[ON

THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON

THE LAWS] 115 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (c. 51 B.C.E.).
55.

Dinah Shelton, Sherlock Holmes and the Mystery of Jus Cogens, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT'L

L. 23, 27 (2016).
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extend.... [And] [s]ince this law is not subject to
change and the obligations which it imposes are necessary and indispensable, Nations can not alter it by
agreement, nor individually or mutually release themselves from it.56
Other classical writers such as Christian Wolff and Emerich de Vattel
spoke of a necessary law in the law of nations." Vattel explained it
thusly:
We use the term necessary Law of Nations for that law
which results from applying the natural law to Nations.
It is necessary, because Nations are absolutely bound
to observe it. . . .This same law is called by Grotius and
his followers the internalLaw of Nations, inasmuch as
it is binding upon the conscience of Nations .... It is
by the application of this principle that a distinction can
be made between lawful and unlawful treaties or conventions and between customs which are innocent and
reasonable and those which are unjust and deserving of
condemnation.5 8
Despite the rise of positivism in the twentieth century, the concept of a necessary law still prevailed with such writers as Lassa Oppenheim and William Hall.59 For instance, Oppenheim explained that
"a number of 'universally recognized principles' of international law
existed which rendered any conflicting treaty void and that the peremptory effect of such principles was itself a unanimously recognized
rule of international law." 60 And Hall observed that there were certain
"fundamental principles of international law" that "invalidate[], or at
least render[] voidable," conflicting international agreements. 6 1
Perhaps the most groundbreaking scholarly work regarding the
concept came with Alfred von Verdross's article, Forbidden Treaties
56.

Id (quoting

HUGO GROTrUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF

WAR AND PEACE] 40 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1925) (1625)).
57.

Id; see also ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 36-37.

58. EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Lot NATURELLE,
APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS
OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS] 4 (James Brown Scott ed., Charles

G.

Fenwick trans., Car-

negie Inst. Washington 1916) (1758) (emphasis in original).
59.

Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 334; Shelton, supra note 55, at 28.

60.

Shelton, supra note 55, at 32.

61.

WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (A. Pearce Higgins ed.,

8th ed. 1924).
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in InternationalLaw.62 Writing in the shadow of Nazism, Verdross
asked "whether general international law contains rules which have the
character of jus cogens." 63 According to Verdross, "it is the quintessence of norms of this character that they prescribe a certain, positive
or negative behavior unconditionally; norms of this character, therefore, cannot be derogated from by the will of the contracting parties. "64
He concluded that international law did contain such norms, drawing
from both a natural law6 5 and what will be explained as a public order
perspective. 66 Moreover, he justified the existence of such norms on
the theory that they arose from general principles of law common to
civilized nations, 67 a core argument of the present Article. Despite
skepticism from positivists, 68 courts in the postwar period began to
recognize the existence of certainjus cogens norms, such as the prohibition on genocide. 69
The next major development in the history of jus cogens occurred in international treaty law. Under the heading "Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ('Jus
Cogens')," Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by

62. Alfred von Verdross, ForbiddenTreaties in InternationalLaw: Comments on Professor Garner'sReport on "The Law of Treaties", 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 571 (1937).

63. Id
64. Id at 571-72.
65. See id at 572 (consisting of "norms determining which persons are endowed with
the capacity to act in international law, what intrinsic and extrinsic conditions must be fulfilled
that an international treaty may come into existence, what juridical consequences are attached
to the conclusion of an international treaty").
66. See id (consisting norms "prohibiting states from concluding treaties contra bonos
mores"); see also infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
67.

Verdross, supranote 62, at 572-73.

68.

Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 335-36.

69.

See, e.g., Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of

Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) ("[T]he principles underlying the
[Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
States, even without any conventional obligation.").
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a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character. 70
As noted earlier, it is now widely accepted thatjus cogens prohibitions extend beyond treaty law to customary international law as
well.7 1 Yet despite codifying jus cogens in international treaty law, the
drafters of the VCLT studiously avoided explaining where such norms
come from.7 2 However, some clues may be found in the views of the
International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. 7 3 In line with the classical tradition, Lauterpacht found that
such norms derived from innate morality, but he also proposed that
they arose from general principles of international law: "These principles . . . may be expressive of rules of international morality so cogent that an international tribunal would consider them forming a part
of those principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations." 74
Again, it is from these principles that the present work later seeks to
discern procedural jus cogens. Nonetheless, the textual hole left in the
VCLT as to the origins of jus cogens sparked vigorous academic debate, to which we now turn.

70.

VCLT, supra note

1, art.

53.

71. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 182-83 cmts. (1)-(5); id at 149 cmt. (1)
("[The definition ofjus cogens], though initially used for the purposes of the 1969 Vienna
Convention, has come to be accepted as a general definition which applies beyond the law of

treaties."); id at 155 n.725 (citing Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 129 (D.D.C.
2009) ("[jus cogens] prevail over both customary international law and treaties"); id at 154
n.717 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundhija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 153 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998)).
[Jus cogens] enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law
and even 'ordinary' customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this
higher rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by states
through international treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with the same normative force.
Id at 150 n.701 (citing Vargas, supra note 54, at 223-24) ("[T]he potential effects of jus
cogens not only expand beyond treaty law but they even appear more significant in situations
that are not concerned with treaty law."); A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept
of Jus Cogens, as Illustratedby the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 18

(1995).
72.

See generally VCLT, supranote 1.

73.

Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. H Lauterpacht, SpecialRapporteur,U.N. Doc.

A/CN.4/63/1953 (Mar. 24, 1953).
74. Id
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B. NaturalLaw

An immediate objection to the entire concept of jus cogens is:
If international law is based on the consent of states, how can a rule
exist that purports to bind states that have not consented to it? One
way around this objection is to continue the classical reliance on natural law. 75 Despite natural law falling out of favor in modern jurisprudence as "artificially conflat[ing] law and morality, confusing parochial and relativistic ethical norms with objective principles of legal
right and obligation," 76 it has conspicuously survived in discussions of
jus cogens. Indeed, at the Vienna Conference itself, a number of states
relied upon natural law to support their views ofjus cogens.7 7 The ILC
recites the origins of jus cogens in terms of "fundamental values," 78
and a "'moral value oriented public order."' 7 9 To be sure, the Commission concluded that although commentators have sometimes used
different terminology to describe these fundamental values, "they indicate the important normative and moral background of the norm in
question."80 Once again, in his First Report on the Law of Treaties as
Rapporteur for the VCLT, Lauterpacht tied jus cogens explicitly to
morality.8 1 Gerald Fitzmaurice, the Second Special Rapporteur, echoed these views, explaining that "a feature common to [jus cogens], or
to a great many of them, evidently is that they involve not only legal
rules but considerations of morals and of international good order."8 2
75. See Shelton, supra note 55, at 48 ("[W]hen Grotius argued for the existence of higher
law, he did not cite any contemporary state practice, but instead invoked the Talmud, Biblical
sources, Greek and Roman jurisprudence and classical literature like the play Antigone.").
76.

Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 343.

77. See, e.g., Jean d'Aspremont, Jus Cogens as a Social Construct Without Pedigree, 46
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 23, 93 n.43 (2015) (noting statements of representatives of Mexico, Lebanon, Nigeria, Italy, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ivory Coast, and Monaco). See generallyU.N. Conf
on the L. of Treaties, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the
Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (Jan. 1969).
78.

Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 152-53 cmts. 5-6.

79. Id at 153 cmt. 3 n.713 (quoting A. Pellet, Comments in Response to ChristineChinkin and in Defense of Jus Cogens as the Best Bastion Against the Excesses ofFragmentation,
17 FIN. Y.B. INT'L L. 83, 87 (2006)).
80. Id at 153 cmt. 7; see also Verdross, ForbiddenTreaties in InternationalLaw, supra
note 62, at 572 ("No juridical order can . . . admit treaties between juridical subjects, which
are obviously in contradiction to the ethics of a certain community"); id at 576 ("A truly
realistic analysis of the law shows us that every positive juridical order has its roots in the
ethics of a certain community, that it cannot be understood apart from its moral basis.").
81.

THOMAS WEATHERALL,

JUS COGENS:

72 (2015).
82.

WEATHERALL, supra note

81, at 73.
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Similarly, the International Court of Justice in its Advisory
Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide referred to "the universal character of the condemnation of genocide" which "shocks the conscience
of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and [which] is contrary to moral law."8 3 For its part, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, in determining that the principle of non-discrimination had
risen to the level of jus cogens, asked whether "it would form part of
the fundamental rights of the human being and of universal morality." 84 And in Prosecutorv. Furundzija, the ICTY explained that because of the "importance of the values it protects," the prohibition on
torture "has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a
norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty
law and even 'ordinary' customary rules."8 5 U.S. courts have taken a
similar tack. In Siderman de Blake v. Republic ofArgentina, the Ninth
Circuit observed thatjus cogens norms are "derived from values taken
to be fundamental by the international community." 86 The courts of
other countries have expressed similar views. For instance, the Constitutional Tribunal of Peru emphasized the "extraordinary importance
of the values underlying"jus cogens,8 7 and the Supreme Court of Argentina concluded thatjus cogens protect "values and general interests
83. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supranote 1, at 155-56 cmt. 13 n.729 (citing Reservations
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 21 (May 28)); see also id at 149 n.699 (citing Prosecutor v. Jelisic,
Case No. C-578/95, Judgment in the Trial Chamber, 431-33 ¶ 60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia of Dec. 14 1999)).
84. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 54 (Sept. 17, 2003) (concurring opinion by
Trindade, J.):
It is evident that these principles of law do not depend on the 'will,' nor on the
'agreement,' nor on the consent of the subjects of law; the fundamental rights of
the human person being the 'necessary foundation of every legal order,' which
knows no frontiers, the human being is titulaire of inalienable rights, which do
not depend on his statute of citizenship or any other circumstance.
85. Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supra note 1, at 151 cmt. 4 n.706 & 154 cmt. 9 n.717
(emphasis added) (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement in the
Trial Chamber (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).

86. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting David F. Klein, A Theoryfor the Application of the Customary InternationalLaw of
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 351 (1988)); see also Kashef v.

BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 2019).
87. Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supranote 1, at 152 cmt. 5 n.709 (citing 25 % del Nnmero
Legal de Congresistas Contra el Decreto Legislativo No. 1097, EXP. No. 0024-2010-PI/TC,
Judgement of the Jurisdictional Plenary ¶ 53, Const. Trib. of Peru (Mar. 21, 2011) ("de la
extraordinariaimportanciade los valores que subyacen a tal [jus cogens] obligacion") (noting "the extraordinary importance of the values that underlie [thejus cogens] obligation")).
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of the international community of States as a whole." 88 Unfortunately,
these courts largely fail to provide objective criteria for discerning a
jus cogens norm other than their protection of fundamental values and
morality, relying principally on the self-evident nature of the violation.
Yet a number of commentators have agreed with a natural law
basis for jus cogens.89 Mark Janis points out, for example, that the
Nuremberg prosecutions would have had no legal basis without the
concept of jus cogens.90 Because the Nazis certainly did not agree to
be bound by the international law that was being applied to them, some
other, overriding norm must have been at play. This norm was the jus
cogens prohibition on crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.9 1 Thus, Thomas Kleinlein explains that "the formal criteria of

88. Id. at 152 n.710 (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 24 agosto 2004, "Chile c. Arancibia" Case No. 259 ¶ 29); id. at 151-52 cmt. 4 n.706 (citing the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights opinion in Michael Domingues v. U.S., Case 12.285,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶ 49 (Oct. 22,

2000)).
89.

Id

at 152-53 cmt. 6 n.711 (citing among others, ROBERT KOLB, PEREMPTORY

INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUS COGENS: A GENERAL INVENTORY 32 (2015); A.A. Cangado TrIn-

-

dade, Jus Cogens: The Determination and the GradualExpansion of Its Material Content in
ContemporaryInternational Case-Law at 6, XXXV Course of International Law, organized
by OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee, Rio de Janeiro (Aug. 2008), oas.org/dil/esp/3
cancado.LR.CV.3-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE49-2H6A] (jus cogens "does not emanate from
the inscrutable 'will' of the States, but rather, in my view, from human conscience"); Kamrul
Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N. Charter, 3 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 72, 73 (2005); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw and the Inter-State System,
216 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT'L L. 60 (1989); ANIEL CARO DE BEER,
PEREMPTORY NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS) AND THE PROHIBITION

OF TERRORISM 79-83 (2019); E. Petrie, Principlesof the Charter of the UnitedNations: Jus
Cogens?, 17 CZECH Y.B. OF PUB. AND PRIV. INT'L L. 8 (2016)); Id. at 156 n.735 (citing Dubois,
supra note 7, at 133-75); see also O'Connell, supra note 36, at 78-99; Louis B. Sohn, The
New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights ofIndividuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.
L. REv.

1,

13-14 (1982); INGRID DETTER DELUPIS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 174-

76 (1994); Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 411, 419-22 (1989).
90. See Mark Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (1988); see
also Stefan Kadelbach, Genesis, Function andIdentificationof Jus Cogens Norms, 46 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 147, 151 (2015).
91. David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 2348, 2350-51 (1992):
The Nuremberg Tribunal held individual Nazi officials responsible for acts that
positive law did not forbid at the time they were committed-so-called 'crimes
against peace' and 'crimes against humanity.' Anticipating the defendants' protest that they were merely following official orders that carried the force of positive law, Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter specifically provided that '[t]he
fact that the defendant acted pursuant to an order of his government or a superior
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invalidity as an effect of conflict, non-derogability, and qualified procedure alone cannot explain jus cogens. Rather, the heart of the matter
is the recognition of moral paramountcy of jus cogens."92
Indeed, it is precisely because they operate outside of state consent that jus cogens are universally binding. 93 This is a somewhat tautological argument: The international law of jus cogens exists, therefore jus cogens must exist. But it is not vacuous in light of state
practice in the form of treaty law and judicial opinions. That is to say,
state practice supports the existence of jus cogens norms so they must
come from somewhere. If it is not positive law, then it must be something else.
Other natural law theorists have focused on fundamental "human goods" represented by very broad categories such as life, health,
and safety, and the means for achieving these goods. 94 For these theorists, "[p]olitical community and legal regulations are needed to mediate and structure the interactions between individuals as they

shall not free him from responsibility.' .... The natural law argument that unjust
laws lose their obligatory character provides a straightforward philosophical justification for Article 8.... [N]atural law . . . form[s] the most obvious justification for criminalizing 'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts ... whether or not in violation of domestic law .... ' Such
crimes against humanity are radically inconsistent with the common good, and
any domestic legal system that permits them must violate natural law.
92. Thomas Kleinlein, Jus Cogens as the HighestLaw'? PeremptoryNorms andLegal
Hierarchies,46 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 173, 176, 198 (2015):
Peremptory norms enjoy a special status because they are 'believed to be morally
paramount.' Scholarly treatment ofjus cogens norms generally assumes that
part of the rationale for their distinctiveness is that states have recognized that
they reflect important moral positions. Jus cogens can therefore be seen as a
minimum of moral obligations in international law.
See id. at 198 nn.142-49 (citing Asif Hameed, Unravelling the Mystery of Jus Cogens, 84
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 52, 92-93 (2014) ("A rule is jus cogens because it is believed by legal
officials to be morally paramount."); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
162 (2d ed. 2019) ("[T]he idea ofjus cogens contains an ineradicable moral element"); STEVEN
R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS 21 (2015); STEFAN KADELBACH, ZWINGENDES VOLKERRECHT 167 (1992); Hermann

Mosler, The InternationalSociety as a Legal Community, 140 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 35
(1974); O'Connell, supra note 36, at 84; Frank Hoffneister & Thomas Kleinlein, International Public Order, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Rudiger Wolfrum, ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford and New York: 2013).
93. See Kleinlein, supra note 92, at 201 n.163 (citing Jure Vidmar, Rethinking Jus Cogens After Germany v. Italy: Back to Article 53?, 60 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 26 (2013)).
94.

Dubois, supranote 7, at 149; Weisburd, supranote 71, at 14 (citing Gerald Fitzmau-

rice, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958), reprintedin [ 1958]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 20, 27-28,40-41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1) (referencing "considerations of morals and international good order which are jus cogens rules").
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participate, sometimes jointly, in any one of the basic goods." 9 5 Because individuals cannot ensure human flourishing on their own, for
example by rebuffing more powerful external threats, only a complete
community can do so. 96 And the main tool for doing so is law. 97 Thus
"[t]he authority of human rights norms, as with prohibitions on genocide, slavery and torture, results from their ability to secure the conditions necessary for human flourishing by protecting the ability of individuals to participate in a number of basic goods[.]" 98 Mary Ellen
O'Connell calls these "person[-] centric" approaches. 99 "Taking this
approach, scholars consider the nature of human beings and use reason
to discover the necessary principles of a legal system based on what
human beings need to thrive." 100 Another, less subjective and more
empirically grounded approach is the "community[-]centric" approach, which "starts with the community and evidence generated by
the community as to its most important values. . . . It principally relies
on judges reasoning on the basis of the evidence in the positive law to
identify the fundamental principles that are superior to the positive
law."1 01 Here she cites the positive law of treaties, custom, and soft
law.1 0 2 By relying on positive consent-based law, she runs into the
roadblock of the persistent objector, discussed below. 10 3 Suffice it to
say that there are difficulties using positive law that a state objects to
then binding that state by calling the positive law in question natural
law. Yet despite these natural law efforts, with the exception of
O'Connell, who problematically relies on positive law, these theories
fail to provide a concrete guide to objective, empirical criteria for identifying a jus cogens norm and thus fall prey to traditional natural law
criticisms. And they have come under serious scholarly critique from
those who view international law as fundamentally consent based,
namely, positivists.

95.

Dubois, supra note 7, at 150.

96. Id at 150-51.
97. Id at 151.
98. Id at 164.
99.

O'Connell, supra note 36, at 93.
&

100. Id These types of views have been more fully critiqued elsewhere. See Criddle
Fox-Decentsupra note 4, at 343.
101.

O'Connell, supra note 36, at 93-94.

102. Id. at 94. This Article, by contrast, asks courts to look at the objective evidence
found in the natural law of general principles.
103.

See infra notes 113-114, 132-139 and accompanying text.
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C. Positivism
Positivism in international law holds that any rule of law must
stem from the will of the state. 104 For international lawyers, this means
states must have consented to the rule in question. Modern international law is generally considered consent based. 105 As to jus cogens,
the scholarly trend is in this direction: "Most contemporary commentators continue to view jus cogens through the positivist prism of state
consent."1 06 As to the consent-based model, the Permanent International Court of Justice (prior to the adoption of the International Court
of Justice Statute) early and famously put it in the Lotus case: "[t]he
rules of law binding upon States ... emanate from their own free
will." 107 Treaties only bind states that have consented to them, 108 and
customary international law relies upon state practice and opiniojuris
for its formation.10 9 Practice alone implies consent, but it is the opinio
juris element of the equation that really forms the meat of the consent
model. This is sometimes referred to as the "psychological" component of custom,1 10 because it requires that the state is behaving according to a sense of international legal obligation or right." In other
words, the state is acting a certain way because it thinks international
104. Dubois, supra note 7, at 141 n.29 (noting that the "paradox [ofjus cogens norms]
... only exists for the positivist [who] view[s] State consent as being the source of international law's authority").
105.

LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:

POLITICS AND VALUES (DEVELOPMENTS IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW) 27 (Kluwer 1995) ("State consent is the foundation of international law.

The principle that law is binding on a state only by its consent remains an axiom of the political
system, an implication of state autonomy."); see also Shelton, supra note 55, at 34 ("Most
contemporary commentators continue to viewjus cogens through the prism of state consent.").
106.

Criddle & Fox-Decentsupra note 4, at 339.

107. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 44 (Sept. 7).
108. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 34 ("A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for
a third State without its consent"). See also id arts. 2(g), (h) ("Third State' means a . . . State
which has [not] consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is [not] in force").
109.

Anthony D'Amato, TrashingCustomary InternationalLaw, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101,

102 (1987).

110. Id
111. Id
For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must
appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris sive necessitatis);a practice that is generally followed but which states feel
legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law.

note 3, § 102 cmt. c; see also
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 cmt. b (2019) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of
international legal right or obligation.").
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
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law obligates it or gives it the right to act that way. Without this belief,
there is no customary international law. But, of course, whether a state
believes a practice is accompanied by opiniojuris is up to the state.
Thus it depends fundamentally on state consent.
Two key features of jus cogens make it incompatible with a
consent-based theory of international law: it is compelling and it is
universal.1 1 2 It is compelling in that it overrides other rules of law
states may have already consented to, say, via treaty or "ordinary" custom. And it is universal because it applies regardless of whether states
have consented to it or not.11 3 Jus cogens thus destroys the international law doctrine of persistent objector, by which a state may opt out
of a certain rule of customary international law by persistently objecting to that rule, 1 4 a doctrine discussed in more detail below." 5
Ulf Linderfalk explains that "[i]n the positivist's universe ...
the jus cogens status of norms derives from ordinary processes creating
customary international law." 1 6 As a result, "it is difficult to reconcile
peremptory norms that bind dissenting states with the positivist theory
of international law."" 7 Or put more forcefully, "the introduction of a
112. Harry Gould, CategoricalObligation in InternationalLaw, 3 INT'L THEORY 254,
257, 266 (2011).
113. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supranote

1, at

156 cmt. 14 n.733 (citing Smith v. Socialist

People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 101 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1996)) ("[P]eremptory norms
'do not depend on the consent of individual states, but are universally binding by their very
nature'.")).
114.

Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Stability and Change in International Customary

Law, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 279, 284-85 (2009).
115.

See infra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.

116. Ulf Linderfalk, Understandingthe Jus Cogens Debate: The Pervasive Influence of
Legal Positivism andLegalIdealism,46 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 51, 58 (2015). This is not, however, a forgone conclusion. Another way of looking atjus cogens is that it has been agreed to
by treaty in general through the Vienna Convention if not specifically regarding the application of a particular norm. Id at 63 ("[I]t is because S has consented to, or acquiesced in, the
relevant law-creating processes. Stated in this revised form-separating the processes creating a rule of law from the source of the ensuing obligations-legal positivism has no problem
coping with the idea of a non-derogable law."); Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 339
("The leading positivist theory ofjus cogens conceives of peremptory norms as customary law
that has attained peremptory status through state practice and opinio juris."); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 102 n.6 (notingjus cogens "is
now widely accepted . .. as a principle of customary law (albeit of a higher status)").
117.

Shelton, supra note 55, at 34.

There is an inherent tension between the concept ofjus cogens and the idea that
international law is derived from the consent of states . . . . [F]or a devoted positivist the idea that some norms transcend the sovereign will of states must be
irreconcilable with the very notion of sovereignty itself.
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consensual ingredient into the concept of jus cogens leads inevitably,
in the ultimate instance, to the very negation of that concept." 18
1. Compelling
In contrast to this trend, the ILC places jus cogens as "hierarchically superior to other rules of international law." 119 In this way, it
can be conceptualized as transforming the international system from a
set of horizontal rules among states into a system comprising both horizontal and vertical components with jus cogens occupying a higher
level, capable of trumping any lower-level horizontal rule. 120 This
view is reflected in the language of international courts. The ICTY
has found that the prohibition on torture "relates to the hierarchy of
rules in the international normative order" and "has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank
in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 'ordinary' customary rules."12 1 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
taken a similar view.12 2 And in Kadi v. Council and Commission, the
Court of First Instance of the European Communities observed that jus
cogens is a "body of higher rules of public international law."12 3 The
Maarten den Heijer & Harmen van der Wilt, Jus Cogens and the Humanization andFragmentation ofinternationalLaw, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 6 (2015).
118.

JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF

TREATIES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 64 (1974); Criddle & Fox-Decentsupra note 4, at 342 ("As
many positivists have recognized, the very concept of jus cogens-peremptory norms that
bind states irrespective of state consent-is sharply at odds with the positivist account of international lawmaking.").
Voluntarism holds that legal obligation over an agent can only be created by the
consent of that agent, that is, for a state to be legally bound it must have consented (willed) to be bound. 'A strictly voluntarist view of international law
rejects the notion that a State may be bound to an international legal rule without
its consent .... In international law there are no rules other than such rules as
may be accepted by the state concerned.' Obligation comes only from consentto-be bound in this understanding.
Gould, supranote 112, at 261 (citations omitted).
119. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 150.
120.

ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 9.

121. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 154 cmt. 9 n.717 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundhija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment in the Trial Chamber, ¶ 153 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998)).
122. Id at 154 n.718 (citing Garcia Lucero, et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
and Reparations, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 267, ¶ 123 n.139 (Aug. 28,

2013)).
123. Id at 154 n.719 (citing Case T-315-01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union & Commission of the European Communities, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649,

¶ 226).
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European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v. the UnitedKingdom
similarly described jus cogens as "a norm that enjoys a higher rank in
the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 'ordinary' customary rules."1 2 4 State practice supports this view as well. In Mann v.
Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the High Court of Zimbabwe described jus cogens as "endowed [with] the primacy in the hierarchy of
rules that constitute the international normative order." 12 With respect to U.S. practice, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Siderman explained that jus cogens norms are "deserving of the
highest status in international law." 126 Other national courts have
agreed. 127 Official statements of states also confirm this view, 128 as do
the writings of some commentators. 129 This has led positivist
124. Id at 154 n.720 (citing Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 2001XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 761,

¶

60).

Id at 154 cmt. 10 n.721 (citing Mann v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Case No.
CA 507/07, Judgment, 2008 ZWHHC 1, 12 (High Ct.) (Zim.)).
125.

126. Id at 154 n.722 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
717 (9 Cir. 1992)).
127. See id at 154-55 nn.723-25 (citing a number of national courts, including Certain
Employees of Sidhu & Sons Nursery Ltd., et al., Case Nos. 61942, 61973, 61966, 61995,
Decision of 1 February 2012, BCLRB No. B28/2012, ¶ 44 (Can.) (jus cogens enjoy a "higher
rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 'ordinary' customary rules"); Julio
H6ctor Simon y otros s/ privacion ilegitima de la libertad, Case No. 17.768, Judgment of 14
June 2005, Sup. Ct. of Argentina, ¶ 48 ("[Q]ue se encuentra no solo por encima de los tratados
sino incluso por sobre todas las fuentes del derecho") [") [which is not only above treaties but
even above all sources of law"]; Julio Lilo Mazzeo y otros s/rec. de casacion e inconstitucionalidad, Judgment of 13 July 2007, Sup. Ct. of Argentina, ¶ 15 ("Se trata de la mas alta fuente
del derecho intemacional") [jus cogens "is the highest source of international law"]; Mario
Luiz Lozano v. the General Prosecutor for the Italian Republic, Case No. 31171/2008, Appeal
Judgment of 24 July 2008, First Criminal Division, Sup. Ct. of Cassation, Italy, at 6 ("dandosi
prevalenza
al principio
di rango
pii
elevato
e
di jus cogens")
["[
P] [riority should be given to the principle of higher rank and ofjus cogens ...
128. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 155 n.726 (citing U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess.,
Summary record of the 25th mtg., ¶ 101, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25 (Dec. 2, 2013) (Statement
of Van Den Bogaard, Netherlands) ("Jus cogens was hierarchically superior within the international law system, irrespective of whether it took the form of written law or customary
law."." (s).
129. Id at 155 n.728 (citing ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 8 as "support in the literature for the hierarchical superiority of peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens)" ); Gennady M. Danilenko, InternationalJus Cogens: Issues ofLaw-Making, 2 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 42, 42 (1991) ("The idea of international jus cogens as a body of 'higher law' of
overriding importance for the international community is steadily gaining ground."); William
E. Conklin, The PeremptoryNorms of the InternationalCommunity, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 837838 (2012) ("[T]he very possibility of a peremptory norm once again suggests a hierarchy of
international law norms with peremptory norms being the 'fundamental standards of the
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commentators to conclude that "[i]nternational lawyers regard the status ofjus cogens in the legal hierarchy as one of the most impenetrable
mysteries" surrounding the concept. 130
2. Universal
The other feature ofjus cogens that causes seemingly intractable problems for a positivist view is that these norms are universally
binding, even on states that have not agreed to them. 131 Members of
the ILC at the time of the VCLT's drafting considered jus cogens binding in this respect. Georgio Gaja, for example, stated that "lack of
acceptance or even opposition on the part of one or a few States is no
obstacle to a norm becoming peremptory."13 2 Others shared this view,
explaining that "it is the essence of the concept that a peremptory norm
is applicable against the states that have not accepted the rule," and
that jus cogens is "a corpus of rules binding on all states, and unlike
rules of customary law, they would be binding on even the persistent

international community' at the pinnacle."); Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, with a ProjectedList, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609 (1977); Janis, supra note 90,
at 359 (noting that "Tomuschat, for example, describes it as a certainty that peremptory norms
of general international law (jus cogens) are superior to other norms," and citing in support
Christian Tomuschat, Reconceptualizing the Debate on Jus Cogens and ObligationsErga Omnes: Concluding Observations, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 425 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc
Thouvenin, eds., 2006) ("One thing is certain, however: the international community accepts
today that there exists a class of legal precepts which is hierarchically superior to 'ordinary'
rules of international law")); Antonio Cassese, For an EnhancedRole of Jus Cogens, in
REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (Antonio Cassese, ed., 2012).
For a contrary view, see KOLB, supra note 89, at 37 (who "suggest[s] that the language of
hierarchy should be avoided and that the focus should be on voidness since the former concept-of hierarchy-leads to confusion and misunderstanding.")).
130.

Kleinlein, supra note 92, at 175 (internal quotations omitted).

131. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Audience andAuthority-The Merit of the Doctrineof Jus
Cogens, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 115,118-19:
A jus cogens norm is, therefore, premised on 'community recognition' and is
meant to operate uniformly in relation to all members of that community. Nonderogability means the legal impossibility of opting out from the substantive
scope of the rule or from peremptory effects of the same rule, reinforcing the
requirement of the continuing uniformity in the application of the relevant norm,
even despite the opposite will of mutually agreeing legal entities.
132.

Gould, supra note 112, at 275.
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objector"13 3 -again, a point taken up below. 134 In a similar vein, the
recent ILC Conclusion 3 holds these norms as "universally applicable." 135 National courts share this view. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated
thatjus cogens are "universal and obligatory." 136 And the Second Circuit found that they "do not depend on the consent of individual states,
Similarly, in
but are universally binding by their very nature."1 13
YoussefNada v. State SecretariatforEconomic Affairs, the Swiss Fed-

eral Supreme Court explained that jus cogens are "binding on all subjects of international law." 138
All of this presents a problem for positivists. The persistent
objector doctrine of international law mentioned earlier holds that
states that persistently object to a rule of customary international law
are not bound by that rule. 139 Ulf Linderfalk explains that:
[a]ccording to the rule of persistent objection ... if,
during the process of formation of a customary rule (R),
a state (S) consistently objects to whatever pattern of
conduct R requires, and then after the entry into force
of R persistently upholds this position, then R is not op-

posable to S.14o
This doctrine obviously creates a sharp tension with the very
notion of jus cogens on a positivist account. But it is a tension that
other methodologies can avoid; namely, a general principles account
that uses laws from around the world to evince jus cogens as a matter
of objectively ascertainable natural law.

133. Id; Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 156 cmt. 15 ("[T]he persistent objector
rule or doctrine is not applicable to peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).").
134. See also Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 184-85 n.843 and accompanying
text (listing statements by various States to the effect that "[jus cogens] cannot be subject to
the persistent objector rule").
135.

Id at 150.

136. Id at 156 cmt. 14 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).
137.

Id at 156 n.733 (citing Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d

239, 242 (2d Cir. 1996)).
138. Id at 156 cmt. 14 (citing Youssef Nada v. State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and
Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Administrative Appeal Judgment, Case No. lA
45/2007, Bundesgericht [Bger] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 14, 2007, 133
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] 11450,

139.

Linderfalksupra note 116, at 62.

140. Id

¶

7 (Switz.)).
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D. Public Order
Another quite interesting justification of jus cogens comes in
the form of a public order role. Boiled down, this argument too may
appear somewhat tautological: the international legal system exists;
therefore, there must be some basis for the international legal system
to exist. But the tautology here is not analytically vacuous either. Nobody argues that there is no such thing as an international legal system.
It follows that the system could not function without some baseline
rules. And these baseline or structural rules constitute jus cogens.14 1
Hence the chief jus cogens norm for a public order advocate is that
international agreements are binding, or pact[us] sunt servanda 142
This rationale comports with Hans Kelsen's concept of a "grundnorm,"143 or "a stipulative bedrock, the origin of which was outside the
realm of legal analysis, and made a matter of sociological inquiry."144
As one scholar has explained:
The foundation for the non-derogable status of jus cogens norms is the common interests of States, as members of the international legal community, in a shared
international order with a uniformity of values and rules
which are essential to its continued existence. It is these
rules, which are the rules and principles without which
an international society would cease to exist, that States
have an interest in granting non-derogable status. 145
Indeed, Verdross relied in part on a public order rationale and
explained its workings in terms of treaty law. He critiqued those who
viewed international law as only consent based, because "they overlook the fact that each treaty presupposes a number of norms necessary
for the very coming into existence of an international treaty." 14 6 Here
141.

ORAKHELASHVILI, Supra

142.

HANS KELSEN, A PURE THEORY OF LAW 216 (M. Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press

note 4, at 44.

1967).
143. Id at 193-221; Gould, supra note 112, at 263; Sheltonsupra note 55, at 32, Linderfalksupranote 116, at 55.
144.

Gould, supra note 112, at 263.

145. Dubois, supra note 7, at 141. There is another public order rationale that analogizes
jus cogens to the public order exception in conflict of laws, whereby a state will refuse to
apply a foreign law because it violates the state's public policy. ORAKHELASHVILISupra note
4, at 17-18. This view relies fundamentally on morality as the basis for the public policy and
I would therefore group it more under the natural law approach. Id at 48 ("It is widely accepted that the concept of public order is based on morality and its function is to outlaw the
acts and transactions offending against the morality accepted in the given legal system.").
146.

Verdross, supranote 62, at 572.
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he cited "norms determining which persons are endowed with the capacity to act in international law, what intrinsic and extrinsic conditions must be fulfilled that an international treaty may come into existence, [and] what juridical consequences are attached to the conclusion
of an international treaty." 147 In other words, there must exist always
some predicate set of norms operative in the system by which legal
actors can enter into legally binding agreements in order for there to
be a system in the first place. Lauterpacht too articulated a public order
justification for jus cogens:
It would thus appear that the test [of] whether the object
of the treaty is void for that reason is not inconsistency
with customary international law pure and simple, but
inconsistency with such overriding principles of international law which may be regarded as constituting
principles of international public policy (ordre internationalpublic).148

For these reasons, public order advocates have also referred to
jus cogens as constitutional norms of international law; that is to say,
they constitute the system and limit lawmakers' ability to craft law that
contravenes a constitutional jus cogens principle. 149
One problem with a public order rationale is that it seemingly
fails to explain the inclusion of certain core jus cogens norms; namely,
prohibitions guaranteeing human rights, especially in relation to intrastate human rights abuses.15 0 Thus if State A tortures X, a national of
State A, inside State A territory, there is arguably no public order rationale about guaranteeing the interstate legal system-as there would
be with, say, pactus sunt servanda-that comes into play in such a
purely intrastate setting.
This problem plagues another theory of international law that
may be housed under the public order rationale; namely, systems theory. This theory treats international law as analogous to a biological
organism. 151 International law differs from top-down systems of law
in the world because it grows organically from the practice of states

147. Id
148. Weisburd, supranote 71, at 13 (citing Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report
by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 155 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63).

149.

ORAKHELASHVILI, Supra note

4, at 10.

150.

Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 344-45.

151. Anthony J. Colangelo, A Systems Theory of FragmentationandHarmonization,49
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 3 (2016).
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accompanied by opiniojuris. 152 Under a systems view, the system is
autopoietic; it evolves for the purpose of its own survival; it is selfperpetuating through rules that tilt toward peace and trade over time.
But like the public order rationales articulated above, it fails to explain
purely intrastate human rights abuses as qualifying for jus cogens protection.
Still another public order rationale has recently been articulated
by Thomas Weatherall. His project is to elevate the value of human
dignity over the state on a public order rationale by marrying public
order to the notion of a social contract informed by fundamental moral
considerations. 153 In other words, the idea is to translate the evolution
of human society from a state of nature to one of social contract. 15 4
Fundamental to the social contract is the peaceful coexistence of society governed by rules that safeguard core values.1 " According to
Weatherall, this view theoretically captures what he calls "normative
individualism," "international constitutionalism," and "cosmopolitanism." 156 Normative individualism is based on the "essential premise
... which holds that the fundamental purpose of law is the good of the
individual."1 57 International constitutionalism holds that "[s]overeignty is no longer conceived to represent absolute freedom in the internal and external affairs of the State; rather, it is understood to be
delegated by the individuals within its borders and contingent upon
responsibilities owed to them." 158 Finally, "the term 'cosmopolitan'
refers to the most basic and fundamental, moral in origin yet legal in
nature, that transcend the boundaries of the State and accrue to the individual." 159
Although superficially looking like a public order theory, by
relying fundamentally on morality this theory falls into the natural law
trap of defining what exactly it means by morality. All we have is that
these core "interests necessary to social coexistence are expressed
through principles regarded to be moral in character and as such evoke

152.

Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, TraditionalandModern Approaches to CustomaryInter-

nationalLaw: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757-58 (2001).
153.

WEATHERALL,

154.

Id at 98.

155.

Id at 100.

156.

Id at 447.

157. Id
158.

Id at 449.

159.

Id at 450.

supra note 81, at 21, 71.
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elements of natural law." 160 And these moral principles relate to the
elevation of human dignity. 16 1 As such, they place moral constraints
on the sovereignty of states insofar as the exercise of sovereign power
denigrates the rights of individuals, which are the primary subjects of
international law within the community. 162 Weatherall's reliance on
natural law fails to adequately identify how to go about discerning natural law in an objective manner and its moral principles and thus runs
into the same obstacle as traditionally relativistic and subjective natural law theories. Moreover, the theory at bottom rests on an analogy
between the individual and the state, one that may well break down
when one considers the nature of the international system made up of
autonomous states versus civil society made up of human beings. The
interests of states in the international system surely elevate peace
among autonomous states but do not necessarily address purely intrastate activity that does not threaten that peace. Thus, as with other
public order rationales, it cannot account for the bulk of modern jus
cogens prohibiting gross human rights violations.
E. FiduciaryDuty

Another theory of jus cogens developed by Evan Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent holds that the state is a fiduciary of those under its
control. 163 This theory attempts to avoid the positivist critique of jus
cogens by basing the nature of these norms not on consent but on the
relationship of the state to the individual. 164 It also distances itself
from natural law theories' rather amorphous reliance on general moral
goods, and grounds jus cogens instead in a specific legal relationship. 165 Indeed, according to a fiduciary duty model, because the statesubject relationship is constitutive of sovereignty, norms guaranteeing
that relationship reinforce sovereignty. 166
The theory proceeds from the premise that "[p]opular sovereignty denotes that the state's sovereign powers belong to the people,
and so those powers are held in trust by their rulers on condition that
160. Id at 10 ("In the context of jus cogens, the higher interests of the community are
'extra-State,' concerning the whole of mankind, and designate the individual human being as
their ultimate beneficiary.").

161. Id at 101-02.
162. Id at 103.
163.

Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 352-60.

164. Id at 347.
165. Id at 348.
166. Id
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they be used for the people's benefit." 167 It does not address dictatorial
states where popular sovereignty is not the governing constitutional
framework. This model also extends to non-citizens over whom the
state exercises control, 168 leaving less clear how popular sovereignty
rooted in democratic accountability and representation would relate to
non-participants in that sovereign enterprise. Its characteristics are
that states must treat individuals with integrity, fairness, equality, solicitude, 169 fundamental equal security, 17 0 and the rule of law. 171 Because jus cogens arises from the state's duty to the individual, Criddle
and Fox-Decent identify due process as an emergent peremptory
norm. 17 2 The empirical study here does not rely on a fiduciary account,
but aligns with it in terms of the result that states owe jus cogens duties
to human beings within their control.
F. GeneralPrinciples

Finally, general principles of international law differ from
treaty and custom in that they are considered fundamentally non-consent based; 173 rather, they are principles common to legal systems
around the world that bind all states as a matter of natural law. 174 Consent does, however, play a role as objective empirical evidence of the
underlying natural law principle. As such, general principles may be
viewed as consent-based in a certain respect: They have been consented to by the large number of states that have affirmatively adopted

167.

Id at 350; see also MAY, supra note 4, at 123:

By violating jus cogens norms and rendering citizens significantly less secure,
States also render themselves less secure. In this sense, jus cogens norms are
merely a reminder to States of what they need to do to secure their sovereignty
by maintaining the only foundational duty that they have, to secure the salus
populi, the safety of the people.
168. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 359, 380 ("Because the fiduciary principle
authorizes state power on behalf of every person subject to it, states can claim no greater entitlement to enslave or torture foreign nationals than they can claim vis-a-vis their own citizens.").

169.

Id. at 363.

170. Id at 366.
171.

Id at 367.

172. Id at 370, 380-81.
173.

See supra notes

11-12, 39 and accompanying

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 55-56 (4th ed. 2003).

174.

See infra notes 310-894.

text; MARK W. JANIS, AN

PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

2022]

409

them. 175 Thus instead of being consent based inter se among states,
they are consent based intra se within the world's legal systems.
Broadly speaking, this would appear to bring international law closer
to human beings as subjects of international law as opposed to just
states. This feature also opens up analysis of which norms states consider hierarchically superior to other norms; namely, through their constitutions, and in this respect makes them a perfect candidate for the
creation and identification ofjus cogens. It also escapes the criticism
of traditional natural law as too subjective and means that the best way
to identify general principles is through a comparative law analysis176-just the type of analysis that the present work performs. "The
basic notion is that a general principle of law is some proposition of
law so fundamental that it will be found in virtually every legal system." 177 Thus:

In order for an international lawyer to argue that a general principle of law is a binding rule of international
law, it would be necessary to canvass all of the world's
great legal systems for evidence of that principle, and
also to reference manifestations of that principle in the
actual domestic law of as many nations as possible. 178
This article does precisely that. The comparative approach
matches up exactly with the ILC test that a "very large majority" 179 of
states "across regions, legal systems and cultures"1 80 is needed to recognize a norm for it to be considered jus cogens. This language tattoos
the report, which elaborates that "[a]cceptance and recognition by a

175. Though again, consent is used principally as objective evidence of a natural law
principle. See supranote 39. It is this feature that makes them binding on all states as opposed
to only those states that have affirmatively consented to them.
176. See supranotes 32, 179-189. For example, the Second Circuit concluded that torture
violated the law of nations in Filartigav. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). It supported
its international law analysis with a species of general principles analysis when it cited to a
survey of over fifty-five nations' constitutions outlawing torture. Id at 884. Similarly, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163 (1820) surveyed the laws of multiple countries around the world to arrive at a definition of piracy.
177. JANIS, supra note 173, at 56; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 44, at 13 (explaining
that "a principle would have to be 'recognized' not just in one legal system, but, rather, in
most of the world's legal cultures" (quoting Statute of the International Court of Justice art.

38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993); KOTUBY & SOBOTA, supra note 12,
at 23 (to avoid selection bias, comparative analysis should be as comprehensive as possible).
178.

BEDERMAN, supranote 44, at 13.

179. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supranote 1, at 167 cmt. 5; see also Criddle & Fox-Decent,
supra note 4, at 341.
180. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 168 cmt. 6.

410

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[60:2

very large majority of States is required for the identification of a norm
as a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens); acceptance and recognition by all States is not required." 18 1 This view
also reflects the statement of M.K. Yasseen, the Chairman of the Drafting Conference of the VCLT, that:
[T]here is no question of requiring a rule to be accepted
and recognized as peremptory by all States. It would
be enough if a very large majority did so; that would
mean that, if one state in isolation refused to accept the
peremptory character of a rule, or if that state was supported by a very small number of States, the acceptance
and recognition of the peremptory character of the rule
by the international community as a whole would not
be affected.18 2
And the ILC commentary to Draft Article 19 of the Articles on
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts explains that
for a norm to be jus cogens, "certainly does not mean the requirement
of unanimous recognition by all the members of that community,
which would give each state an inconceivable right of veto." 183 Scholars are of the same opinion. 184

181. Id at 165.
182. Id at 167 n.788 (citing U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records,
Summary Records of the PlenaryMeetings andof the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole
(Statement of Yasseen, M., Chairman of the Drafting Committee) 472 ¶ 12, A/CONF.39/11

(Mar. 26-May 24, 1968)).
183. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/31/10, at 287 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 119, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1-2 [updated language from Yearbook]. Although Draft Article
19 does not appear in the final version of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the Commission, Article 19's characterization of violations of
jus cogens norms as "serious," and the severe consequences of such violations were nevertheless captured in Articles 40 and 41. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at 112-16 (2001). As the International Law Commission commentaries to Article 40 explain, the Commission deliberately incorporated the previous list of "serious
crimes" from Article 19 into Article 40. See id. at 112.
184. Cf Sue S. Guan, Jus Cogens: To Revise a Narrative, 26 MINN. J. INT'L L. 461, 470
(2017); Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision of the InternationalLegal Order, 29 PENN
ST. INT'L L. REv. 233, 266 n.130 (2010) (citing Walter Gangl, The Jus Cogens Dimensions of
Nuclear Technology, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 76 (1980)) (citations omitted) (stating that
"[A]rticle 53 [of the Vienna Convention] does not require universal acceptance"); Danilenko,
supra note 129, at 49 (concluding and deploring the fact that Article 53 of the Vienna Convention creates "majority rule-making in the framework of the established sources [of
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This test is thus a centerpiece of the ILC report 85 supported by
other relevant international law materials. 186 And it is one that fits
snugly with the comparative general principles account of jus cogens
that calls out for "a detailed and rigorous study" of potential jus cogens
as a general prescription in Conclusion 23(1).187 I therefore use it as
the test for discerning procedural jus cogens from general principles,
which, as the Article shows, clearly demonstrate "[a]cceptance and
recognition by a very large majority of states188 . . . across regions, legal systems and cultures." 189 Indeed, because their natural law roots
are revealed by a comparative analysis of states' internal laws, the ILC
criterion comports precisely with the empirical, comparative approach
of this Article's argument.
Perhaps because general principles have less of a consentbased element to them, some sources find in them the basis for jus
cogens.190 As already noted, they certainly make sense of the principle
that only a great majority of states must recognize them and that unanimity is not required 19 1 (but note that unanimity is quite close when
one looks to the number of states that provide for basic due process
protections). 192 Moreover, as will be shown below, 193 a general principles account ofjus cogens remains faithful to the modem progenitors
of the doctrine: Lauterpacht and Verdross.

international law]"); Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and
Protectionof the Global Environment: Developing Criteriafor PeremptoryNorms, 11 GEO.
INT'L ENV'T. L. REV. 101, 112 (1998) ("Identifying a norm asjus cogens does not require
recognition by each and every member of the international community, but only the consent
of a very large majority reflecting the essential components of the international community.").
185.

Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 167-68 cmts. 5-6.

186.

Id at 167 n.788 (citing E. de Wet, Jus Cogens andObligations Erga Omnes, in THE
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 541, 543 (D. Shelton, ed., 1st
ed. 2013) ("This threshold for gaining peremptory status is high, for although it does not require a consensus among all states ... it does require the acceptance of a large majority of

OXFORD HANDBOOK
states.");

JOAO ERNESTO CHRIST6FOLO, SOLVING ANTINOMIES BETWEEN PEREMPTORY NORMS

IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2016) ("[The formation of peremptory norms reflects] a
common will represent[ing] the consent of an overwhelming majority of States. Neither one
State nor a very small number of States can obstruct the formative process of peremptory
norms.").

187. Id at 203-04 cmt. 1.
188. Id at 165.
189.

Id at 168 cmt. 6; see infra notes 310-894 and accompanying text.

190.

See, e.g., Criddle & Fox-Decent, supranote 4, at 341; Strong, supra note 4, at 369.

191.

See supra notes 173-174, 176-82 and accompanying text.

192.

See infra Part III.

193.

See infra notes 199-200.
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The ILC leads the way on the contemporary use of general
principles to derive jus cogens. Conclusion 5(2) states that "general
principles of law may . .. serve as bases for peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)." 194 The Commentary to Conclusion 5 explains further that "[i]t is appropriate to refer to the possibility
of general principles of law forming the basis of peremptory norms of
general international law (jus cogens)." 195 It continues: "General principles of law are part of general international law since they have a
general scope of application with equal force for all members of the
international community." 196 As far as judicial opinions go, in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice explained that "the principles underlying
the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on all States, even without any conventional

194. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 158.
195.

Id at 161-62 cmt. 8; see also id. at 162 n.764 (citing S VRINE KNUCHEL, JUS COGENS:

IDENTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PEREMPTORY NORMS 52 (2015) ("[G]eneral principles

[of law] may be elevated to jus cogens if the international community of States as a whole
accepts and recognizes [them as such].")); Sheltonsupra note 55, at 27 (explaining that "[a]
related theory derives the concept ofjus cogens from general principles of law").
196. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 161-62 cmt. 8; see also Int'l Law Comm'n,
Provisional Summary Record of the 3416th Meeting (Seventieth Session), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3416 at 10 (2018) ("[P]aragraph 2 of draft conclusion 17 indicated that resolutions
of international organizations should be interpreted in a manner consistent with jus cogens
norms ... it should presumably also apply in the case of... general principles of law."); Int'l
Law Comm'n, Provisional Summary Record of the 3417th Meeting (Seventieth Session),

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3417, at 12 (2018):
He could not conceive of a situation in which a general principle of international
law could conflict with a norm of jus cogens. If such a situation were to be
asserted by a State, the general principle of law would surely be interpreted in a
way that would render it consistent withjus cogens.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Provisional Summary Record of the 3417th Meeting (Seventieth Session)
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3418, (2018) ("The report included a discussion of the relationship
between peremptory norms and customary law, unilateral acts and resolutions of international
organizations, including the Security Council, but the relationship between peremptory norms
and general principles of law should also be considered."); Int'l Law Comm'n, Provisional
Summary Record of the 3417th Meeting (Seventieth Session) at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3419 (2018) ("Draft conclusions 15, 16 and 17 provided for the invalidity or nullity of other sources of international law besides treaties ... where those sources conflicted
with jus cogens. Perhaps ... general principles of law should also be included among those
sources."); Int'l Law Comm'n, Provisional Summary Record of the 3417th Meeting (Seventieth Session) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3421 (2018) ("Jus cogens was, by its nature, potentially disruptive to international law: even the fundamental principle of pactasunt servanda
might, in rare cases, have to give way to it. So too might ... general principles of law within
the meaning of article 38(1)(c) .... ").
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obligation."1 97 Scholarship supports this view. As Criddle and FoxDecent put it, a "popular theory of jus cogens asserts that peremptory
norms enter international law as 'general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations."' 198
Again, general principles originally made up a large part of the
justification of jus cogens by the primary progenitors of the concept
during the World War II period: Lauterpacht and Vedross. To repeat,
Lauterpacht found jus cogens in "principles ... expressive of rules of
international morality so cogent that an international tribunal would
consider them forming a part of those principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations."199 And Verdross, who was dealing with
treaties contrary to jus cogens, cited "the general principle prohibiting
states from concluding treaties contra bonos mores. This prohibition,
common to the juridical orders of all civilized states, is the consequence of the fact that every juridical order regulates the rational and
moral coexistence of the members of a community." 200
Of course, the next question is where to find these general principles. The ILC has elaborated on this as well. The ILC explains that
domestic legislation is a "way by which States express their views"
and thus "provide evidence of the peremptory character of a norm of
general international law." 20 1 The primary sources this Article looks
to are the constitutions and municipal laws of states, where the constitutions are skeletal in their fair trial rights. Again, constitutions form
a particularly powerful source ofjus cogens because they contain those
principles states consider hierarchically superior, most important, and
central to the structure of a particular legal system. Indeed, unlike inter
se sources of law, general principles elevate certain norms within a
legal hierarchy and place them at the center of a particular legal system. It is this feature that differentiates them from other norms of international law and places them on the pedestal of jus cogens; not as a

197.

Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide,

Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 23 (May 28).
198. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 4, at 341; see also O'Connell, in THE ROLE OF
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36, at 83-84. It should be pointed out that there
is another theory that takes "general principles to refer to precepts 'accepted by all nations in
foro domestico', which are essentially 'maxims of law' adopted from domestic orders to fill
gaps in international law to avoid non liquit." WEATHERALL, supra note 81, at 129 (citations
omitted).
199. Law of Treaties: Report by Mr. H Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.
200.

Verdross, supranote 62, at 572.

201.

See Int'l Law Comm'n Report, supranote 1, at 169-70 cmt. 5.
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matter of subjective natural law reasoning, but rather as an empirically

provable fact.20 2

II. PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

A. Procedurevs. Substance
The first thing to do before exploring the existence and contours of procedural jus cogens is to try to differentiate procedure from
substance. Such a distinction is helpful, for example, in distinguishing
substantive jus cogens violations, like the prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention, from the procedural right to notice and a hearing.
The prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention protects a substantive
right, namely, the right to liberty, while a procedural right protects the
process by which that substantive right is taken away. 20 3
The line between procedure and substance is an eternal debate
in the law. As Walter Wheeler Cook famously put it:
Nearly every discussion seems to proceed on the tacit
assumption that . . . the object is to find out, as one
writer puts it, "on which side of the line a set of facts
falls." This way of stating the problem, if taken literally, seems to the present writer to start us off on the
wrong scent, and to divert our attention from the fact
that we are thinking about the case precisely because
there is no "line" already in existence which can be discovered by analysis alone . . .. [O]ur problem turns out
to be not to discover the location of a pre-existing "line"
but to decide where to draw a line.20 4

202. Some scholars have expressly considered proceduraljus cogens as arising from general principles of international law in other areas. For instance, Strong makes a compelling
case for the use of arbitration proceedings as a source ofjus cogens in civil matters, see Strong,
supra note 4, at 362-70, and further extends her views to the Trump Administration's immigration policies, analyzing another type of civil proceeding. See SI. Strong, Can International
Law Trump Trump's ImmigrationAgenda? ProtectingIndividualRights Through Procedural
Jus Cogens, 2018 U. ILL. L. REv. ONLINE 272, 285-87 (2018). This Article by contrast deals
largely with criminal actions and offers an entirely different empirical approach looking to the
constitutions and municipal laws of states around the world.
203.

MAY, supranote 4, at 51.

204. Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L.J. 333, 335-36 (1933). Henry Maine made a similarly famous statement that "substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."
SIR HENRY

S.

MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM

389

(1883).
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Nonetheless, legal philosophers and courts have tried to draw
such a line. For example, H.L.A. Hart distinguished between "primary" and "secondary" rules. 20 5 For Hart, primary rules govern actors' behavior out in the real world (drive below the speed limit); secondary rules prescribe how officials enact and enforce that primary
rule (one gets a speeding ticket under a validly enacted law that one
may challenge in court). The rules differ as to whom they address. 20 6
While primary rules address all of us, secondary rules address those
government officials tasked with enforcing the law. 20 7 This distinction
is helpful for our purposes because a procedural jus cogens does not
regulate one's primary behavior but only kicks in after that primary
behavior has occurred. Similarly, it addresses itself to those tasked
with enforcing the primary rule of conduct.
The question of procedure versus substance was also taken up
by the U.S. Supreme Court in a line of cases starting with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 20 ' Erie pronounced the death of the general
federal common law and held that in federal diversity suits federal law
governed procedural issues while state law governed matters of substance. 20 9 Almost immediately, courts began wrestling with the question of how to draw the line between procedure and substance. 2 10 In
response, the Court began with a line that distinguished between rules
that were "outcome determinative," which were substantive, and those
that were not, which were procedural. 211 This distinction naturally
subjected itself to criticism because minor things like the color of a
brief might be outcome determinative in litigation but could be classified as quintessentially procedural.2 12 This test later evolved in concurrence into a test that "inquir[ed] if the choice of a rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct,"

205.

HART, supra note 40, at 81.

206.

MAY, supranote 4, at 48.

207. Id
208.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).

209. Id at 78.
210. See, e.g., Cohen v. Benefit Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) ("[I]n many situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational
separation becomes well-nigh impossible. But, even so, this fact cannot dispense with the
necessity of making a distinction.").

211.

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1945).

212.

BARBARA

A.

BABCOCK, TONI M. MASSARO & NORMAN

W.

SPAULDING,

CIVIL

PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 923 (6th ed. 2017); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 468-69 (1965) (explaining that "every procedural variation is outcome determinative");
Lawrence Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 192-206 (2004).
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in which case it would be substantive,213 and more recently by the
Court, a test that provides that a procedural rule is a rule that "must
'really regulat[e] procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."' 214 Yet as
Lawrence Solum has observed, fuzziness between procedure and substance nonetheless persists because "the entanglement of substance
and procedure required by the application of abstract rules to concrete
cases is a pervasive feature of litigation." 215 Although subject to criticism, these tests are still heuristically useful for distinguishing procedural jus cogens from substantive ones. For the substantive rule regards the thing to be adjudicated while the procedural rule relates to
the manner of adjudication.
None of this is to say that procedure and substance do not
blend; they can and often do. As Larry May points out, procedural
rules may comprise part of a legal system that impacts individuals in
their day to day lives by guaranteeing that their behavior will not be
subject to arbitrariness, a feature that goes directly to the Rule of
Law. 2 16 Thus if I exceed the speed limit, I can expect that some established procedure will adjudicate the legality of my conduct, not the
arbitrary whim of some governmental official. Or, as Solum points
out, "even an idealized model of substance and procedure requires procedures to play the substantive role of action-guiding particularization
of legal norms." 21 7 Yet again, for purposes of the present discussion,
Hart's distinction between primary and secondary rules and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence offer useful heuristics by which to gage
the line between procedure and substance; jus cogens that guarantee
things like notice, a hearing, and an impartial and independent decisionmaker fall on the procedural side of both.
B. Treaty Law

Turning to the existence of a procedural jus cogens, treaty law
by itself is an incomplete source on a positivist account because

213.

Plumer, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).

214. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010)
(quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
215.

Solum, supra note 212, at 224.

216.

MAY, supranote 4, at 52.

217.

Solum, supra note 212, at 220.
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treaties bind only states parties. 2 18 Nonetheless, there has been some
reliance on it. One technique stems from the VCLT and argues that by
signing on to the Convention, which affirms the existence of jus cogens, states parties have accepted the law of jus cogens even if they
may later dispute a particular norm or application of a norm. 21 9 And
the ILC cites treaty provisions as "bases for peremptory norms of general international law." 2 20 Significantly, the Commission explains that
the basis of ajus cogens norm extracted from a treaty is not the entire
treaty itself but only those provisions of a treaty that reflect jus cogens.2 21 Yet treaties are ultimately consent-based among states and do
not explain their application to non-state parties.
Treaties do useful work, however. They crystalize customary
international law, which is the subject of the next section. And they
also provide evidence of domestic law in the form of general principles
of law where the treaties are incorporated into domestic law (a not uncommon phenomenon). Thus, it is appropriate here to spell out those
major treaties and international instruments created under the auspices
of treaties providing for due process of law or its equivalent.
For a primary example, Article 14 of the widely ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has
173 state parties,22 2 lays out extensive protections:
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. The press and the public may be
excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals,
public order (ordre public) or national security in a
218. Compare VCLT, supra note 1, art. 2(g) ("'[P]arty' means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force"), with id art. 2(h)
(" [T]hird State' means a State not a party to the treaty.").
219. See Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 165 cmt. 5 (explaining that the "generally accepted interpretation of article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention" forms the basis for
the "framework of acceptance and recognition by the international community of States" of
jus cogens).

220. Id at 158.
221. Id at 162 cmt. 9.
222.
E, 95-2,
Sept. 8,
OFFICE

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc.
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States
1992) [hereinafter ICCPR]; see Status of Ratification: Interactive Dashboard, U.N.

Feb32022

HIGH

COMM'R,

https://indicators.ohchr.org/

[https://perma.cc/E53N-BXAN].
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democratic society, or when the interest of the private
lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case
or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the
interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the
proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against
him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language
which he understands of the nature and cause of the
charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel
of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing;
to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of
this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him,
in any case where the interests ofjustice so require, and
without payment by him in any such case if he does not
have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he
cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt.

[60:2
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4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall
be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to
his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher
tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted
of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on
the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows
conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result
of such conviction shall be compensated according to
law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the
unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to
him.
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again
for an offence for which he has already been finally
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and
penal procedure of each country. 22 3
The Human Rights Committee has elaborated these requirements.2 2 4 As the text indicates, they cover equality of arms, the right
of access to the courts, 2 2 ' and place a strong emphasis on "[t]he right
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law." 2 26 As to the latter condition, "[t]he requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal . . . is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception." 2 2 7 As
we will see, a central feature of this requirement in the European system is that the judiciary is separate from and not influenced by the
other branches of government. 22 8 Interestingly, the impartiality requirement contains two separate subsidiary requirements: one, the tribunal must in fact be independent and impartial; and two, the tribunal

223.

ICCPR, supra note 222, art. 14.

224. Hum. Rts Comm. Gen. Comment No. 32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, art. 14 (Aug.
23, 2007) [hereinafter General Comment No. 32].

225. Id ¶¶ 8-9.

Id 15.
227. Id 19.
226.

228. Id
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must give the appearance of independence and impartiality. 229 The
Committee Report does not absolutely prohibit military trials of civilians but insists that such "exceptional" trials are "in full conformity
with the requirements of article 14 and that its guarantees cannot be
limited or modified because of the military or special character of the
court concerned." 230 Again, and as we will see below, the European
Court of Human Rights takes a much more skeptical view of military
tribunals under the fair trial right in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 23 1
As to the right to fair notice, the Human Rights Committee explains, "[t]he right of all persons charged with a criminal offence to be
informed promptly and in detail in a language which they understand
of the nature and cause of criminal charges brought against them ...
is the first of the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings of article 14."1232 And the Committee Report spells out in great detail the
panoply of rights guaranteeing the right to a fair hearing, including
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defense, 23 3 access
to documents and all other material evidence, 23 4 prompt access to
counsel, and the right to communicate with counsel. 235
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (ECHR), which has 47 states parties, 236 also contains detailed due process protections in Article 6:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly
but the press and public may be excluded from all or
part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order
or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life
229. Id ¶21.
230. Id ¶¶22.
231.

See infra notes 246-250.

232.

General Comment No. 32, supra note 224,

¶¶ 31.

Id ¶¶32.
234. Id ¶¶33.
235. Id ¶¶34.
233.

236. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]; see Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications of Treaty 005, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/fulllist/-/conventions/treaty/005/signatures_[https://perma.cc/XRG8-EL87].
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of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances
where publicity would prejudice the interests ofjustice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court. 23 7
In the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights,
Ocalan v. Turkey is a leading case on Article 6.238 Before his arrest by
Turkey, Ocalan was the leader of the Kurdish Separatist Movement, or
PKK. 239 He challenged his conviction for terrorism under numerous
provisions of the ECHR, including Article 6. In particular, Ocalan

237.

European Convention, supranote 236, art. 6.

238. Ocalan v. Turk., 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131. There is an earlier case challenging the
domestic Turkish proceedings where the National Security Court was comprised of a military
judge. See Incal v. Turk., 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 48. Like Ocalan, the European Court of
Human Rights addressed a challenge to the domestic proceedings based on Article 6 of the
European Convention, see id ¶ 61. And like the Court in Ocalan, the Court found a violation
of right to an independent and impartial tribunal. Id ¶¶ 65, 71, 73. Because the treatment of
the issue is more fulsome and detailed in Ocalan, this Article focuses on that case in the body
text.

239.

Ocalan, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131

¶ 13.
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alleged violations of the right to a hearing before an impartial tribunal, 2 40 and the right to a fair trial, including in terms of: the right to
equality of arms, 24 1 the right to legal assistance, 242 the right to consult
with his lawyers out of the hearing of third parties, 243 the right to be
visited by his lawyers, 2 44 and access to evidence. 2 4
As to the right to an impartial tribunal set out in Article 6, Section 1 of the ECHR, the Court found a violation because one of the
judges who made up the national security court that convicted Ocalan
was a military judge. 246 It observed that, as a result, the national security court "might allow itself to be unduly influenced by considerations
that had nothing to do with the nature of the case." 247 Indeed, the Court
took what seems to be a very liberal view of the right to an impartial
tribunal because, while the case was being appealed, the military judge
was replaced with a civilian judge. The Court found this insufficient
to cure the fair trial defect:
In order to comply with the requirements of Article 6
regarding independence, the court concerned must be
seen to be independent of the executive and the legislature at each of the three stages of the proceedings,
namely the investigation, the trial and the verdict (those
being the three stages in Turkish criminal proceedings
according to the Government). 248
Moreover, "where a military judge has participated in an interlocutory decision that forms an integral part of proceedings against a
civilian, the whole proceedings are deprived of the appearance of having been conducted by an independent and impartial court." 2 49 Because the "military judge [in Ocalan's case] was present at two preliminary hearings and six hearings on the merits, when interlocutory
decisions were taken," the proceedings failed to provide for an independent tribunal under Article 6 and, significantly, the appearance of

¶ 106.
Id 124.
242. Id 131.
240. Id
241.

243. Id ¶¶ 132-33.
244. Id ¶ 134.
245. Id ¶¶ 138, 145.
246. Id

112.

247. Id

113.

248. Id

114.

249. Id

115.
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justice. 25 0 Also quite interesting is that, while Ocalan's trial was underway, Turkish law changed to prohibit military judges from sitting
on civilian criminal tribunal cases-a development that did not save
Ocalan's trial from being unfair,2 1 ' but that goes to general principles
of international law discussed below.
Ocalan's various other objections housed under the right to a
fair trial were met with a similarly expansive view of Article 6. As to
access to counsel, the fact that Ocalan
was questioned by the security forces, a public prosecutor and a judge of the National Security Court while
being held in police custody in Turkey for almost seven
days . . . [and] received no legal assistance during that
period and made several self-incriminating statements
that were subsequently to become crucial elements of
the indictment and the public prosecutor's submissions
and a major contributing factor in his conviction ...
deprived him of access to a lawyer under Article 6.252 As to the right
to consult with his lawyers outside the hearing of third parties, because
Ocalan's discussions with his attorneys were observed by the government, he was deprived of this right as well. 253 The Court also found a
violation of the fair trial right stemming from the limited interaction
Ocalan was allowed with his legal team, 254 and his lawyers not being
given sufficient opportunity to prepare their case:
The Court . .. notes that the presentation of th[e] highly
complex charges generated an exceptionally voluminous case file . . . It considers that in order to prepare
his defence to those charges the applicant required
skilled legal assistance equal to the complex nature of
the case. It finds that the special circumstances of the
case did not justify restricting applicant to a rhythm of
two one-hour meetings per week with his lawyers in or5
der to prepare for a trial of that magnitude. 2

250. Id ¶¶117-18.
251. Id ¶ 43 ("On 18 June 1999 Turkey's Grand National Assembly amended Article 143
of the Constitution to exclude both military judges and military prosecutors from national
security courts.").
252. Id

¶

253. Id

¶¶ 132-33.

131 (quoting the Lower Chamber).

254. Cf id ¶¶134-37.
255.

Id ¶135 (quoting the Lower Chamber).
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Other violations included his and his lawyers being given only
limited access to a 17,000-page case file.256
The European Court of Human Rights also issued a document
detailing with case citations the criminal rights contained in the ECHR,
starting with the right that "everyone is entitled to a ... hearing by [a]
tribunal." 25 7 The panoply of rights central to a fair hearing makes up
the overwhelming bulk of the document. 2 ' As to independence and
impartiality of the tribunal, like Ocalan the Court stressed independence of the judiciary from the political branches, 25 9 and both actual
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. 260 As to fair notice,
the Court observed that "[i]n criminal matters the provision of full,
detailed information concerning the charges against a defendant, and
consequently the legal characterization that the court might adopt in
the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings
are fair." 26 1 Here "[p]articulars of the offence play a crucial role in the
criminal process, in that it is from the moment of their service that the
suspect is formally put on written notice of the factual and legal basis
of the charges against him." 2 62 To be sure, the Court emphasized that:
Article 6 § 3 (a) affords the defendant the right to be
informed not only of the "cause" of the accusation, that
is to say, the acts he is alleged to have committed and
on which the accusation is based, but also of the "nature" of the accusation, that is, the legal characterization given to those acts. 2 63
Indeed:
While the extent of the "detailed" information varies
depending on the particular circumstances of each case,
the accused must at least be provided with sufficient information to understand fully the extent of the charges

256. Id

¶ 142.

257. Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR (Aug. 31,
2021),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/GuideArt 6 criminal ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JDS3-TR6T] [hereinafter Guide on Article 6].
258.

For a critical assessment of the criminal right to a fair trial, see generally RYAN Goss,

CRIMINAL FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS, ARTICLE

6

OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

(2014).
259.

Guide on Article 6, supra note 257, at 90.

¶¶ 103-34.
¶ 388 (citations omitted).
262. Id ¶ 390 (citations omitted).
263. Id ¶ 391 (citations omitted).
260. Id
261. Id

PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

2022]

425

against him, in order to prepare an adequate defence.
For instance, detailed information will exist when the
offences of which the defendant is accused are sufficiently listed; the place and the date of the offence is
stated; there is a reference to the relevant Articles of the
Criminal Code, and the name of the victim is mentioned.2 64
An interesting move the ECHR makes, and the ICCPR hints
at,265 is to guarantee the right to a translation of the charges in a language the accused understands:
Whilst Article 6 § 3 (a) does not specify that the relevant information should be given in writing or translated in written form for a foreign defendant, a defendant not familiar with the language used by the court
may be at a practical disadvantage if he is not also provided with a written translation of the indictment into a
language which he understands. 266
Thus, "[i]f it is shown or there are reasons to believe that the
accused has insufficient knowledge of the language in which the information is given, the authorities must provide him with a translation. "267
This is reinforced by the Article 6(3)(e) right to the "free assistance of
an interpreter if [the person charged with a criminal offence] cannot
understand or speak the language used in court. "268
Like the ECHR, the American Convention on Human Rights,
which has 24 states parties, also contains a right to a fair trial. 2 69 Article 8, the "Right to a Fair Trial," provides:
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation
of a criminal nature made against him or for the
264. Id

¶ 404 (citations omitted).

265.

ICCPR, supra note 222, art. 14(3)(f).

266.

Guide on Article 6, supra note 257,

267. Id
268.

¶ 409

(citations omitted).

¶ 408 (citations omitted).

European Convention, supranote 236, art. 6(3)(e).

269. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Am.CHR]; see American Convention on Human Rights:
Signatories and Ratifications, ORG. AM. STATES,
https://www.oas.org/dil/treatiesb-32_american convention on human rights sign.htm

[https://perma.cc/8MFY-E4CY].
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determination of his rights and obligations of a civil,
labor, fiscal, or any other nature.
2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the
right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has
not been proven according to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the
following minimum guarantees:
a. the right of the accused to be assisted without charge
by a translator or interpreter, if he does not understand
or does not speak the language of the tribunal or court;
b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the
charges against him;
c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his
defense;
d. the right of the accused to defend himself personally
or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing,
and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel;
e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally
or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law;
f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses present
in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses,
of experts or other persons who may throw light on the
facts;
g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself or to plead guilty; and
h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.
3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid
only if it is made without coercion of any kind.
4. An accused person acquitted by a nonappealable
judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the
same cause.

[60:2
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5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar
as may be necessary to protect the interests ofjustice. 270
The Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has elaborated these provisions in its Report on
Terrorism and Human Rights, 2 7 1 which encompasses "the jurisprudence of the inter-American human rights system, as articulated
through opinions and judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and special and individual case reports of the Commission
... ."272 Article 8(2)(b) of Am.CHR obviously provides for the right
to adequate notice. 2 73 As the Report states, one of the most "essential
protections . . . include[s] the right of the accused to prior notification
in detail of the charges against him or her," 2 7 4 and, "[i]n cases where
the defendant does not understand or speak the language of the court
or tribunal he or she must be assisted without charge by a translator or
interpreter." 2 7 As with the ECHR, the bulk of the protections go to a
fair hearing. Moreover, the right to an independent and impartial judiciary is an indispensable component of a fair hearing, 27 6 especially
the judiciary's independence from the executive.277 To be sure, and in
keeping with the European model, it is not just actual independence
and impartiality that is required, but also the appearance of an independent and impartial court. The right "require[s] that a judge or tribunal not harbor any actual bias in a particular case, and that the judge
or tribunal not reasonably be perceived as being tainted with any
bias." 2 78 Finally, the Report explains that the basic due process rights
are non-derogable and cannot justifiably be suspended:
These protections include in particular the right to a fair
trial by a competent, independent and impartial court
for persons charged with criminal offenses . . . the right
to be informed promptly and intelligibly of any criminal charge, the right to adequate time and facilities to
prepare a defense, the right to legal assistance of one's
270.

Am.CHR, supra note 269,art. 8.

271.Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116 Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr. (Oct. 22, 2002).

Inter-Am.

Comm'n

H.R.,

272. Id ¶221.
273. Am.CHR, supra note 269,art. 8(2)(b) (guaranteeing "prior notification in detail to
the accused of the charges against him").

274. Id

¶ 235.

275. Id
276. See id

¶ 229.

277. See id ¶¶230-31.
278. Id

¶ 229 (citations omitted).
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own choice or free legal counsel where the interests of
justice require .... 279
The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples Rights,
which has 54 parties, provides in Article 6: "No one may be deprived
of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down
by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained." 2 80 And Article 7 provides:
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his
cause heard. This comprises:
a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs
against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force;
b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
by a competent court or tribunal;
c) the right to defense, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;
d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an
impartial court or tribunal.
2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission
which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at
the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted
for an offence for which no provision was made at the
time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can
be imposed only on the offender. 2 81
Thus, as with the ICCPR and the ECHR, the African Charter
also guarantees due process rights, although it is vague on notice.

279. Id

¶ 247 (citations omitted).

280. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights art. 6, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter AfCHPR]; see List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded, AFR. UNION (June 15, 2017), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-sl-african_charter_on_human and peoplesrights_2.pdf

[https://perma.cc/B5SV-LRDA].
281.

AfCHPR, supra note 280, art. 7
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The League of Arab States' Charter on Human Rights, which
has 16 states parties, also contains (non-derogable) fair trial rights28 2
at Article 13:
1. Everyone has the right to a fair trial that affords adequate guarantees before a competent, independent and
impartial court that has been constituted by law to hear
any criminal charge against him or to decide on his
rights or his obligations. Each State party shall guarantee to those without the requisite financial resources legal aid to enable them to defend their rights.
2. Trials shall be public, except in exceptional cases that
may be warranted by the interests of justice in a society
that respects human freedoms and rights. 2 83
As with the prior conventions, the League of Arab States'
Charter provides due process protections, though is also vague in some
respects, in particular on notice to the accused. Article 67, "Rights of
the accused," of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court,
which has 123 state parties, 284 provides:
1. In the determination of any charge, the accused shall
be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees, in
full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature,
cause and content of the charge, in a language which
the accused fully understands and speaks;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to communicate freely with
counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence;

282. League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 4(2), May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005)
[hereinafter Ar.CHR]; see Signature and
Certification Human Rights Committee, LEAGUE ARAB STATES, http://www.lasportal.org/ar/humanrights/Committee/Pages/MemberCountries.aspx
[https://perma.cc/R7X4L7SJ] Feb42022(noting date of ratification for 16 state parties).
283.

Ar.CHR, supra note 282, art. 13.

284. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see The State Partiesto the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM.
CT.,https://asp.icccpi.int/enmenus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20
rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/6M8A-H4CY].
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(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at
the trial, to conduct the defence in person or through
legal assistance of the accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have legal assistance,
of this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the
Court in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him or her. The
accused shall also be entitled to raise defences and to
present other evidence admissible under this Statute;
(f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary to
meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings of or documents presented to the Court are not in
a language which the accused fully understands and
speaks;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and
to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence;
(h) To make an unswom oral or written statement in his
or her defence; and
(i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of
the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.
2. In addition to any other disclosure provided for in
this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable,
disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's
possession or control which he or she believes shows
or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to
mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect
the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of
doubt as to the application of this paragraph, the Court
shall decide. 28 5

285.

Rome Statute, supranote 284, art. 67.
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The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR)-bodies created under the auspices of the United Nations-also guarantee procedural rights. Article 21 of the ICTY Statute, under the heading, "Rights of the accused," provides:
1. All persons shall be equal before the International
Tribunal.
2. In the determination of charges against him, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to article 22 of the Statute.
3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to the provisions of the present Statute.
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall
be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equality:
(a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language
which he understands of the nature and cause of the
charge against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of
his own choosing;
(c) to be tried without undue delay;
(d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing;
to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of
this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him,
in any case where the interests ofjustice so require, and
without payment by him in any such case if he does not
have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him;
(f) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in the International Tribunal;

432
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(g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt. 286
The ICTR Statute contains similar protections in Article 20,
under the heading "Rights of the accused":
1. All persons shall be equal before the International
Tribunal for Rwanda.
2. In the determination of charges against him or her,
the accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing,
subject to article 21 of the Statute.
3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to the provisions of the present Statute.
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall
be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language
which he or she understands of the nature and cause of
the charge against him or her;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence and to communicate with
counsel of his or her own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his or her presence, and to defend
himself or herself in person or through legal assistance
of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or she
does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have
legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case
where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does
not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him or her;

286.

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 21,

U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (May 25, 1993) and S/25704/Add.l (May 19, 1993) [adopted by
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993)] [hereinafter ICTY].
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(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or
she cannot understand or speak the language used in the
International Tribunal for Rwanda;

(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or
herself or to confess guilt. 287
C. Custom
As noted above, the primary power of treaties is manifested in
their incorporation into the domestic law of states. One other role of
treaties in relation to the establishment of jus cogens is their role in
forming or crystalizing rules of customary international law. It is now
well-settled that treaties may contribute to the formation of custom. 288
Indeed, the predominant view in court jurisprudence and scholarly literature is that jus cogens frequently arise out of custom. As the ILC
unambiguously states: "Customary international law is the most common basis for peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)." 289 The ILC goes on to cite as examples jurisprudence from the
Supreme Court of Argentina, the Constitutional Tribunal of Peru, the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, the High Court of Kenya, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Ninth
and Sixth Circuits. 290 International courts are in accord: The ICTY has
noted that the prohibition on torture arises from "customary

287. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 20, Nov. 8, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1958 [hereinafter ICTR]; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of

Prisoners of War art. 105, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
288. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 70-71 (Feb. 20). The argument of Denmark and the Netherlands:
involves treating [Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf] as a
norm-creating provision which ... has generated a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of
international law, and is now accepted as such by the opiniojuris, so as to have
become binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become parties
to the Convention. There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly possible one
and does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the recognized
methods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed.

Id ; see also RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 102 n.5 (citation
omitted) ("International agreements that do not purport to codify customary international law
may in fact do so. International agreements may also help create customary law of general

applicability.").
289.

Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 158 cmt. (1).

290. Id. at 159-61.
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international law" and that it "constitutes a norm of jus cogens."291
And in Prosecutorv. Jelisi, the tribunal explained that "[t]here can be
absolutely no doubt" that the prohibition on genocide is a norm of
"customary international law" that has risen to the "level of jus cogens." 292

Commentators are of the same view. The Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States explains that jus cogens
"is now widely accepted . . . as a principle of customary international
law (albeit of a higher status)." 293 Indeed, O'Connell refers to jus cogens as a species of "super customary law." 2 94 And Weatherall states:
"[T]he formal source by which peremptory norms of international law
are evidenced as a matter of positive law remains customary international law." 2 95 One interesting aspect of viewing jus cogens as customary law is that it avoids the maxim against retroactive law for violations occurring prior to the adoption of the VCLT. The idea is that
jus cogens existed prior to the VCLT, which simply codified the preexisting law.2 96
Yet, rooting jus cogens in customary law presents its problems.
If custom is comprised of state practice and opiniojuris, it fails to account for the state that refuses to engage in the practice and persistently
objects to the rule. That is to say, custom is (like treaty law) fundamentally consent based. Thus far there are no criteria for how to elevate ajus cogens norm from ordinary customary international law to a
jus cogens norm. For these reasons, some have objected, arguing that
"[c]alling peremptory norms customary distorts the concept of custom
beyond recognition," and "custom, unlike jus cogens, can be corrupted
by contrary practice or persistent objection." 2 97
291. Id at 161 cmt. (6) (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment in
the Trial Chamber, ¶ 454 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)).
292. Id at 161 cmt. (6) (citing Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment in
the Trial Chamber, ¶ 60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999)).
293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 102 n.6; see also
d'Aspremont, supra note 77, at 101 ("Most ... scholars resort to the doctrine of customary
international law [as the source ofjus cogens].").

294.

O'Connell, supra note 36, at 78 n.3, 83 (citing

ANDRE DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS

ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 44-48 (1996)); see also Linderfalk,

supranote 116,
at 80 ("[T]he jus cogens status of norms derives from ordinary processes creating customary
international law."); Kadelbach, supra note 90, at 167 ("[P]ractice and opinio juris is required
with respect to the recognition of the rule itself.") (citation omitted).
295.

WEATHERALL, supra note

81, at 93.

296. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep., supra note 1, at 162 cmt. (8) n.764 (citing Vargas, supra
note 54, at 214).
297. Id at 163 n.766 (citing ORAKHELASHVILI, supranote 4, at 113-14).
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As far as the present project is concerned, and contrary to the
prevailing views, customary law does not do much work-largely because due process rights are simply not the stuff of international relations based on an inter se consent model that requires universality. Of
course, one might say that all of the materials included under the section above regarding treaties may be translated into customary law
since treaties may form custom, but that would still fail to account for
states that have not consented to the rule in question. For all the customary work treaties do, they are still subject to the objection that international law is consent based and relies upon obligations states undertake as to each other. As we will see now, general principles of law
do not necessarily rely on this consent-based model. Rather, they are
principles derived from legal systems around the world that make up a
source of international law grounded in natural law. In this respect,
jus cogens are accepted not as consent based in terms of states vis-avis other states but rather as states vis-a-vis themselves revealing
through objective, comparative evidence the norm in question.
D. GeneralPrinciples

Rather than rehash all the characteristics of general principles
elaborated above that make them attractive candidates for jus cogens,
and a procedural jus cogens in particular, the next Part comprises an
empirical survey that seeks to distill the basics of jus cogens in the
municipal laws of the countries around the world. It begins by introducing the basic protections prescribed by U.S. law and then jumps
into an empirical survey looking to all of the U.N. member states, as
well as Kosovo, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the Vatican City
(Holy See).
III. DISTILLING THE BASICS
It is far simpler to look to detailed written constitutions and
municipal laws than to analyze case law that elaborates only skeletal
provisions of the fair trial right. One example of the latter is, of course,
the U.S. Constitution which, nonetheless, provides a good framework
to move forward since the jurisprudence outlines the basics of the fair
trial right. The U.S. Constitution secures fair trial guarantees through
the vehicles of due process 29 8 and habeas corpus. 2 99 Hamdi v.

298.

U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.

299.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 9, cl. 2.
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Rumsfeld is a prominent example of due process acting through the
vessel of habeas corpus, in which the Supreme Court held that due
process requires that "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker," even in a
state of armed conflict. 300 Interestingly, as noted, the requirements of
due process state that:
[A]s critical as the Government's interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an immediate threat to
the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense
teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries
the potential to become a means for oppression and
abuse .... 301
Thus, even in a state of armed conflict, due process applies. In
fact, "[t]he war power 'is a power to wage war successfully, and thus
it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war
power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding individual liberties. '302 Justice O'Connor poetically explained that "[i]t
is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in
those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad." 30 3
Boumediene v. Bush 304 also affirmed extending the writ of habeas corpus to non-citizen detainees outside of the United States, but
within U.S. jurisdiction and control, holding that "the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous application
or interpretation of relevant law." 30 5 Moreover, the "habeas court must
have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the
cause for detention and the Executive's power to detain.
This authority must be able to guarantee, among other things, the ability to

300.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).

301. Id at 530.
302. Id at 536 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
303. Id at 532.
304.

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

305.

Id at 779 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

306. Id at 783.
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find and present evidence, an impartial decisionmaker, the assistance
of counsel, and the full ability to question witnesses, even in a time of
war. 30 7

Extracting from these cases three basic components of due process-notice, a hearing, and an impartial and independent decisionmaker-what follows surveys the world's nations on whether their
constitutions and municipal laws contain these rights: 189 states provide for fair notice, 196 states provide for a hearing, and 196 states
provide for an impartial and independent decisionmaker. Moreover,
the vast majority of these protections are constitutional. The right to
notice is protected in 179 constitutions, the right to a hearing is protected in 193 constitutions, and the right to an impartial and independent decisionmaker is protected in 193 constitutions.
One final, important point before jumping in. Because all the
different nations of the world obviously will not describe due process
using the exact same language, structure, and level of detail, a global
"margin of appreciation" is appropriate.
The margin of appreciation introduces a degree of flexibility into the operation of the law. It is woven into the
fabric of international society. Decentralization in the
elaboration and application of norms calls for a certain
deference towards the principal actors of society, the
Nation-States. 30 8

Thus, "[t]he margin of appreciation recognises that where appropriate procedures are in place a range of solutions compatible with

307. See id at 783-84. Note, however, that the United States has not been willing to
extend habeas corpus to non-citizens detained in a foreign active theater of war where the
United States does not have jurisdiction or control. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84,

88, 96-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
308. Jean-Pierre Cot, Margin of Appreciation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INT'L L., ¶¶ 1 (Anne Peters ed. 2021) (internal parentheticals omitted) (last updated June
2007). All of the country reports have core features of due process, they just vary in terminology and level of detail. The harsh critic will say: "you purport to show a general principle
of due process by pointing to country A's law. But country A's definition of notice is vague
if not deficient. Thus, rather than establishing a due process norm you are actually showing
that country A violates that purported norm, indicating its nonexistence." Here the margin of
appreciation comes in and says that just because the notice norm deviates from another country's (or treaty's) more robust norm in its provisions and details-which may make it look
deficient-that is an acceptable deviation. This is assuming the existence of a core due process
right (in the hypothetical, country A's vague notice provision).
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human rights may be available to the national authorities. "309 Accordingly, while there is a wide range of variations in how states describe
their procedural protections, those variations are accounted for-in-

deed built into-international law.
A. Notice*
The right to notice of the charges against one and the facts giving rise to those charges is critical to a fair trial. According to the empirical study below, 189 states provide for notice, including: Afghanistan, 310 Albania, 3 1 1 Algeria, 3 12 Andorra, 3 13 Angola, 3 14 Antigua and
Barbuda, 3 15 Argentina, 3 16 Armenia, 3 17 Australia, 3 18 Austria, 3 19 Azer-

baijan, 320 Bahamas, 32 1 Bahrain, 322 Bangladesh, 323 Barbados, 324 Belarus, 325 Belgium, 32 6 Belize, 327 Benin, 328 Bolivia, 329 Bosnia and Herze-

Brazil, 3 32 Bulgaria, 3 33 Burkina Faso, 334
govina,33o335 Botswana, 3 31
336 Cameroon, 337 Canada, 338 Cape Verde, 339
Cambodia,
Burundi,
Central African Republic, 340 Chad, 34 1 Chile, 3 4 2 Colombia, 34 3 (Democratic Republic of) Congo, 34 4 (Republic of) Congo or Congo-Brazzaville, 34 5 Costa Rica, 34 6 C6te d'Ivoire, 34 7 Croatia, 348 Cuba, 349 Cyprus, 350
Czech Republic, 35 1 Denmark, 3 52 Djibouti, 353 Dominica, 3 54 Dominican
Republic, 355 Ecuador, 356 Egypt, 357 El Salvador, 358 Equatorial
Guinea, 3 59 Eritrea, 3 60 Estonia, 36 1 Ethiopia, 3 62 Fiji, 363 Finland, 364
France, 3 65 Gabon, 366 The Gambia, 36 7 Georgia, 368 Germany, 369
Ghana, 370 Greece, 371 Grenada, 372 Guatemala, 373 Guinea, 37 4 GuineaBissau, 375 Guyana, 376 Haiti, 377 Honduras, 378 Hungary, 379 Iceland, 380 In-

dia, 3 81 Indonesia, 382 Iran
maica,

3 88

Japan,

389

383

Jordan,

Iraq, 3 84 Ireland, 385 Israel, 386 Italy, 3 87 Ja-

390

Kazakhstan, 39 1 Kenya, 392 Kiribati, 393

(Democratic People's Republic of) Korea, 394 (Republic of) Korea, 395
Kosovo, 396 Kuwait, 397 Kyrgyzstan, 398 Lao (People's Democratic Republic), 399 Latvia, 4 0 Lebanon, 401 Lesotho, 40 2 Liberia, 4 03 Libya, 40 4
Liechtenstein, 40 5 Lithuania, 406 Luxembourg, 40 7 Madagascar, 40 8 Ma-

lawi, 40 9 Malaysia, 410 Maldives, 41 1 Mali, 412 Malta, 413 Marshall Islands, 4 14 Mauritania, 4 15 Mauritius, 416 Mexico, 417 Micronesia, 418 Moldova, 4 19 Monaco, 420 Mongolia 421 Montenegro, 4 22 Morocco, 423

309. Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human
Rights?, 23 HUM. RTs. L. J. 161, 162 (2002). The margin of appreciation is reflected in various
instruments of international law. For example, the notion is embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights, which "does not purport to impose uniform approaches to the myriad different interests which arise in the broad field of fundamental rights protection; it seeks
to establish common minimum standards to provide an Europe-wide framework for domestic
human rights protection." Id
* In order to better format this Article, the editors of the Columbia Journalof TransnationalLaw have decided to place footnotes 310-891 in an appendix. See infra Appendix I.
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Mozambique, 424 Namibia, 425 Nauru, 426 Nepal, 427 Netherlands, 42 8 New

Zealand, 42 9 Nicaragua, 430 Niger, 43 1 Nigeria, 432 North Macedonia, 433
Norway, 4 34 Oman, 435 Pakistan, 436 Palau, 437 Panama, 438 Papua New
Guinea, 43 9 Paraguay, 440 Peru, 44 1 Philippines, 442 Poland, 443 Portugal, 444
Qatar, 4 45 Romania, 446 Russian Federation, 447 Rwanda, 448 Saint Kitts

and Nevis, 449 Saint Lucia, 450 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 45 1 Sa-

moa,45 2 San Marino,453 Sio Tome and Principe,454 Senegal,455 Serbia, 4 56 Seychelles, 4 57 Sierra Leone, 4 58 Singapore, 4 59 Slovakia, 4 60 Sbovenia, 461 Solomon Islands, 462 Somalia, 4 63 South Africa, 4 64 South
Sudan, 465 Spain, 466 Sri Lanka, 467 Sudan, 468 Suriname, 469 Swaziland, 470
Sweden, 471 Switzerland, 472 Syria, 473 Taiwan, 474 Tajikistan, 47 5 Tanzania,47 6 Thailand, 477 Timor-Leste, 478 Togo, 479 Tonga, 480 Trinidad and
Tobago, 4 81 Tunisia,4 82 Turkey, 4 83 Turkmenistan, 484 Tuvalu, 48 5

Uganda, 486 Ukraine, 487 United Kingdom, 4 88 United States, 4 89 Uruguay, 490 Uzbekistan, 49 1 Vanuatu

492

Vatican City, 493 Venezuela, 494 Vi-

etnam,495 Yemen, 496 Zambia,497 and Zimbabwe.498 Seven states do not
guarantee the right to notice. 499
B. Hearing

Similarly, a fair procedure would be empty without an opportunity to be heard. In this respect, 196 states provide for the right to a
fair hearing, including: Afghanistan, 00 Albania,50 1 Algeria,5 0 2 Andorra,50 3 Angola,s 4 Antigua and Barbuda,ss Argentina,s 6 Armenia, 50 7 Australia,5 08 Austria,5 0 9 Azerbaijan,51 0 Bahamas, 511 Bahrain,5

Bangladesh, 5 13

Barbados, 514

Belarus, 5 15

Belgium, 516

Belize, 5 17

12

Be-

nin,5 18 Bhutan, 519 Bolivia, 520 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 521 Botswana,5 22
Brazil, 523 Brunei Darussalam, 524 Bulgaria, 525 Burkina Faso, 526 Burundi, 5 27 Cambodia,5 2 8 Cameroon,s 29 Canada,5 30 Cape Verde,5 3 1 Cen-

tral African Republic, 5 32 Chad, 533 Chile, 534 China, 53 5 Colombia, 536
Comoros, 537 (Democratic Republic of) Congo, 538 (Republic of) Congo
or Congo-Brazzaville, 539 Costa Rica, 540 C6te d'Ivoire, 541 Croatia, 542
Cuba, 54 3 Cyprus, 54 4 Czech Republic, 54 5 Denmark, 54 6 Djibouti, 54 7 Dom55 2
inica, 54 8 Dominican Republic, 549 Ecuador,5 5 0 Egypt, 551 El Salvador,
553
554
5
5
5
556
557
Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea,
Estonia,
Ethiopia,
Fiji,
Finland, 558 France, 559 Gabon, 560 The Gambia, 56 1 Georgia,s6 2 Germany, 563

Ghana, 564 Greece, 565 Grenada, 566 Guatemala, 567 Guinea
Bissau,

569

Guyana, 5 70

Haiti,57 1

568

Guinea-

Honduras,5 72 Hungary, 73 Iceland,5 74 In-

dia, 57 5 Indonesia, 576 Iran 5 77 Iraq 57 8 Ireland, 579 Israel,5 80 Italy, 581 Jamaica,5 8 2 Japan, 5 83 Jordan, 584 Kazakhstan, 58 5 Kenya, 5 86 Kiribati, 58 7

(Democratic People's Republic of) Korea, 588 (Republic of) Korea, 58 9
Kosovo, 590 Kuwait, 591 Kyrgyzstan,5 92 Lao (People's Democratic Republic), 593 Latvia, 594 Lebanon, 59 5 Lesotho, 596 Liberia, 597 Libya, 598
Liechtenstein, 59 9 Lithuania, 60 0 Luxembourg, 60 1 Madagascar, 60 2
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Malawi, 60 3 Malaysia, 60 4 Maldives,6 0 5 Mali,6 06 Malta, 60 7 Marshall Islands,60 8 Mauritania, 60 9 Mauritius, 610 Mexico, 611 Micronesia, 612 Mol-

dova, 6 13 Monaco, 614 Mongolia, 615 Montenegro, 6 16 Morocco, 6 17
Mozambique, 6 18 Myanmar, 619 Namibia, 620 Nauru, 621 Nepal, 622 Netherlands, 623 New Zealand, 62 4 Nicaragua, 625 Niger, 626 Nigeria, 62 7 North
Macedonia, 62 8 Norway, 629 Oman, 630 Pakistan, 63 1 Palau, 632 Panama, 633

Papua New Guinea, 6 34 Paraguay, 635 Peru, 636 Philippines, 637 Poland, 638
Portugal, 63 9 Qatar, 640 Romania, 64 1 Russian Federation, 6 42 Rwanda, 643
Saint Kitts and Nevis, 644 Saint Lucia, 645 Saint Vincent and the Grena-

dines,64 6 Samoa,64 7 San Marino,6 4 8 Sio Tome and Principe,6 49 Saudi
Arabia,65 0 Senegal, 6 51 Serbia, 6 2 Seychelles, 65 3 Sierra Leone, 65 4 Singapore, 65 5 Slovakia, 65 6 Slovenia, 6 57 Solomon Islands, 658 Somalia, 659
South Africa, 660 South Sudan, 66 1 Spain, 662 Sri Lanka, 663 Sudan, 664 Suriname,66s Swaziland, 6 66 Sweden, 667 Switzerland, 668 Syria, 669 Taiwan, 670

Tajikistan, 67 1

Tanzania ,672

Thailand, 67 3

Timor-Leste, 674

Togo, 675 Tonga,676 Trinidad and Tobago, 677 Tunisia, 678 Turkey, 679
Turkmenistan, 6 80 Tuvalu, 681 Uganda, 682 Ukraine, 683 United Arab Emirates, 6 84 United Kingdom, 685 United States, 6 86 Uruguay, 6 87 Uzbekistan, 688 Vanuatu, 689 Vatican City, 690 Venezuela, 691 Vietnam, 692
Yemen, 69 3 Zambia, 69 4 and Zimbabwe. 69 5
C. Impartialand IndependentDecisionmaker

Finally, notice and an opportunity to be heard could be rendered meaningless absent the right to an impartial and independent decisionmaker, which 196 states guarantee, including: Afghanistan, 696
Albania, 697 Algeria, 698 Andorra, 699 Angola, 700 Antigua and Barbuda, 70 1
Argentina, 70 2 Armenia, 70 3 Australia, 70 4 Austria, 705 Azerbaijan, 706 Ba-

hamas, 7 07 Bahrain, 7 08 Bangladesh, 7 09 Barbados, 7 10 Belarus, 71 1 Belgium, 71 2 Belize, 71 3 Benin, 71 4 Bhutan,7 15 Bolivia, 7 16 Bosnia and Herzegovina,717 Botswana,7 18 Brazil, 7 19 Brunei Darussalam, 720 Bulgaria, 72 1

Burkina Faso, 72 2 Burundi, 723 Cambodia, 724 Cameroon, 725 Canada, 726
Cape Verde, 72 7 Central African Republic, 7 2 8 Chad, 72 9 Chile, 73 0
China, 73 1 Colombia, 732 Comoros, 733 (Democratic Republic of)
Congo, 734 (Republic of) Congo or Congo-Brazzaville, 735 Costa
Rica, 73 6 C6te d'Ivoire, 7 37 Croatia, 73 8 Cuba, 73 9 Cyprus, 740 Czech Republic,7 41 Denmark, 7 42 Djibouti, 743 Dominica, 744 Dominican Republic, 745
7 0
Ecuador, 746 Egypt, 747 El Salvador, 748 Equatorial Guinea, 749 Eritrea,

Estonia,7 51 Ethiopia, 75 2 Fiji, 753 Finland, 754 France, 755 Gabon, 7 56 The
Gambia, 757 Georgia, 758 Germany, 7 59 Ghana, 760 Greece, 7 61 Grenada, 762
Guatemala, 7 63 Guinea, 7 64 Guinea-Bissau, 765 Guyana, 7 66 Haiti, 767 Honduras, 768 Hungary,7 69 Iceland, 770 India, 77 1 Indonesia, 77 2 Iran, 773 Iraq, 774
Ireland, 775 Israel, 776 Italy, 777 Jamaica, 77 8 Japan 7 79 Jordan, 780 Kazakh-

stan, 7 8 1 Kenya, 78 2 Kiribati, 7 83 (Democratic People's Republic of)
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Korea, 78 4 (Republic of) Korea, 78 5 Kosovo, 7 86 Kuwait, 787 Kyrgyzstan, 788 Lao (People's Democratic Republic), 789 Latvia 790 Lebanon, 79 1
Lesotho, 7 92 Liberia, 793 Libya, 794 Liechtenstein, 795 Lithuania,796 Luxembourg, 797 Madagascar, 798 Malawi, 799 Malaysia,8 00 Maldives,s0
Mali,802 Malta,80 3 Marshall Islands, 804 Mauritania,80 5 Mauritius,8 0 6
Mexico, 8 07 Micronesia,8 0 8 Moldova, 80 9 Monaco, 810 Mongolia, 8 11 Montenegro, 812 Morocco, 813 Mozambique, 8 14 Myanmar, 8 15 Namibia, 816 Na-

uru, 817 Nepal, 818 Netherlands, 819 New Zealand, 820 Nicaragua, 82 1 Niger, 822 Nigeria, 823 North Macedonia, 824 Norway, 825 Oman, 826
Pakistan, 827 Palau, 828 Panama, 829 Papua New Guinea, 83 0 Paraguay, 83 1

Peru, 83 2 Philippines, 833 Poland, 83 4 Portugal, 83 5 Qatar, 83 6 Romania, 83 7
Russian Federation,8 3 8 Rwanda, 839 Saint Kitts and Nevis, 840 Saint Lu-

cia, 841 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,8 42 Samoa,84 3 San Marino,84 4
Sao Tome and Principe, 84 5 Saudi Arabia 84 6 , Senegal, 847 Serbia, 84 8 Seychelles, 84 9 Sierra Leone,85 0 Singapore, 85 1 Slovakia, 8 52 Slovenia, 853 Solomon Islands, 854 Somalia8 55, South Africa, 856 South Sudan, 857 Spain,8 58
Sri Lanka, 859 Sudan, 860 Suriname, 861 Swaziland, 862 Sweden, 863 Switzerland, 864 Syria, 865 Taiwan, 866 Tajikistan, 867 Tanzania, 868 Thailand, 869

Timor-Leste, 870 Togo, 87 1 Tonga, 872 Trinidad and Tobago, 873 Tunisia, 874 Turkey, 875 Turkmenistan, 876 Tuvalu, 877 Uganda, 87 8 Ukraine, 879
United Arab Emirates, 880 United Kingdom, 881 United States, 8 8 2 Uruguay, 883 Uzbekistan, 884

Vanuatu, 885 Vatican City, 886 Venezuela, 887 Vi-

Zambia, 890 and Zimbabwe. 891
Such an overwhelming majority of states agreeing upon the
same due process protections elevates those protections to the status of
jus cogens within the ILC view 8 92 and explains the studied criterion
that for the formation of jus cogens, it is sufficient for "a very large
majority of states" to accept the norm, 893 and that it be accepted "across
regions, legal systems and cultures.1"894
etnam, 88 8 Yemen, 889

CONCLUSION

The existence of procedural jus cogens is a novel development
in international law. This Article is the first to identify that norm by
employing general principles of international law common to legal
systems around the world. To do so, the Article looked to most if not
all state constitutions and municipal legal systems to discern the basics

892.

See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.

893.

ILC Report, supra note 1, at 167, concl. 7 cmt. (5).

894.

dat 168, cmt.(6).
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of a fair trial: notice, a hearing, and an impartial and independent decisionmaker.
The first-order question of the existence of a procedural jus cogens norm raises a number of second-order questions that now must
be answered.
For instance, what about emergencies 895 or war896 presaged by
Hamdi and Boumediene? Do procedural jus cogens survive such situations? Some constitutions deem procedural rights non-derogable in
emergencies 97 while others do not.898 Yet individual rights can still
be jus cogens under the VCLT, even if they are considered formally
derogable in times of emergency. In this respect, the language of the
VCLT requiring that the norm be non-derogable has taken on an overly
formalistic, acontextual reading. As Alexander Orakhelashvili has explained, the VCLT deals with bilateral treaties, which cannot contract
out of peremptory international law "by attempt[ting] to replace public
order norms, to make them inapplicable and inoperative inter se, themselves deciding when and how to derogate." 899 It does not deal with
895. Criddle and Fox-Decent have specifically argued that the most basic procedural jus
cogens survive states of emergency under a fiduciary duty. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra
note 4 at 370-71; Evan Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Human Rights, Emergencies, and the
Rule of Law, 34 HUM. RTs. Q. 39, 67 (2012).
896. The right to a fair trial is also guaranteed during times of war. Common Article 3 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Additional Protocol I (which is generally considered to have passed
into customary law) covers those not covered by Common Article 3. See Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also ICTR,
supra note 287, art. 20, ¶¶ 1-4; PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS 466 (2013).
897. See e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, Sept. 22, 1995, art. 44. Article
44 sets out prohibitions on derogations of certain rights which includes the protections granted
by the right to a fair hearing. Id, see also supra note 682 and accompanying text.
898. See e.g., K'IWAMI ERITIRA, art. 26(3). Article 26 excludes the right to notice and the
right to a fair hearing from express protection against derogation. Id, see also supra note 554
and accompanying text.
899. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 59. One may conceptualize this as a limitation on
party autonomy in choice of law. While parties are generally free to contract for the chosen
law, there are certain "'overriding' mandatory rules that invalidate the choice of the parties.
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL: CASES AND MATERIALS 463 n.44 (4th ed. 2019). "Because

of the importance of the interests they embody, these rules displace, override, or preempt the
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emergencies under rights instruments. 900 Rather, "[i]n clarifying
whether a formally 'derogable' right can still be part ofjus cogens the
relevant criterion would be the content of specific rights and their status under general international law, namely their embodiment of the
community interest as distinct from individual State interests"-such
"derogable" yet peremptory rights explicitly include the right to a "fair
trial and due process." 90 1 He both ties these rights to treaties and domesticates them by deeming their deprivation "non-bilateralizable." 90 2
Indeed, just because a right is derogable under a rights instrument does
not mean it is not peremptory. Here he cites the UN Human Rights
Committee, which explained:
The enumeration of non-derogable provisions in article
4 [ICCPR] is related to, but not identical with, the question whether certain human rights obligations bear the
nature of peremptory norms of international law ....
[T]he category of peremptory norms extends beyond
the list of non-derogable provisions as given in article
4, paragraph 2 [ICCPR]. States-parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of . .. peremptory norms
of international law, for instance . .. by deviating from
fundamental principles of fair trial. 903

ordinary choice of law process: they apply immediately (immediatament), directly, and mandatorily." Id at 259. Jus cogens can be viewed as the ultimate mandatory rule.
900. ORAKHELASHVILI, supranote 4, at 58; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact ofPeremptory Norms on the InterpretationandApplicationof UnitedNations Security Council Resolutions, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 59, 65 (2005).
901.

ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 58.

902. Id at 59.
903. Id at 59. There are human rights sources holding that fair trial guarantees survive
emergency situations. Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR General Comment 29, States of Emergency:
Article 4:
Derogation During a State of Emergency,
¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. 1/Add. 11(2001) ("[T]he Committee finds no justification for derogation
from [fair trial] guarantees during ... emergency situations. The Committee is of the opinion
that the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair
trial must be respected during a state of emergency. Only a court of law may try and convict
a person for a criminal offence. The presumption of innocence must be respected. In order to
protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court
to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State
party's decision to derogate from the Covenant."); Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency
(Arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 American Convention of Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶ 29 (Oct. 6, 1987) ("The concept of due process of law
expressed in Article 8 of the Convention should be understood as applicable, in the main, to
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Orakhelashvili concludes, "[t]herefore, certain 'derogable'
rights can be peremptory. This is clear with regard to due process
guarantees and the right to a fair trial, as well as the freedom from
illegal deprivation of liberty." 904
Next, does such a norm, which places a positive obligation on
states, stand in contrast to other, substantive jus cogens, which merely
prohibit states from doing things? In other words, other jus cogens
norms are just instructions to states not to do things: no slavery, no
torture, no crimes against humanity, etc. But a procedural jus cogens
puts the burden on the state to take affirmative action to ensure that the
norm is not violated. A follow up question is: Can jus cogens norms
be waived? Criminal defendants accept plea bargains all the time;
what is to stop them from waiving the procedural jus cogens to a fair
trial? Further, what effect do procedural jus cogens have on international institutions? In the famous Kadi cases, for example, the European Court of Justice held that the deprivation of Kadi's right to notice
and a hearing violated a fundamental freedom of the European Union
in the face of United Nations Security Council resolutions.9 0 5

all the judicial guarantees referred to in the American Convention, even during a suspension
governed by Article 27 of the Convention.").
904.

ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 4, at 60 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

905.

Joined Cases Nos. C-402/05 P & C-415/04 P, Kadi v. Council and Comm'n, 2008

E.C.R. I-06351,

¶¶ 326-28.

[I]n the light of the actual circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the appellants' names in the list of persons and entities covered by the restrictive measures
contained in Annex I to the contested regulation, it must be held that the rights
of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review of those rights, were patently not respected.

Id. ¶ 334.
Because the Council neither communicated to the appellants the evidence used
against them to justify the restrictive measures imposed on them nor afforded
them the right to be informed of that evidence within a reasonable period after
those measures were enacted, the appellants were not in a position to make their
point of view in that respect known to their advantage. Therefore, the appellant's
rights of defence, in particular the right to be heard, were not respected.

Id. ¶ 348. Joined Cases Nos. C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, & C-595/10 P, Comm'n v. Kadi (Kadi
II), ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, ¶67 (July 18, 2013) ("[T]he requirement that the European Union
institutions should pay due regard to the institutions of the United Nations must not result in
there being no review of the lawfulness of [Security Council] measures, in the light of ...
fundamental rights"); id. ¶ 97 ("[T]he Courts of the European Union must ... ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Union acts in the light of. .. fundamental rights . . . including review of such measures as are designed to give effect to resolutions adopted by the Security Council"); id. ¶¶ 98-99 ("[T]he right[] of defence . . . includes
the right to be heard and the right to have access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in
maintaining confidentiality.").
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Moreover, what are the precise contours of a procedural jus cogens
right to a fair hearing? All this Article has shown is that there is a
minimum, but there is great variation among procedures in countries
around the world.
And finally, what about questions of how procedural jus cogens interact with U.S. domestic law? The United States has opened
itself to claims alleging violations of procedural jus cogens through
statutes like the Alien Tort Statute, 90 6 allowing aliens to sue for violations of the law of nations, 907 as well as through "a federal common
law right [against the U.S. government] derived from international law
that entitles individuals not to be the victims of jus cogens violations." 90 8 What would be the chance of such cases moving forward in
light of recent decisions stripping foreign conduct-based immunity for
jus cogens violations 90 9 and U.S. sovereign immunity for jus cogens
violations, 9 10 and holding thatjus cogens override the Act of State doctrine?9 11 These and other questions must await future scholarship for
which this Article has hopefully set the stage.

[T]he right to effective judicial protection ... requires that the person concerned
must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation
to him is based .. . so as to make it possible for him to defend his rights in the
best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts,
whether there is any point in his applying to the court having jurisdiction, and in
order to put the latter fully in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision
in question.
Id ¶¶ 98-100; see also id ¶¶ 25, 88 (describing the "fundamental right[]" of "independent
and impartial review, including review of European Union measures based on international

law"); id
906.

¶¶ 111-14, 118, 125, 135.
§ 1350.

28 U.S.C.

907. See id. ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.").

908.

Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 3d 935, 959 (E.D. Va. 2019),

appeal dismissed, 775 F. App'x 758, 759-60 (4th Cir. 2019), petition for cert.filed, No. 19-

648 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019).
909.

See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 775-77 (4th Cir. 2012).

910. Al Shimari, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 968 ("[T]he United States does not retain sovereign
immunity for violations ofjus cogens norms of international law.").

911. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1992);
Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 61-62 (2d Cir. 2019).
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I

310. QANUN-I ASASI-I AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 26, 2004, art. 31. Afghanistan
has also acceded to the ICCPR. The State "observe[s] ...
international treaties to which
Afghanistan has joined." Id art. 7. See ICCPR, supra note 222, art. 14, ¶ 3(a); Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en_[https://perma.cc/6ABX-KAXP] (listing
countries that have acceded to the ICCPR).
311.

KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKES SE SHQIPERISE [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 28, 1998, art. 28(1),

31(a) (Alb.). Albania has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified international agreements
that "constitute[ ] part of the internal juridical system." Id art. 122, ¶ 1. See Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; see also KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKES SE SHQIPERISE Nov. 28, 1998,
arts. 5, 116(1)(b); Hum. Rts. Comm, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Albania, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ALB/2 (2011) (noting that ICCPR accession was implemented through
Law No. 7510).
.

312. Algeria has ratified the ICCPR and its constitution provides that "treaties ratified .
are superior to the law." DUSTUR ALJAZAYIR [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 23, 1989, art. 150 (Alg.).
See Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
313.

CONSTITUCI6 DEL PRINCIPAT D'ANDORRA [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 28, 1993, art. 10(2)

(Andorra). Andorra has also ratified the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Id arts. 5(2), 6(3)(a); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures
and Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?pauth=yH8iALrv [https://perma.cc/N4FN-XLKM]. "Treaties and international agreements take effect in the legal system from the moment of their publication in the Official
Gazette." CONSTITUCI6 DEL PRINCIPAT D'ANDORRA Apr. 28, 1993, art. 3(4).

314. Angola has acceded to the ICCPR, and "[r]atified international treaties ... come into
force in the Angolan legal system after they have been officially published." CONSTITUI AO
DE ANGOLA [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 21, 2010, art. 13. See Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote

310.
315. CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Nov. 1, 1981, arts. 5(2), 15(2)(b). Antigua and Barbuda has acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions
explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
316. Hum Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: Addendum: Argentina, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/add.l (1994) (citing C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL
DE LA NACI6N [COD. PROC. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE], art. 298). The Argentinian
constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR, CONSTITUTION NACIONAL Aug. 22, 1994,
art. 75(22) (Arg.), and the American Convention on Human Rights, AMCHR, supra note 269,
art. 7(4). See also CONSTITUTION NACIONAL Aug. 22, 1994, art. 31 (Arg.) (stating that treaties
are part of the supreme law). Argentina is a party to both conventions. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human
Rights, ORG. OF AM. STATES, https://www.oas.org/dil/treatiesB-32_AmericanConvention_on_HumanRightssign.htm [perma.cc/7RPE-9WX3].
317.

HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYAN SAHMANADRUTYUN [CONSTITUTION]

July 5, 1995,

arts. 27(2), 67(1) (Arm.). Armenia has also acceded to the ICCPR and "[t]he practice ofbodies
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operating on the basis of international human rights treaties . .. ratified by the Republic of
Armenia, shall be taken into account when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution on
fundamental rights and freedoms." Id. art. 81(1). See Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote

310.
318. Human Rights Act 2019 (Cth) ss 29(4), 32(2)(a) (Austl.). Australia ratified the
ICCPR and notes that ICCPR's application influences domestic law without having to incorporate it through legislation or a constitutional provision. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 2013: Australia, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/6 (2016);
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
319.

BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ OBER DEN SCHUTZ DER PERSONLICHEN FREIHEIT [THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ACT ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY] No. 684/1988, as

amended, art. 4(6), https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000950 (Austria); Hum. Rts. Comm, Fifth Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2012: Austria, ¶ 101, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUT/5 (2013), (citing
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] No. 60/1974, as amended, § 171,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002296); Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic Report: Austria, ¶ 126, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/AUT/4 (2006) (citing STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO][CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE] No. 631/1975, as amended, ¶ 178, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002326). Austria has ratified the
ICCPR and its constitution provides that "universally acknowledged rules of international law
are valid constituent parts of the laws of the Confederation." BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ
[B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, as last amended by BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ

[BVG] BGBL I No. 102/2014, art. 9, ¶ 1, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Geltendefassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer-1 0000138 (Austria); see Status of Treaties:ICCPR,
supra note 310.
320.

AZERBAYCAN RESPUBLIKASININ KONSTITUSIYASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 12, 1995, art.

67, § I (Azer.). Azerbaijan has also acceded to the ICCPR and its constitution provides that
"international treaties, to which the Republic of Azerbaijan is a party, are an inalienable substantive part of the legal system." Id. at 148, § II. See Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote
310.
321. CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS July 10, 1973, arts. 19(2),
20(2)(b). The Bahamas has also ratified the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. See Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

.

322. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Bahrain, ¶ 40,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BHR/1 (2017). Bahrain has also acceded to the ICCPR and its constitution provides that "a treaty shall have the force of law once it has been concluded and ratified
and published in the Official Gazette." DUSTUR MAMLAKAT AL-BAHRAYN [CONSTITUTION]
July 10, 1973, art. 37 (Bahr.). See Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
323.

GANAPRAJATANTRI BANLADE$ERA SAMBIDHANA [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 4, 1972, art.

33(1), (5) (Bangl.). Bangladesh has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310. Cf Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due
in 2001: Bangladesh, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BGD/1 (2015) (indicating that Bangladesh does
not automatically incorporate international treaties).
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324. CONSTITUTION OF BARBADOS Nov. 22, 1966, arts. 13(2), 18(2)(b). Barbados has also
acceded to the ICCPR and the AMCHR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignatoriesandRatifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supranote 316.
325. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1993: Addendum:
Belarus, ¶¶ 64, 67, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/Add.4 (1996) (citing OFFICE OF THE PROCURATOR
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS ACT Jan 29, 1993). Belarus has also ratified the ICCPR and
"recognize[s] the supremacy of universally acknowledged principles of international law and
ensures its laws comply."

KANSTYTUCYJA RESPUBLIKI BIELARU$ [CONSTITUTION] May 9,

1994, art. 8. See Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
326. Belgium has ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR and "treaties take effect only after
they have received approval of the House of Representatives." 1994 CONST. (Belg.) art. 167,
§ 2; see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications ofEuropean
Convention on Human Rights, supranote 313.
327. CONSTITUTION OF BELIZE Sept. 21, 1981, arts. 5(2)(a), 6(3)(b). Belize has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of
international treaties on its legal system. See Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
328. Benin references common law cases as evidence of the right to notice in its legal
system. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Benin, ¶ 67(a), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BEN/2004/1/Add. 1 (2004). Benin has also acceded to the ICCPR and "treaties ... regularly ratified have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws." CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU BtNIN
Dec. 11, 1990, art. 147. See Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
329. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art. 23(V) (Bol.). Bolivia has
also acceded to the ICCPR and the ACHR, and "international treaties and conventions ratified... which recognize human rights... prevail over internal law." Id at 13(IV); see Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 316; see also CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009,
art. 256(I)-(II).
330. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA arts. 4(1), 6(1). Bosnia
and Herzegovina is also a party to the ICCPR through succession and has ratified the ECHR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatificationsof EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313. The Boznia and Herzegovinian constitution incorporates and prioritizes the ECHR over all other law and incorporates the ICCPR by reference.
USTAV BOSNE I HERTCEGOVINE [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 14, 1995, art. 2(2), ann. I ¶ 7; see also
id at 4(3)(b) (stating that "general principles of international law shall be an integral part of
the law").

331. CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966, arts. 5(2), 10(2)(b), 16(2)(a). Botswana has also ratified the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining
the effect of international treaties on its legal system. See Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra
note 310.
332. Brazil has acceded to the ICCPR and the ACHR, and "treaties and conventions on
human rights ... [are] equivalent to Constitutional Amendments." CONSTITUI AO FEDERAL
[C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 5, §30 (Braz.); see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310;
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Signatories andRatifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supranote 316; see
also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993: Addendum: Brazil, §
11(16), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.6 (1995) (stating that the ICCPR came into force and then
was promulgated by Decree No. 592); id. at 3 (treaties protecting human rights are self-executing).
333.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Report of States Parties: Bulgaria, ¶ 255, U.N.

Doc. CCPR/C/BGR/3 (2009) (citing RULES ON APPLICATION OF THE LAW ON MINISTRY OF

INTERIOR, art. 63). Bulgaria has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR, and its constitution
provides that "[a]ny international treaty, which has been ratified... promulgated... [and] entered into force... shall be part of the domestic law of the land." KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA
BALGARIA [CONSTITUTION] July 13, 1991, art. 5(4); see Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supranote
310; Signatures andRatificationsof EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
334. Burkina Faso acceded to the ICCPR and "treaties and agreements regularly ratified
... have, on their publication, an authority superior to its laws." CONSTITUTION DU BURKINA
FASO June 2, 1991, art. 151. See Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
335. Burundi acceded to the ICCPR and "[t]he rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed by the international texts related to the rights of man regularly ratified are [an] integral
part of the Constitution." CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI June 7, 2018, art. 19;
see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
336.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF [THE] KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA Aug. 6, 2007, art. 238.

See RODTHATHOMMONOUNHNH NEI PREAHREACHEANEACHAKR KAMPOUCHEA [CONSTITUTION]

Sept. 21, 1993, art. 38(8) (Cambodia); Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due

in 1993: Addendum: Cambodia, ¶ 134, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.12 (1998) (Stating that the
right to defense provision includes right to be informed of accusation). Cambodia also acceded to the ICCPR and "recognizes and respects human rights as enshrined in...all the treaRODTHATHOMMONOUNHNH NEI
ties and conventions related to human rights."
PREAHREACHEANEACHAKR KAMPOUCHEA Sept. 21, 1993, art. 31; see Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
337. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Cameroon, ¶¶ 417423, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CMR/4 (2009) (citing CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (CAMEROON), §§
31, 39-41, 56-57, 167, 410). Cameroon also acceded to the ICCPR and "ratified treaties and
international agreements shall, following their publication, override national laws."
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN [ June 2, 1972, art. 45; see Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
338. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.), arts.
10(a), 11(a). Canada has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional
provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
339. CONSTITUI AO DA REPUBLICA DA CABO VERDE [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 28, 1992, art.
28(3), 29(1) (Cape Verde). Cape Verde has also acceded to the ICCPR and "international
treaties and agreements, validly approved or ratified, shall be in force in the Capeverdean legal
order after their official publication." Id. at 11(2); see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note
310; see also CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA DA CABO VERDE Sept. 28, 1992, art. 11(1), (4);
Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report Submitted by Cabo Verde Under Article 40 of the Covenant,

Due in 1994, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CPV/1 (2018) (ICCPR published through Law
75/IV/92).
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340.

Central African Republic acceded to the ICCPR, and "[r]eaffirms its adherence to
Conventions duly ratified."
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE
CENTRAFRICAINE [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 27, 2016, pmbl.; see Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra
note 310.
all

International

341. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Chad, ¶ 360, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/TCD/2 (2013) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, art. 239). Chad has also
acceded to the ICCPR and its constitution provides that "the Treaties and Agreements regularly ratified have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the national laws."
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Mar. 31, 1996, art. 225; see Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
342. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fifth Periodic Report: Chile, ¶¶ 154-55, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/CHL/5 (2006) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, arts. 93-94). Chile has also
ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR, and "it is the duty of the organs of the State to respect and
promote [essential] rights guaranteed . . . by the international treaties ratified by Chile."
CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] Oct. 21, 1980, as amended, art. 5;
see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic

Reports of States Parties Due in 1994: Addendum: Chile,¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/Add.11
(1998) (ICCPR promulgated through Decree No. 778 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

1976 and published and given full force of law in 1989).
343. Colombia ratified the ICCPR and "international treaties...ratified by the Congress
that recognize human rights ... have prevalence in the internal order." CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA
DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] July 4, 1991, arts. 93-94; see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
344.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Feb. 18, 2006, art. 18.

Democratic Republic of the Congo has also acceded to the ICCPR and "international treaties...have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws." Id at 215; see Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
345. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO Nov. 6, 2015, art. 11. Republic of the
Congo has also acceded to the ICCPR and "treaties... have, from their publication, an authority
superior to that of the laws." Id at 223; see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
346. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1995: Addendum: Cost Rica, ¶ 235, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/103/Add.6 (1998) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE art. 278, 373). Costa Rica has also ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR, and its
constitution provides that "public treaties... international agreements... duly approved by the
Legislative Assembly, will have from their promulgation... authority superior to that of the
laws." CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COSTA RICA Nov. 7, 1949, art. 7; see Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 316.
347. CONSTITUTION IVOIRIENNE Nov. 8, 2017, art. 7 (C6te d'Ivoire). C6te d'Ivoire has
also acceded to the ICCPR and its constitution provides that"[t]he Treaties and Agreements
regularly ratified have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws." Id at
123; see Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
348. USTAV REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 22, 1990, arts. 24, 29 (Croat.).
Croatia is also party to the ICCPR through succession and ratified the ECHR, and "[i]nternational treaties which have been concluded and ratified ... published and ... entered into force
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shall be a component of the domestic legal order . . . and shall have primacy over domestic
law." Id. at 134; see Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
349.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA Apr. 10, 2019, art. 95(f) (Cuba).

350.

SVNTAGMA TIS KYPRIAKS DIMOKRATIAS [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 16, 1960, arts. 11(4),

12(5)(a), 30(3)(a) (Cyprus). Cyprus has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR, and its constitution provides that "treaties, conventions and agreements... shall have, as from their publication... superior force to any municipal law." Id at 169(3); see Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; Signatures andRaticationsofEuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra
note 313 see also SVNTAGMA TIS KYPRIAKS DIMOKRATIAS Aug. 16, 1960, art. 169(2).
351.

LISTINA ZAKLADNICH PRAV A SVOBOD [CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND

BASIC FREEDOMS] art. 8(3) (Czech). See generally USTAVN ZAKON C

1/1993

SB., USTAVA

CESKE REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC] art. 3 (stating that the Charter of

Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms forms part of the constitutional order). Czech Republic is also party to the ICCPR through succession and has ratified the ECHR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 313. Its constitution provides that "[p]romulgated treaties, to the
ratification of which Parliament has given its consent . . . form a part of the legal order."
USTAVN ZAKON C 1/1993 SB., USTAVA CESKE REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECH
REPUBLIC] art. 10; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report of the Czwch Republic on the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for the Period
1993-1999, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/2000/1 (2000) (ICCPR took effect in in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1976. The Czech Republic succeed into the obligations arising
from the ICCPR in 1993).
352. CONSTITUTIONAL ACT OF DENMARK June 5, 1953, § 71(3). Denmark has also ratified
the ICCPR and the ECHR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect
of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications of EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supranote 313.
353. Djibouti has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310. Its
constitution provides that "treaties or agreements regularly ratified have, on their publication,
an authority superior to that of the laws." CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI Sept.
15, 1992, art. 70;
354.

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA Nov. 3, 1978,

§§

3(2), 8(2)(b).

Dominica has also acceded to the ICCPR and the ACHR but does not have any constitutional
provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 316.
355. Dominican Republic acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ACHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; SignatoriesandRatifcationsofAmerican Convention on Human
Rights, supranote 316. Its constitution provides that "[t]he norms in force of ratified international agreements will govern within the domestic sphere." CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA
DOMINICANA June 13, 2015, art. 26(2). See also Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of
States parties Due in 1991: Dominican Republic, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/C70/Add.3 (1992)
(ICCPR ratified through decision No. 684 and published in Gaceta Oficial No. 9,451).
356. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 77(3), 77(7)(a).
The Ecuadorean constitution provides that "international human rights treaties ratified by the
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State that recognize rights that are more favorable than those enshrined in the Constitution
shall prevail over any other legal regulatory system." Id. arts. 424-25. Ecuador has also
ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories
andRatifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316; see also Hum.
Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977: Addendum: Ecuador 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/l/Add.8 (1977) (ICCPR ratified by Executive Decree No. 37).
357.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 54. The consti-

tution provides that the country "[is] bound by the international human rights agreements,
covenants and conventions ratified by Egypt, and which shall have the force of law after publication." Id. art. 93 Egypt has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra
note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., The Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of
Egypt Submitted to the Human Rights Committee 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/EGY/2001/3 (2001)
(accession to ICCPR pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537 of 1981 and subsequently pub-

lished).
358. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR Dec. 20, 1983, arts. 12, 13. El
Salvador's constitution provides that "international treaties foramlized by El Salvador... constitute laws of the Republic once they enter into effect." Id. art. 144. El Salvador has also
ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories
andRatifications ofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316.
359. CONSTITUCI6N DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 26, 2012, art. 13(1)(n)
(Eq. Guinea). Equatorial Guine's constitution provides that the country "respects the principles of International Law and reaffirms its adherence to the rights and obligations that emanate
from the International Organizations and Organs to which it has adhered." Id art. 8. Equatorial Guinea has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.

360. K'IwAMI ERITIRA [CONSTITUTION] May 23, 1997, art. 17(3) (Eri.). Eritrea has also
acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of
international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
361. EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS [CONSTITUTION] July 3, 1992, art. 21 (Est.). Estonia's
constitution provides that "generally recognized principles and rules of international law are
an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system." Id. art. 3. Estonia has also acceded to the
ICCPR and ratified the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and
Ratifications of EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
362.

YE'ITIYOP'IYA

FEDERALAWI

DIMOKIRASIYAWI

RIPEBILIKI

HIGE

MENIGISITI

[CONSTITUTION] Aug. 21, 1995, arts. 19- 20 (Eth.). The constitution provides that "[a]ll international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land." Id. art.
9(4). Ethiopia has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
363. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI Sept. 6, 2013, art. 13(1)(a)(i), (g). The constitution provides that "[a]n international treaty or convention binds the State only after it has
been approved by Parliament." Id. art. 51. Fiji has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
364. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977: Addendum:
Finland 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.32 (1978) (Finland acknowledging notice in practice but
no citation to municipal law or constitutional provision); id art. 1 (ratification and enforcement of the Covenant in state by Decree No. 108 of 30 January 1976). Finland has also ratified
the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications ofEuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313. The Finnish constitution

2022]

PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

453

provides that "provisions of treaties and other international obligations...are brought into force
by an Act." SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [CONSTITUTION] June 11, 1999, § 95 (Fin.).
365. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: Addendum: France, ¶ 115, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.7 (1997) (citing Code de Procedure
Penale [C. pr. pen.] [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 123(Fr.)). France has also acceded to the
ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313. The constitution provides
that "[t]reaties and agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over
Acts of Parliament." 1958 CONST., pmbl. (Fr.); Cf Int'l Hum. Rts. Instruments, Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: France, ¶ 93, U.N. Doc.
HRI/CORE/1/Add.17/Rev.1 (1996) (providing that international human rights treaties are
self-executing).
366. Gabon has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310. The
constitution provides that "treaties take effect only after having been ratified and published."
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE GABONAISE [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 3, 1991, art. 114 (Gabon).
367.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA

Jan.

16, 1997,

arts

19(2),

24(3)(b). The constitution provides that "[t]he State... shall be guided by international human
rights instruments to which The Gambia is a signatory and which recognize and apply particular basic human rights to development processes." Id. at 216(3). The Gambia has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
368. SAKARTVELOS K'ONSTITUTSIA [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 17, 1995, art. 13(4) (Geor.).
The constitution provides that "[t]he legislation of Georgia shall comply with the universally
recognized principles and norms of international law. An international treaty shall take precedence over domestic normative acts unless it comes into conflict with the Constitution." Id.
art. 4(5). Georgia has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on Human
Rights, supranote 313; see also SAKARTVELOS K'ONSTITUTSIA Oct. 17, 1995, art. 4(2).

369. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch gg/index.html, art. 104(3) (Ger.). The constitution provides that "general
rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence
over the laws." Id. art. 25. Germany has also ratified the ICCPR and ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supranote 310; Signatures andRatfcationsofEuropean Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 313. See also Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties

Due in 1993: Addendum: Germany, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/Add.5 (1996) (implementing
Covenant indirectly under Unification Treaty in 1990); Int'l Hum. Rts. Instruments, Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: Germany, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc.
HRI/CORE/l/Add.75 (1996) (ICCPR has become an integral part of German law by ratification).
370. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA. Jan. 7, 1993, arts. 14(2), 19(2)(d).
Ghana has also ratified the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining
the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note
310. But see Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 2001: Ghana, ¶ 101,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GHA/l (2014) (Ghana stating domestication of ICCPR is Chapter 5 of
1992 Constitution).
371. 2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2 art. 6(1) (Greece). The constitution provides that "international conventions ... shall become an integral part of domestic Greek law."
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Id. art. 28. Greece has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 313; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report: Greece 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GRC/2004/1 (2004) (ratification of Covenant and its two Optional Protocols by vir-

tue of Law 2462/1997).
372. CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA Dec. 19, 1973, arts. 3(2), 8(2)(b). Grenada has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ACHR but does not have any constitutional provisions
explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignatoriesandRatifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supranote 316.
373.

CONSTITUCI6N POL TICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA Jan. 14, 1986, art. 7. The

constitution provides that "within the matter of human rights, the treaties and agreements approved and ratified by Guatemala, have preeminence over the internal law." Id. art. 46. Guatemala has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ACHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignatoriesandRatifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993: Addendum: Guatemala, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.7 (1995) (ICCPR entering into force by
Decree No. 9-92).
374. Hum. Rts. Comm., Thidr Periodic Report Submitted by Guinea Under Article 40 of
the Covenant, Due in 1994, ¶ 113, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GIN/3 (2017) (citing CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 90 (Guinea)). The constitution provides that "treaties or agreements regularly approved or ratified have, from their publication, a[n] authority superior to
that of the laws." CONSTITUTION DE LA GUINtE Apr. 19, 2010, art. 151 (Guinea). Guinea has
also ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
375.

CONSTITUIAO DA REPIBLICA DA GUINt-BISSAU [CONSTITUTION] May 16, 1984, art.

39(1) (Guinea-Bissau). Guinea-Bissau has also ratified the ICCPR, and "fundamental rights
consecrated by [its] Constitution shall not exclude any others foreseen by...the applicable
rules of international law." Id. art. 29; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
376.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA ACT

Oct.

6, 1980,

arts. 139(3), 144(2)(b). The constitution provides that "human rights enshrined in the said
international treaties... shall be respected and upheld by...all organs and agencies of Government." Id. art. 154A(1). Guyana has also ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
377. CONSTITUTION D'HAITI Mar. 10, 1987, art. 24.3(a)(b). The constitution provides that
"once international treaties or agreements are approved and ratified... they become part of the
legislation of the country." Id. art. 276.2. Haiti has also acceded to the ICCPR and the ACHR.
Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316.
378. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS Jan. 11, 1982, art. 84. Honduras has also ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR, and "[i]nternational treaties... form part of
the domestic law as soon as they enter into force." Id. art. 16; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra
note 310; SignatoriesandRatificationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supranote
316; see also CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS Jan. 11, 1982, art. 18.

379. Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977: Addendum: Hungary 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.l 1 (1977) (citing ACT ON PENAL PROCEDURE art. 132
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(Hung.)). Hungary has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignaturesandRaticationsofEuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra
note 313; see also MAGYARORSZAG ALAPTORVtNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY],

ALAPTORVtNY Jan. 1, 2012, art. Q(2) ("[E]nsure[s] that Hungarian law is in conformity with
international law"); Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977: Addendum: Hungary 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.l 1 (1977) (ICCPR entered into force Mar. 22,

1976).
380.

STJ6RNARSKRA LYDVELDISINS ISLANDS [CONSTITUTION] June 17, 1944, art. 67 (Ice.).

Iceland also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR but does not have any constitutional provisions
explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; Signatures andRaticationsofEuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra
note 313. But see Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Addendum:
Icleand, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/Add.2 (1995) (ECHR incorporated into Icelandic law by
Act No. 62/1944).
381. India Const. art. 22(1). The constitution provides that the country "endeavour[s] to
foster respect for international law and treaty obligations." Id art. 51(c). India has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
382. Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties: Indonesia, ¶ 210(c), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/IDN/l (2012) (citing CRIMINAL PROCEEDING CODE arts. 50-68 (Indon.)). Indonesia
also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the
effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
383.

ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO THE

CONSTITUTION] 1989 art. 32 (Iran). Iran has also ratified the ICCPR but does not have any
constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
384. Iraq "respects its international obligations." Article 8, DustarJumh. irtyat al- Iraq
[The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005. Iraq has also ratified the ICCPR. Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
385. See CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937 art. 38(1); Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of
States Parties Due in 1991, ¶ 123(i), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/Add.3 (1992) (holding right to
notice is an inherent requirement of article 38 in the Constitution); id ¶ 55 (citing Criminal
Justice Act (SI 119/1987). Ireland has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR, and an international agreement is part of the domestic law after being determined by the Oireachtas, its legislative body. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see Constitution of Ireland 1937 art.

29(6).
386.

§§ 24-25, Criminal Procedure Law, 5742-1982, LSI 36 40 (1981-82), as amended

(Isr.),
https://knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns 0_criminallaw eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW8P-TR8L]. Israel has also ratified the ICCPR but does not have any
constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
387. Art. 111 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.). The constitution provides that "international
treaties which involve...changes in the law become effective from the date of Parliament's
convocation." Id at Transitional and Final Provisions, pt. V. Italy has also ratified the ICCPR
and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also Art. 10 COSTITUZIONE
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[COST.] (It.) ("[L]egal system shall conform to generally recognized principles of international
law").
388. CONSTITUTION OF JAMAICA July 25, 1962, §§ 15(2), 16(6)(a). Jamaica also ratified
the ICCPR and the ACHR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect
of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatoriesand RatificationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316.
389. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 34, ¶ 1 (Japan). The constitution
provides that "treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations [are] faithfully observed." Id. at 98, ¶ 2. Japan has also ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra
note 310.
390.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: Addendum:

Jordan, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.l (1993) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE,

art.

116 (Jordan)). Jordan has also ratified the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
391.

The constitution provides that "[i]nternational treaties ratified by the Republic have

priority over its laws."

QAZAQSTAN RESPYBLIKASYNYN KONSTITYTSIIASY [CONSTITUTION]

Aug. 30, 1995, art. 4(3) (Kaz.).

ICCPR, supra note

310.

See

Kazakhstan has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:

generally QAZAQSTAN RESPYBLIKASYNYN KONSTITYTSIIASY

Aug. 30, 1995, art. 4(1).
392. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA Aug. 27, 2010, arts. 49(1)(a), 50(2)(b) . The constitution
provides that "[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law." Id art.
2(6). Kenya has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
393.

CONSTITUTION OF KIRIBATI, Jul. 12, 1979, arts. 5(2), 10(2)(b).

394. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2 (2000) (citing CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, art.
103 (N. Kor.)). North Korea has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
395. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 12 (S. Kor.). The constitution provides that "[t]reaties... and the generally recognized rules of international law shall
have the same effect as the domestic laws." Id art. 6(1). South Korea has also acceded to the
ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supranote 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports
of States Parties Due in 1991: Addendum: Republic of Korea, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/68/Add.1 (1991) (referencing constitutional article 6, paragraph 1 of the constitution
to show that separate domestic legislation is unnecessary for ICCPR to have force of law).

396.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KoSovo, Sept. 7,

1990, art. 29(2).

397. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report of States Parties: Kuwait, ¶ 139, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/KWT/2 (2009) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND TRIALS, art. 155
(Kuwait)). The constitution provides that a "treaty [has] the force of law after it is signed,
ratified, and published in the Official Gazette." AD-DISTOR AL-KUWAYTI [CONSTITUTION]
Nov. 11, 1962, art. 70. Kuwait has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report of States parties Due in 1997: Kuwait,¶¶ 28, 40, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/120/Add.1 (1999) (accession to ICCPR by virtue of Law
No. 12 of 1996 and confirmed publication in Official Gazette).
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398. KIRGIZ RESPUBLIKASININ KONSTITUTSIYASI [CONSTITUTION], June 27, 2010, art.
24(5) (Kyrg.). The constitution provides that "international treaties... and also universally recognized principles and norms of international law shall be a constituent part of the legal system." Id. art. 6(3). Kyrgyzstan has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.

399.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 2010: Lao People's Dem-

ocratic Republic, ¶ 67, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/LAO/1 (2017) (citing LAW ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, art. 138, ¶ 2 (Laos)). Lao People's Democratic Republic has also ratified the
ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international
treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
400.

Hum.

Rts.

Comm.,

Second

CCPR/C/LVA/2002/2 (2002) (citing

Period

Report:

Latvia,

¶

201,

U.N.

Doc.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 150 (Lat.)). The con-

stitution "recognize[s] and protect[s] fundamental human rights in accordance with...interna-

tional agreements binding upon Latvia." LATVIJAS REPUBLIKAS SATVERSME [CONSTITUTION]
Feb. 15, 1922, art. 89 (Lat.). Latvia has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatificationsof EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1993: Latvia, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.l/Rev. 1 (1994) (detailing procedure from Latvia's accession to the ICCPR and entering it into force in the state).
401. Decree 328 of 7 Aug. 2001, arts. 76, 107 (Code of Criminal Procedure) (Leb.). Lebanon has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining
the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note

310.
402. CONSTITUTION OF LESOTHO, Apr. 2, 1993, arts. 6(2), 12(2)(b). Lesotho has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of
international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
403. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Jan. 6, 1986, art. 21(c). Liberia has also
ratified the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of
international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
404. Libya "commit[s] itself to joining international.. declarations and charters which
protect such [human] rights and [basic] freedoms. AL'IIELAN ALDSTWRY ALMUAQAT ALLIYBII
[CONSTITUTION] Aug. 3, 2011, art. 7 (Libya). Libya has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
405. Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report: Liechtenstein, ¶ 117, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/LIE/2003/l (2003) (citing STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]
[STPO] §§ 165(3), 166(1) (Liech.)). Liechtenstein has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified
the ECHR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international
treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 309; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316. But see Hum. Rts.
Comm., Initial Report: Liechtenstein, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/LIE/2003/1 (2003) (Liechtenstein stating ratified international treaties are self-executing and no domestic law needed unless treaty provisions are not sufficiently specific).
406.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report:

CCPR/C/LTU/2003/2 (2003) (citing

Lithuania, ¶ 199, U.N. Doc.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 44(2) (Lith.)). The

constitution provides that "international treaties ratified by the Seimas... shall be a constituent
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part of the legal system." LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 25,

1992, art. 138 (Lith.). Lithuania has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignaturesandRaticationsofEuropeanConvention on Human Rights,supra
note 313.
407. Luxembourg has ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR, and treaties will have effect after
having been approved by the law and published. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310;
Signatures andRatificationsof European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313. See
LETZEBUERGER KONSTITUTIOUN [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 17, 1868, art. 37bis (Lux.).
408. Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Report: Madagascar, ¶ 152, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/MDG/2005/3 (2005) (citing Act No. 97-036 of 30 Oct. 1997). The constitution provides that "the treaties or agreements regularly ratified... have, from their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws."
CONSTITUTION DE LA QUATRIEME REPUBLIQUE
[CONSTITUTION] Dec. 11, 2010, art. 137 (Madag.). Madagascar has also ratified the ICCPR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
409.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI May 17, 1994, art. 42(1)(a), (2)(b),

(2)(f)(ii). The constitution provides that "international agreements... form part of the law of
the Republic." Id. at 211. Malawi has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,
supra note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties: Malawi, ¶ 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/MWI/1 (2012) (Referencing constitutional article 211(1) to verify that the
ICCPR forms part of its law).
410.

PERLEMBAGAAN PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 16, 1963, art. 5(3).

411.

DHIVEHI RAAJJEYGE JUMHOORIYYAAGE QAANOON ASAASEE [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 7,

2008, art. 48(a), 51(a) (Maldives). The Maldives has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not
have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal
system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
412. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report: Mali, at 22, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/MLI/2003/2 (2003) (Referencing article 9 of the constitution, stating right to a defence includes right to notice). The constitution provides that "treaties or agreements regularly
ratified or approved have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws."
CONSTITUTION DU REPUBLIQUE DU MALI Jan. 12, 1992, art. 116. Mali has also acceded to the
ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supranote 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report: Mali, at 40, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MLI/2003/2 (2003) (acceded to ICCPR by Ordinance No. 25/CMLN of 3 July 1974). See generally CONSTITUTION DU REPUBLIQUE DU
MALI Jan. 12, 1992, art. 115.
413. COSTITUZIONEDI MALTA [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 21, 1964, arts. 34(2), 39(6)(a). The
Maltese Parliament makes laws "in conformity with full respect for human rights, generally
accepted principles of international law . . . [and] international . . . obligations in particular
those assumed by the treaty of accession to the European Union." Id. art. 65(1). Malta has
also acceded to the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also
Hum. Rts. Comm., Iniital reports of States Parties Due in 1991: Malta, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/68/Add.4 (1993) (confirming ICCPR entered into force but referring to already incorporated rights through Constitution and Act XIV of 1987 that made ECHR part of its law).
414. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, May 1, 1979, art. II, §
4(4). The Marshall Islands has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional
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provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
415. The constitution provides that "treaties or agreements regularly ratified or approved
have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws." DUSTUR JUMHURIAT
MURITANIA AL'IISLAMIA [CONSTITUTION] July 12, 1991, art. 80. Mauritania has acceded to
the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; DUSTUR JUMHURIAT MURITANIA
AL'IISLAMIA July 12, 1991, art. 78.
416.

LA CONSTITUTION DE MAURICE Mar. 12, 1968, art.s 5(2), 10(2)(b) (Mauritius). Mau-

ritius has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions that explain the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra
note 310. Cf Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Partis Due in 1977: Addendum:
Mauritius, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.21 (1978) (stating that Mauritius did not find it
necessary to give ICCPR force of law since substance present in Constitution or other specific
enactments).
417.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

[CPEUM], art.

20(B)(III), Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 05-02-1917, nltimas reformas DOF 03-0620 (Mex.). The constitution provides that "all the Treaties that are in accord with [the Constitution and the laws of Congress], celebrated by the President with approval of the Senate, will
be the Supreme Law of all of the Union." Id. at 133. Mexico has also acceded to the ICCPR
and ACHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310; SignatoriesandRatificationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic
Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: Mexico, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.2 (1993) (referencing constitutional article 133 to confirm that ICCPR forms part of Mexican law and can
serve as the basis and foundation for any legal action).

§

418.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA, May 10, 1979, art. IV,

419.

CONSTITUTIA REPUBLICII MOLDOVA [CONSTITUTION], July 29, 1994, art. 25(5). The

6.
constitution "commits to observe...the treaties to which it is a party." Id. art. 8(1). Moldova
has also acceded to the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310;
Signatures andRatifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see
also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report of States Parties Due in 1994: Moldova, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/MDA/2000/1 (2001) (ICCPR ratified through Parliament's Decision No. 217-XII
and subsequently entered into force).
420. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report: Principality of Monaco, ¶ 400, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/MCO/2 (2007) (citing proposed amendments for CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE art. 1401-12 (Monaco)); Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report of the Principality of
Monaco, ¶ 117, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MCO/99/1 (2000) (referencing CONSTITUTION DE LA
PRINCIPAUTt DE MONACO Dec. 17, 1962, art. 19 to include right to notice and CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, art. 166). Monaco has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR but does
not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal
system. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications ofEuropean
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
421.

MONGOL ULSYN UNDSEN

KHUULI [CONSTITUTION]

Jan.

13, 1992,

art.

16(13)

(Mong.). The constitution provides that "international treaties ... become effective as domestic legislation, upon the entry into force of its laws on their ratification or accession." Id. art.
10(3). Mongolia has also ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
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422. USTAV CRNE GORE [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 22, 2007, arts. 29, 37 (Montenegro). The
constitution provides that "ratified and published international agreements and generally accepted rules of international law . . . make an integral part of the internal legal order . .. [and]
have the supremacy over the national legislation." Id art. 9. Montenegro has also succeeded
the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures and
Ratifications of EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
423.

DUSTUR ALMAMLAKAT ALMAGHRIBIA [CONSTITUTION],

July

29, 2011,

art.

23 (Mo-

rocco). The constitution "reaffirms ... and commits itself: [t]o comply with the international
conventions duly ratified by it." Id at pmbl. Morocco has also ratified the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
424.

CONSTITUI AO DA REPUBLICA DE MOCAMBIQUE [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 21, 2004, art.

64 (Mozam.). The constitution provides that "ratified international treaties and agreements ... enter into force in the Mozambican legal order once . . . officially published." Id at
18(1). Mozambique has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note
310; see also CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA DE MOCAMBIQUE Dec. 21, 2004, art. 18(2) (stating
norms of international law have the same force in its legal order as infra-constitutional legislative acts).
425. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, Feb. 9, 1990, art. 11(2). The constitution provides that "international agreements binding upon Namibia ... shall form part of the
law." Id art. 143. Namibia has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra
note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report: Namibia, ¶ 118, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/NAM/2003/1 (2003) (Namibia stating treaties are self-executing under the Constitution); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, Feb. 9, 1990, art. 144 (general rules of
public international law also form part of the law).

426. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU, Jan. 31, 1968, arts. 5(2), 10(3)(b). Nauru
is only a signatory to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
427. NEPALAKO SAMVIDHANA [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 22, 2015, art. 20(1). Nepal has also
acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of
international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
428.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Report: Netherlands,

CCPR/C/NET/99/3 (2000) (citing Art. 82 SV.

¶

405, U.N. Doc.

[WETBOEK VAN STRAFVORDERING] [CODE OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]). The constitution provides that "[p]rovisions of treaties ... become
binding after they have been published." Gw. [CONSTITUTION] art. 93 (Neth.). The Netherlands has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310;
Signatures andRatifications ofEuropean Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
429. BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990, arts. 23 (1)(a), 24(a) (N.Z.). The constitution incorporates
by reference the ICCPR to which New Zealand is a party. Id at pmbl; Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
430. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA [Cn.] tit. IV, ch. I, art.
33(2)(2.1), LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley No. 854,
Feb. 8, 2014, Reforma Parcial a la Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Nicaragua, L.G.
Feb. 18, 2014. The constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR and the ACHR to which
Nicaragua is a party. Id tit. IV, ch. I, art. 46; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310;
Signatories andRatifications ofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316.

431. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report Submitted by the Niger Under Article 40
of the Covenant, Due in 1994, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NER/2 (2018) (Niger stating right
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to notice guaranteed with no reference to municipal or constitutional law). The constitution
incorporates by reference the ICCPR to which Niger is a party. CONSTITUTION DE LA
REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER Nov. 25, 2010, pmbl.; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310. See
generally CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER Nov. 25, 2010, art. 171 (published ratified treaties have an authority superior to that of the laws).
432. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 36(6)(a). The constitution provides that "a
treaty has the force of law if it has been enacted into law by the National Assembly." Id. at §
12. Nigeria has also acceded to the ICCPR Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see
also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States PartiesDue in 1994: Nigeria, ¶¶ 3-5, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/92/Add.1 (1996) (Nigeria explaining ICCPR rights in Constitution, and the Supreme Court's and Government's approaches to the enforceability of human rights treaties).
433.

USTAV NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA

[CONSTITUTION]

Nov.

17,

1991,

art.

12

(Maced.). The constitution provides that "international agreements ratified ... are part of the
internal order." Id. art. 118. Macedonia has also ratified the ECHR. Signatures and Ratifications of EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
434. The constitution provides that "the authorities of the State . . . respect and ensure
human rights . . . in the treaties concerning human rights that are binding to Norway."
KONGERIKET NORGES GRUNNLOV [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814, art. 92 (Nor.). Norway has
ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures and
Ratifications of EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
435.

ALNIZAM AL'ASASII LILDAWLA [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 6, 1996, art. 24 (Oman).

436. PAKISTAN CONST., art. 10, § 1. Pakistan has ratified the ICCPR but does not have
any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
437. UCHETEMEL A LLACH ER A BELUU ER A BELAU [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 1, 1981, art. IV, §
7 (Palau). Palau is only a signatory to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310.
438. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA Oct. 11, 1972, arts. 21, 22.
Panama has also acceded to the ICCPR and the ACHR but does not have any constitutional
provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 316. But see CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPBLICA DE PANAMA Oct.
11, 1972, art. 4 (Panama complies with international law norms).
439.

CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA, Sept. 16, 1975,

arts. 37(4)(b), 42(2)(a). The constitution is "subject only to such obligations at international
law as are freely accepted." Id. art. 2(2). Papua New Guinea has also acceded to the ICCPR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supranote 310. But see CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE
OF PAPUA NEw GUINEA, Sept. 16, 1975, art. 117(7) (stating treaties do not form municipal law
unless given status by a Constitutional Law or an Act of Parliament).
440.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DEL PARAGUAY Aug. 9, 1940, art. 12(1). The con-

stitution provides that "treaties, conventions and international agreements approved and ratified ... integrate the positive national law." Id. art. 137. Paraguay has also ratified the ICCPR
and the ACHR. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report: Paraguay, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/PRY/2004/2 (2004) (ICCPR ratified by Act No. 5 of 9 Apr. 1992); Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 316; see also CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPJBLICA DEL PARAGUAY Aug. 9, 1940,
art. 141 (treaties are part of the internal legal order).

462

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[60:2

441. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DEL PERU Dec. 29, 1993, art. 139(14), (15). The constitution provides that "treaties concluded by the State and are in force are part of the national law."
Id. art. 55. Peru has also ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra
note 310; SignatoriesandRatificationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supranote

316.
442. CONST. (1987), art. III, §14(2) (Phil.). A treaty is valid and effective when it is concurred in by at least two-third of all the Members of the Senate. Id art. VII, § 21. Philippines
has also ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
443.

KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION]

Oct.

17, 1997, art. 41(3)

(Pol.). The constitution provides that "[a]fter promulgation ... a ratified international agreement shall constitute part of the domestic legal order." Id. art. 91(1). Poland has also ratified
the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also KONSTYTUCJA
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Oct. 17, 1997, arts. 9, 87, 91(2) (Pol.) (provisions concerning
other effects of international law and agreements on the State).
444.

CONSTITUI AO DA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 25, 1976, 27(4),

28(1) (Port.). The constitution provides that "rules set out in duly ratified ... international
agreements ... come into force in Portuguese internal law once ... officially published." Id.
art. 8(2). Portugal has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignaturesandRaticationsofEuropeanConvention on Human Rights,supra
note 313; see also CONSTITUICAO DA REPOBLICA PORTUGUESA Apr. 25, 1976, art. 8(1), (4)
(rules and principles of general international law form an integral part of internal law).
445. Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Report Submitted by Qatar Under Article 40 of the Convention, Due in 2019, ¶ 136, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/QAT/1 (2019) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE art. 113 (Qatar)). The constitution provides that "international charters and conventions, and strives to implement all international agreements, charters, and conventions it is
party thereof" DASTOR QATAR [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 29, 2003, art. 6. Qatar has also acceded
to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial
Report Submitted by Qatar Under Article 40 of the Convention, Due in 2019, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/QAT/1 (2019) (acceded to ICCPR pursuant to Decree No. 40 of 2018 and subsequently entered into force).
446. CONSTITUTIA ROMXNIEI [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 29, 2003, art. 23(8) (Rom.). Romania
has also ratified the ICCPR and ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supranote 310; Signatures
and Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316; see also
CONSTITUTIA ROMXNIEI Oct. 29, 2003, art. 20 (constitutional provisions interpreted in conformity with treaties and international regulations take precedence in conflict).
447.

See Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977: Addendum:

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at 9-11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.22 (1978) (citing the
Regulations on the Procedure for Short-Term Detention of Persons Suspected of Having Com-

mitted a Crime, art. 10 (1977) and CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR, art. 92).
The constitution provides that "international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation
shall be a component part of its legal system." KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST.
RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15(4) (Russ.). Russia has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatificationsof EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII
[KONST. RF] art. 55(1). Cf Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977:

Addendum: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.22 (1978)
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(Russia stating ICCPR ratification and entry into force "did not necessitate any changes in or
additions to Soviet laws").
448.

ITEGEKO NSHINGA RYA REPUBULIKA Y'U RWANDA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 24, 2015,

art. 29(1) (Rwanda). The constitution provides that ratified treaties "have the force of law as
national legislation." Id. art. 168. Rwanda has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Report: Rwanda, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/RWA/3 (2007) ("ICCPR incorporated into domestic law pursuant to DecreeLaw No. 8/75").
449.

CONSTITUTION OF SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS June 23, 1983 (St. Kitts & Nevis),

arts. 5(2), 10(2)(b).
450. CONSTITUTION OF SAINT LUCIA Dec. 20, 1978, art. 3(2), 8(2)(b). Saint Lucia is only
a signatory to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
451.

CONSTITUTION OF SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES Oct. 27, 1979, arts. 3(2),

8(2)(b), (f). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not
have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal
system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
452.

O LE FAAVAE

O LE MALO TUTOATASI O SAMOA

[CONSTITUTION] Oct. 28, 1960, arts.

6(3), 9(4)(a) (Samoa). Samoa has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
453. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report: San Marino, ¶ 100, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SMR/2 (2007) (San Marino stating in stop and hold cases, "police shall draw up a
report and notify the interested party and his or her counsel"). The constitution "recognizes,
as an integral part of its own legal system, generally recognized principles of international law
and conforms its law and conduct to them." DICHIARAZIONE DEI DIRITTI DEI CITTADINI E DEI
PRINCIPI FONDAMENTALI DELL'ORDINAMENTO SAMMARINESE [CONSTITUTION] July 8, 1974,

art. 1 (San Marino). San Marino has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR. Status
of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications of EuropeanConvention on
Human Rights, supra note 313.
454. The constitution provides that"[r]ules provided for in international conventions, treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified ... shall be binding in the Sao Tomdan legal
order."

CONSTITUI AO

DA

REPUBLICA

DEMOCRATICA

DE

SAO TOME

E

PRINCIPE

[CONSTITUTION] Nov. 5, 1975, art. 13(1)-(3) (Sao Tomd & Principe). Sao Tomd and Principe
has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see also CONSTITUI AO
DA REPUBLICA DEMOCRATICA DE SAO TOME E PRINCIPE Nov. 5, 1975, art. 18(1) (constitutional
rights do not exclude rights in international laws).
455. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1995: Addendum: Senegal, ¶¶ 53-54, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/103/Add.1 (1996) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE art. 55 (Sen.)). The constitution provides that "treaties . . . regularly ratified ...
have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws." CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL Jan. 7, 2001, art. 98. Senegal has also ratified the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310. See generally CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL
2001, pmbl. (affirming its adhesion to international instruments adopted by the U.N.).
456. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA Nov. 8, 2006, arts. 27, 33. The constitution provides that "generally accepted rules of international law and ratified international treaties shall be an integrated part of the legal system." Id. art. 16. Serbia has also succeeded to
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the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures and
Ratifications of EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
457.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES June 21, 1993, arts. 18(3), 19(2)(b).

The constitution provides that "[it] shall be interpreted in such a way so as not to be inconsistent with any international obligations." Id art. 48. Seychelles has also acceded to the
ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
458. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE Oct. 1, 1991, arts. 17(2)(a), 23(5)(a). The constitution provides that "respect for international law and treaty obligations" is part of its foreign
policy objectives. Id art. 10(d). Sierra Leone has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see also CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE Oct. 1, 1991, art.
40(3) (President ensures respect for treaties and international agreements); Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Initial Reports of States Parties Due in November 1997: Sierra Leone, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SLE/1 (2013) ("Parliament has yet to take necessary action by way of enactment or
the passing of a resolution ... [notwithstanding,] the country continues to abide by the provisions of the ICCPR").
459.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Aug. 9, 1965, art. 9(3).

460.

USTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 1, 1992, as amended in 2017,

art. 17(3) (Slovk.). The constitution provides that "international agreements on human rights
and freedoms which were ratified . .. take precedence over its laws whenever they guarantee
a wider scope." Id art. 11. Slovak Republic succeeded to the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatificationsof EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report of
States Parties Due on 31 December 2001: Slovakia, ¶¶ 3-5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SVK/2003/2
(2002) (Slovakia stating ICCPR is part of the legal order in Slovakia after dissolution of
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic).
461.

USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 23, 1991, art. 19 (Slovn.). The

constitution provides that "ratified and published treaties shall be applied directly." Id art. 8.
Slovenia has also succeeded to the ICCPR and ratified the ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignaturesandRaticationsofEuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra
note 313. See generally USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE Dec. 23, 1991, art. 153 ("Laws must
be in conformity with generally accepted principles of international law and with valid treaties
ratified by the National Assembly").
462. CONSTITUTION OF THE SOLOMON ISLANDS July 7, 1978, arts. 5(2), 10(2)(b). The
ICCPR has a territorial application on the Solomon Islands. See Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
463.

DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [CONSTITUTION] Aug.

1,

2012, art. 35(2), (3) (Som.). The constitution provides that "[i]n interpreting [fundamental]
rights, the court may consider the . . . international law." Id art. 40(2). Somalia has also
acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see also DASTUURKA
JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA Aug. 1, 2012, art. 3(4) (promotion of human
rights and general standards of international law).
464. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 35(1)(e), (2)(a), 3(a). The constitution provides that
"[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court ... must consider international law." Id art.
39(1)(b). South Africa has also ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note

310.
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465. TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN 2011, art. 19(2).
After its separation from Sudan, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly of South Sudan ratified the ICCPR in 2019 but it has not reached accession status. Compare PressBriefing Note on South Sudan, UN OFF. HIGH COMM'R HUM. RTS. (June 7, 2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24683&LangID
=E [https://perma.cc/A7GE-Z27L] with OHCHR, Ratification Status for South Sudan, UN
HUM. RTS. TREATY BODIES, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ layouts/1 5/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=215&Lang=en [https://perma.cc/8VNX-BTJK].

466. CONSTITUCI6N ESPANOLA [C.E.], B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, arts. 17(3), 24(2)
(Spain). The constitution provides that "validly concluded international treaties, once officially published . . . shall form part of the internal legal order." Id. art. 96(1). Spain has also
ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures and
Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also Int'l Hum.
Rts. Instruments, Core Document Forming an Integral Part of the Reports of States Parties:
Spain, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/l/Add.2/Rev.2 (1995) ("Covenant has been fully incorporated into internal legislation in Spain," with reference to article 96(1)).
467. SRI LANKA ANDUKRAMA VYAVASTHAVA [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 7, 1978, art. 13(1)
(Sri Lanka). The constitution provides that "[t]he State . . . shall endeavour to foster respect
for international law and treaty obligations in dealings among nations." Id art. 27(15). Sri
Lanka has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
468. DUSTUR ALSUWDAN [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 4, 2019, art. 51(2) (Sudan). The constitution provides that "[a]ll rights and freedoms contained in international human rights agreements . . . ratified . . . shall be considered an integral part of this document." Id. art. 41(2).
Sudan has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see also
Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2001: Sudan, ¶ 121, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/3 (2007) (Sudan stating all articles of ICCPR became binding and enforceable constitutional articles under 2005 Interim National Constitution, article 27(3)).
469. The constitution provides that "provisions of the agreements [based on international
law] . . . shall become effective upon promulgation."
GRONDWET VAN SURINAME
[CONSTITUTION] Sept. 30, 1987, art. 105 (Surin.). Suriname has acceded to the ICCPR and
the ACHR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310; Signatories andRatificationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316. See generally GRONDWET VAN SURINAME
Sept. 30, 1987, art. 103 (agreements shall not enter into force without proper adherence to
process involving political bodies).
470.

CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND, 2005, art. 16(2), (6)(a). The consti-

tution provides that "an international agreement ... shall be subject to ratification and become
binding on the government" and "[u]nless it is self-executing, an international agreement becomes law ... only when enacted into law by Parliament." Id. art. 238(2), (4). Swaziland has
also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
471. Sweden ratified the ICCPR, and Constitution incorporates by reference the ECHR
to which Sweden is a party. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310; Signaturesand Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see REGERINGSFORMEN
[RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2:19 (Swed.); see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Par-

ties Due in 1977: Addendum: Sweden, ¶¶ 1, 2(ii), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.9 (1977) (Sweden stating Covenant entered into force but did not require enactment of new legislation).
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472. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 31, ¶ 2
(Switz.); id. art. 32, ¶ 2. The constitution provides that "[t]he Confederation and the Cantons
shall respect international law." Id. art. 5, ¶ 4. Switzerland has also acceded to the ICCPR
and ratified the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 190 (judicial authorities apply international law).
473.

DUSTUR ALJUMHURIAT ALEARABIAT ALSUWRIA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 27, 2012, art.

53(3) (Syria). Syria also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions
explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310. But see Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Reports of Stats Parties Due in

1984: Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SYR/2000/2 (2000) (Syria referring to
its accession to the ICCPR under Legislative Decree No. 3 and "Covenant became part of its
domestic legislation").
474.

MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 8 (1947) (Taiwan).

475. Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Report Submitted by Tajikistan Under Article 40
of the Covenant, due in 2017, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TJK/3 (2017) (citing the 2016 amendment of the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, providing that a defendant's family be immediately notified of arrest). The constitution provides that "[i]nternational legal documents recognized by Tajikistan shall be a component part of the legal system of the republic ... .[and]
come into force after their official publication." KONSTITUTSIJAI (UMHURII TOCIKISTON
[CONSTITUTION] Nov. 6, 1994, art. 10 (Taj.). Cf Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Report
Submitted by Tajikistan Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Due in 2017, ¶¶ 12-13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/TJK/3 (2017) (Tajikistan referring to a Supreme Court decision that holds international instruments are of direct and immediate effect). Tajikistan has also acceded to the
ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
476. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES ACT Nov. 1, 1985, § 23(1) (Tanz.). Tanzania has also
acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of
international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310. Cf Hum.
Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977: United Republic of Tanzania, at 4,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.48 (1979) (Tanzania stating no internal laws needed to enforce
Covenant because rights are adequately protected by the Constitution).
477. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2009: Thailand,
107(b), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/THA/2 (2015) (citing CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE §§ 83(2),
84(1) (Thai.)). Thailand has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional
provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310. Cf Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due
in 2009: Thailand, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/THA/2 (2015) (Thailand stating articles of Covenant already found in Thai Laws). Thailand's Constitution previously had an explicit provision for right to notice, but the most recent version guarantees due process generally. Compare

¶

RATTHATHAMMANUN HAENG RATCHA-ANACHAK THAI [CONSTITUTION]
(explicit right

to

notice)

with RATTHATHAMMANUN

HAENG

Oct. 11,

1997,

RATCHA-ANACHAK

§

237

THAI

[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 6, 2017, §§ 28-29. It is likely that the newer, broader due process provisions encompass the older, more explicit right.
478.

CONSTITUIcAO DA REPUBLICA DEMOCRATICA DE TIMOR-LESTE [CONSTITUTION] May

20, 2002, § 30(3) (Timor-Leste).
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479. CONSTITUTION TOGOLAISE DE LA QUATRItME REPUBLIQUE [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 14,
1992, art. 17 (Togo). The constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR, to which Togo
is a party. Id at pmbl.; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310. See also CONSTITUTION
TOGOLAISE DE LA QUATRItME REPUBLIQUE Oct. 14, 1992, arts. 138, 140 (treaties relative to
status of persons and rights of Man take effect after ratification and are superior to domestic
laws). Cf Int'l Hum. Rts. Instruments, Core Document Forming Part of State Party Reports:
Togo, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/l/Add.38/Rev.1 (1996).

480.

CONSTITUTION OF TONGA Jan. 26, 2014, art. 11.

481.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Aug. 1, 1976, art. 2(c)(i).

Trinidad and Tobago has also acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ACHR but does not have
any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system.
Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316; see Hum. Rts. Comm., Third and Fourth Periodic
Reports of States Parties Due in 1990 and 1995 Respectively: Addendum: Trinidad and Tobago, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TTO/99/3 (2000) (Trinidad and Tobago stating international
law provisions need to be "expressly transformed by Act of Parliament").
482. DUSTUR TUNIS [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 26, 2014, art. 29 (Tunis.). The constitution provides that "[i]nternational agreements approved . . .have a status superior to that of laws and
inferior to that of the Constitution." Id art. 20. Tunisia has also ratified the ICCPR. Status
of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Fifth Periodic Report: Tunisia, at 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TUN/5 (2007) (Act No. 68-30 of Nov. 29, 1968 approved accession to ICCPR).
483.

TQRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 19 (Turk.).

The constitution provides that "[i]nternational agreements duly put into effect have the force
of law." Id at 90. Turkey has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 313; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties: Turkey,
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TUR/l (2011) (confirming that the Covenant has direct effect in
Turkish law).
484. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 2015: Turkmenistan, ¶ 147, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CTKM/2 (2015) (citing CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 13
(Turkm.)). The constitution provides that "[r]ights and freedoms of a person ...
shall be
recognized in accordance with the universally recognized norms of international law."
TQRKMENISTANYN

KONSTITUSIYASY

[CONSTITUTION] May 18, 1992, art. 25 (Turkm.). Turk-

menistan has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
485.

CONSTITUTION OF TUVALU Oct. 1, 1986, arts. 17(3), 22(3)(b).

486. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Sept. 22, 1995, arts. 23(3), 28(3)(b).
The constitution provides that "[t]he foreign policy of Uganda shall be based on the principles
of respect for international law and treaty obligations." Id at § XXVIII(i)(b). Uganda has
also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see also Hum. Rts.
Comm., Initial Report: Uganda, ¶¶ 52-54, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UGA/2003/1 (2003) (once
Cabinet approves and Minister of Foreign Affairs ratifies a Covenant, the provisions are incorporated into domestic law unless review of Constitution necessary).
487. KONSTYTUTSIYA UKRAYINY [CONSTITUTION] June 28, 1996, art. 29 (Ukr.). The constitution provides that "[i]nternational treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding . . . are
part of the national legislation of Ukraine." Id art. 9. Ukraine has also ratified the ICCPR
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and the ECHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313.
488. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977: Addendum:
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.17
(1977) (UK stating in general, an arrested person must be informed on ground of arrest without
reference to specific law). The United Kingdom has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatfcationsof EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supranote 313; see Hum. Rts. Comm., Fifth Periodic Report of States
Parties in 1999: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/UK/99/5 (2000) (referring to Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates ECHR into
UK law); see discussion on Act's level of authority supra, note 25.
.

489. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The constitution provides that "Treaties made.
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The United States has
also ratified the ICCPR, is only a signatory to the ACHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra
note 310; SignatoriesandRatifcationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supranote
316. But see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 95-20, §§ 11(5), III(2) (1992) (Covenant articles 1-27 are not self-executing but
implemented through legislative and judicial means).
490. C6DIGO DEL PROCESO PENAL [CODE OF PENAL PROCEDURE] art. 65(a), (f) (Uru.).
Uruguay ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR but does not have any constitutional provisions
explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignatoriesandRatifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supranote 316. But see Hum. Rts. Comm., Sixth Periodic Report Submitted by Uruguay Under
Article 40 of the Covenant Pursuant to the Optional Reporting Procedure, Due in 2019, ¶ 16,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/URY/6 (2019) (Uruguay stating that the ACHR is part of country's legal
order).

491. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 46 (Uzb.). The constitution provides that "recognizes priority of the generally accepted norms of the international law." O'ZBEKISTON
RESPUBLIKASI KONSTITUTSIYASI [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 8, 1992, pmbl. (Uzb.). Uzbekistan has
also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see also Hum. Rts.
Comm., Second Periodic Report: Uzbekistan, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UZB/2004/2 (2004)
(Uzbekistan stating rights in ICCPR "reflected in the Constitution and other laws"). See generally Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Uzbekistan, ¶ 132, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/UZB/3 (2008) (Uzbekistan commenting on an "analysis of the domestic legislation underpinning and giving effect to the primacy of international law over national law");
id. ¶ 138 (referencing International Treaties Act of 25 December 1995 that subject its treaties
to direct and mandatory application).
492. CONSTITUTION OF VANUATU July 30, 1980, art. 5(2)(c). Vanuatu has also ratified the
ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international
treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
493. Vatican City acknowledges its application of "the general regulations and local regulations of the province and government of Rome" in the context of judicial work. Stephen
Young and Alison Shea, SeparatingStatefrom Church: A Research Guide to the Law of the
Vatican City State, 99 L. LIBR. J. 589, 594 (2007) (citing Vatican City's Law of the Sources
of the Law 2002, art. 3). Cf World Factbook: Holy See (Vatican City), CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/holy-see-vatican-

2022]

PROCEDURAL JUS COGENS

469

city/ [https://perma.cc/HXR4-HNTP] (most criminal matters handled by Republic of Italy
courts).
494.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Dec. 15, 1999, art.

49(1). The constitution provides that "treaties ...
relating human rights which have been
executed and ratified by Venezuela have a constitutional rank, and prevail over internal legislation ... [and] shall be immediately and directly applied by the courts and other organs." Id.
art. 23. Venezuela has also ratified the ICCPR and the ACHR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; SignatoriesandRatifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in

1993: Addendum: Venezuela, ¶¶ 12-15, 52, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/VEN/98/3 (1998) (ICCPR
and other international human rights instruments are self-executing).
495.

Vietnam "conforms to the ...

international treaties in which [it] is a member." HItN

PHAP NUC CONG HOA XA HOI CHU NGHIA VIET NAM [CONSTITUTION]

Jan. 1,

2014, art. 12.

Vi-

etnam acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310; see also Hum. Rts.
Comm., Third Periodic Report Submitted by Vietnam Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Due
in 2004, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/VNM/3 (2018) (treaties prevail over domestic legislation,
except for the Constitution).
496. DUSTUR ALYAMAN [CONSTITUTION] May 16, 1991, art. 48(c) (Yemen). Yemen
"confirms its adherence to the ... Principles of international Law which are generally recognized." Id. art. 6. Yemen has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra
note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., Fourth Periodic Report: Yemen, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/YEM/2004/4 (2004) (citing article 6 of Yemen's constitution to confirm that ICCPR
is part of its legal system).
497. CONST. OF ZAMBIA (1996) § 13(2). Zambia also acceded to the ICCPR but does not
have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal
system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic
Report of States Parties Due in 1998: Zambia, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ZMB/3 (2005) ("[The]
rights contained in the Covenant accrue to every person in Zambia as ... recognized in Article
11 of the Constitution.").
498. CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE Mar. 6, 2013, arts. 50(l)(a), (4)(d), (5)(a), 70(l)(b).
The constitution provides that "[w]hen interpreting legislation, every court ... must adopt any
reasonable interpretation . . . consistent with customary international law applicable in Zimbabwe" and that "[c]ustomary international law is part of the law of Zimbabwe." Id art. 326.
Zimbabwe has also acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; see
also CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE Mar. 6, 2013 art. 46(l)(c), (e) (court must take into account
international law and all treaties party to when interpreting declaration of rights).
499. In particular, the following seven states do not guarantee the right to notice: Bhutan,
Brunei Darussalem, China, Comoros, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
500. QANUN-I ASASI-I AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, arts. 27, 31 (Afg.). Afghanistan acceded to and observes the ICCPR, with relevant provision in article 14, paragraph 3(a). See
id art. 7; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
501. KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKES SE SHQIPERISE Nov. 28, 1998, arts. 33, 42 (Alb.). Albania has also acceded to the ICCPR, implemented through Law No. 7510, and acknowledges
ratified international agreements as binding and effective. Id arts. 5, 116(1)(b); Hum. Rts.
Comm., Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Albania, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ALB/2

(2011); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
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502. Algeria has ratified the ICCPR and treats ratified international treaties superior to
domestic law. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310; DUSTUR ALJAZAYIR Feb. 23, 1989,

arts. 56, 169 (Alg.).
503.

CONSTITUCI6 DEL PRINCIPAT D'ANDORRA Apr. 28, 1993, art. 10 (Andorra).

504.

CONSTITUICAO DE ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010, art. 72.

505.

CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Oct. 31, 1981 art. 15(8).

506.

Art. 18, CONSTITUCION NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).

507.

HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYAN SAHMANADRUTYUN June 16, 2015, arts. 50,63 (Arm.).

508. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 2019 § 31(1) (Act No. 5/2019) (Austl.). Australia ratified the
ICCPR and notes that ICCPR's application influences domestic law without having to incorporate it through legislation or a constitutional provision. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2013: Australia, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/6 (2016);
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
509.

BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ OBER DEN SCHUTZ DER PERSONLICHEN FREIHEIT [THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ACT ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY] No. 684/1988, as

amended, arts. 3, 4, 6, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000950 (Austria).
510.

HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYAN SAHMANADRUTYUN

Nov. 12, 1995, arts. 60, 67(2),

127(11) (Azer.)
511.

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS Jul. 9th, 1973, art. 20(1).

The Bahamas has also ratified the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions
explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
512. HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYAN SAHMANADRUTYUN Feb. 14, 2002, art. 20(c) (Bahr.).
Bahrain has also acceded to the ICCPR through Act No. 56 of 2006, which was published in
the Official Gazette on Aug. 16, 2006, giving it force of law. Hum. Rts. Comm., supranote
322, ¶ 1; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
513. GANAPRAJATANTRI BANLADE$ERA SAMBIDHANA Nov. 4, 1972, art. 35(3) (Bangl.).
Bangladesh has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions
explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310; see Hum. Rts. Comm., supranote 323, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BGD/l (2015)
(explaining the need to pass a statute to make a treaty effective but does not mention a corresponding statute for the ICCPR).
514. CONSTITUTION OF BARBADOS Nov. 26, 1966, art. 18(1). Barbados has also acceded
to the ICCPR and ACHR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect
of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatoriesand RatificationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316.
515. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fifth Periodic Report Submitted by Belarus Under Article 40 of
the Covenant Pursuant to the Optional Reporting Procedure, Due in 2016, ¶¶ 266-79, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/BLR/5 (2017). Belarus has also ratified the ICCPR and ensures that its laws
comply. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310; see KANSTYTUCYJA RESPUBLIKI BIELARU$
May 9, 1994, arts. 8, 25, 26 (Belr.)
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516. Belgium has ratified the ICCPR and ECHR, both of which are in effect. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 313; see 1994 CONST. art. 167, §§ 2, 12, 13, 14 (Belg.).
517. BELIZE CONSTITUTION Sept. 21, 1981, art. 6(2). Belize has acceded to the ICCPR
but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties
on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
518. Benin references common law cases as evidence of the right to hearing in its legal
system. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 328, ¶ 67(c), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BEN/2004/1/Add. 1
(2004) (citing decision DCC 97-011 of 6 March 1997, in the case of Jean-Marie Houmenou,

Recueil 1997, pp. 49-51; decision DCC 98-059 of 4 June 1999, in the case of Vincent Ekpagouda, Recueil 1999, pp. 291-293; decision DCC 00-041 of 29 June 2000, in the case of
Raymond Issa Ali ,Kpara Recueil 2000, pp. 151-53). Benin has also acceded to the ICCPR
and holds international instruments superior to domestic law. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310; CONSTITUTION DE LA RtPUBLIQUE DU BtNIN Dec. 11, 1990, arts. 17, 147.
519.

THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF BHUTAN Nov. 26, 2004,

GI CHA-THRIMS-CHEN-MO Jul. 18, 2008, art. 7
520.

¶ 16,

art. 21

§ 4.

'DRUK-

¶ 1 (Bhutan).

CONSTITUCI6N POL TICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, arts. 115, 120 (Bol.).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA arts. 7, 13 (Bosn.
Herz.). Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a party to the ICCPR through succession and has
ratified the ECHR; it holds the ECHR priority over all other law and specifically names ICCPR
as applicable in the State. USTAV BOSNE I HERTCEGOVINE Dec. 14, 1995, arts. 2(2), 3(e)
4(3)(b), ann. I, ¶ 7 (Bosn. & Herz.); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures
andRatifications ofEuropean Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313.

&

521.

522. CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966, art. 10(1). Botswana has also ratified
the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
523.

CONSTITUTIGAO FEDERAL [C.F.] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 5(LV). (Braz.)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE Oct. 1, 2001, § 1 (Brunei).
(CIVIL PROCEDURE) RULES Jan. 31, 2001, § 42 (Brunei).
524.

MAGISTRATES' RULES

525. KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA July 13, 1991, art. 31(4), 121(1) (Bulg.).
Bulgaria has also ratified the ICCPR and incorporates it into domestic law. See id art. 5(4);
Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatificationsof EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, supra note 313; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 333, ¶ 255,
(citing RULES ON APPLICATION OF THE LAW ON MINISTRY OF INTERIOR art. 63 (Bulg.)).

526. Burkina Faso has acceded to the ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law.
Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; CONSTITUTION DU BURKINA FASO June 2, 1991,
art. 151.
527.

Burundi has acceded to the ICCPR which is in effect. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,

supra note 310; see CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI June 7, 2018, arts. 19,

38,

39.
528.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in July 2002: Cam-

bodia, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/KHM/2 (2013); Id. ¶ 132 (stating that the principle of fair
trial provides the accused with the right to be tried publicly through a protection and guarantee
of

fundamental

right);

RODTHATHOMMONOUNHNH

NEI

PREAHREACHEANEACHAKR

KAMPOUCHEA Sept. 21, 1993, arts. 38(8), 128(2), 129 (Cambodia).

Cambodia has also
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acceded to the ICCPR and recognizes and respects human rights in international covenants.
of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310;
RODTHATHOMMONOUNHNH NEI

Status

PREAHREACHEANEACHAKR

KAMPOUCHEA, art. 31.

529. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE § 8(2) (Cameroon). Cameroon has also acceded to the
ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note
310; CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN, June 2, 1972, art. 45 (Cameroon).

530. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.)
art. 11(b), (d). Canada has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional
provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
531. CONSTITUIIAO DA REPBLICA DA CABO VERDE Sept. 28, 1992, arts. 19(a), 20(1).
Cape Verde has also acceded to and published the ICCPR through Law 75/IV/92 and holds
ratified international law superior to domestic law. Id art. 11(1)-(4); Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Human Rights Comm, supra note 341, ¶ 141.
532.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE March 27, 2016, art. 4 (Cent.

Afr. Rep.). Central African Republic has acceded to the ICCPR and adheres to ratified conventions. See id pmbl.; Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
533. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD March 31, 1996, arts. 24, 25 (Chad).
Chad has also acceded to the ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law. See id art.
225; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 341, ¶ 328,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TCD/2 (2012) (stating that laws on the justice system and procedural laws
contain many provisions guaranteeing a fair hearing).
534. CONSTITUCI6N POLI TICA DE LA REP BLICA DE CHILE art. 19(3). Chile has also ratified the ICCPR, promulgated through Decree No. 778 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
1976 and published and given full force of law in 1989, and the ACHR. See id art. 5; Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
535. XIANFA art. 130 (1982) (China). Chinia is a signatory to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
536. Colombia has ratified the ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law. Status
of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 9394. Id. art. 29 (due process of law).
537.

CONSTITUTION DE LA UNION DES COMORES Jul. 30, 2016, art. 15 (Comoros).

538.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Feb. 18, 2006, arts.

19-21 (Dem. Rep. Congo). Democratic Republic ofthe Congo has also acceded to the ICCPR
and holds treaties superior to domestic law. Id. art. 215; Status of Treaties:ICCPR,supranote

310.
539. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO Nov. 6, 2015, art. 9 (Congo). Republic
of the Congo has also acceded to the ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law. Id
art. 223; Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
540.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 4 (Costa Rica).

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE

COSTA RICA, Nov. 7, 1949, arts. 39, 41. Costa Rica has also ratified the ICCPR and ACHR
and holds treaties superior to domestic law. See id art. 7; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra
note 310; SignatoriesandRatificationsofAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supranote

316.
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541. CONSTITUTION IVOIRIENNE Nov. 8, 2017, art. 7 (C6te d'Ivoire). C6te d'Ivoire has
also acceded to the ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law. Id at pmbl., art. 123;
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
542. USTAv REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE Dec. 22, 1990, arts. 25, 29 (Croat.). Croatia is also
party to the ICCPR through succession and holds treaties superior to domestic law. Id art.
134; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
543.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPBLICA DE CUBA April 10, 2019, art. 92, 93, 94(d)-(e).

544. SYNTAGMA TIS KYPRIAKS DIMOKRATIAS Aug. 16, 1960, art. 12(5)(c) (Cyprus). Cyprus has also ratified the ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law. Id art. 169(2)(3); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
545.

LISTINA ZAKLADNICH PRAV A SVOBOD [CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND

BASIC FREEDOMS] art. 36(1) (Czech); Ustavni zakon c 1/1993 Sb., Ustava Ceskd Republiky
[Constitution of the Czech Republic] art. 3. Czech Republic is also party to the ICCPR through
succession and holds treaties superior to domestic law. See id art. 10; Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; see also Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 351, ¶ 2.
546.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACT OF DENMARK, June 5, 1953, art. 71(3).

547. CONSTITUTION DE LA RPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI Sept. 15, 1992, art. 10(5) (Djib.). Djibouti acceded to the ICCPR and holds treaties superior to domestic law. See id art. 70; Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
548. ThE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA Nov. 3, 1978, § 8(1).
Dominica has also acceded to the ICCPR and the ACHR but does not have any constitutional
provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 316.
549.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DOMINICANA June 13, 2015, art. 69(2) (Dom. Rep.).

Dominican Republic has acceded to the ICCPR and ratified the ACHR. See id art. 26(2);
Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatories and Ratifications of American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 316. See also Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 355, ¶ 4.
550.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 75, 76, 169. Ec-

uador has acceded to the ICCPR and adheres to ratified conventions. See id art. 417; Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
551.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT Jan. 14, 2014, arts. 96, 97, 98.

Hum. Rts. Comm., supranote 357, ¶ 402. Egypt has acceded to the ICCPR and does not have
any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
552. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR Dec. 20, 1983, arts. 11-12 (El
Salv.). El Salvador has acceded to the ICCPR and ACHR but there are no constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties. Hum. Rts. Comm., Seventh Periodic
Reports of States Parties Due in 2016: El Salvador, ¶ 1(5), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/7 (2016)
(stating that court cases citing international treaties reinforce the right to a defense/trial); see
also Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.

553. CONSTITUCI6N DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL Aug. 15, 1982, art. 13(1)() (Eq. Guinea).
Equatorial Guinea has acceded to the ICCPR and the African Charter of Human and People's
Rights (African Charter). Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
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554. K'IWAMI ERITIRA May 23, 1997, art. 17(6) (Eri.). See also id art. 26(3) (express
provisions protected from derogation. The provisions protecting the right to notice and the
right to a fair hearing are not protected from derogation). Eritrea has acceded to the ICCPR
and the African Charter. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
555. EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS Jun. 28, 1992, art. 15 (Est.). Estonia has acceded to
the ICCPR and international treaties that conflict with laws or other domestic legislation take
precedence. See id art. 123; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
556.

YE'ITIYOP'IYA FEDERALAWI DIMOKIRASIYAWI RIPEBILIKI HIGE MENIGISITI Aug.

08,

1994, art. 20(1) (Eth.). The constitution provides thatinternational treaties are an integral part
of the fundamental law. See id. art. 9(4). Ethiopia has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310. Ethiopia has also enacted measures giving effect to the
ICCPR. Hum. Rts. Comm., First Periodic Report of States Parties: Ethiopia, ¶ 15(d), U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/ETH/l (2009) (citing ¶¶ 173-88 of the Common Core Document).
557. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI Sept. 6, 2013, art. 14(2)(f). Fiji has acceded
to the ICCPR and international treaties are given effect only after ratification by parliament.
See id. § 51; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
558. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI Jun 11, 1999, § 21 (Fin.). Finland has ratified the ICCPR
and ECHR, both of which are in effect. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supranote 310; Signatures
and Ratifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313. International
See SUOMEN
treaties "shall not endanger the democratic foundation of Finland."
PERUSTUSLAKI,

§ 94.

559. France has ratified the ICCPR and ECHR, both of which are in effect. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; Signatures and Ratifications of European Convention on
Human Rights,supra note 313. International treaties take precedence over Acts of Parliament.
1958 CONST., art. 55 (Fr.).
560. CONSTITUTION DE LA RPUBLIQUE GABONAISE Mar. 26, 1991, art. 1(4) (Gabon). Gabon has acceded to the ICCPR and adheres to international conventions after ratification by
the legislature. See id art. 133; Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
561. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GAMBIA 1997, Jan. 16, 1997, art. 24(1)(b).
The constitution provides that international treaties will guide the state in pursuing its social
objectives. See id. art. 216(3). Gambia has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,
supra note 310.

562. SAKARTVELOS K'ONSTITUTSIA Aug. 24, 1995, arts. 18(1), 31(1) (Geor.). Article
18(1) outlines an administrative right to a hearing and article 31(1) outlines a judicial right to
a fair hearing. Id Georgia has acceded to the ICCPR and international treaties hold precedence over domestic laws. See id art. 4(5); Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
563. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englischgg/index.html, art. 103(1). The constitution provides that international treaties take precedence over domestic laws. Id art. 25. Germany has ratified the ICCPR. Status
of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310. The Federal Constitutional Court has also deemed the
right to a fair trial to be a fundamental right (citing BVerfGE (Official collection of decisions
of the Federal Constitutional Court) 57, 250, 274 et seqq., BVerfGE 66, 313, 318, BVerfGE
89, 120, 129 in conjunction with arts. 2(1) and 20(3) of the Basic Law). Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Sixth Periodic Report: Germany, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DEU/6 (2011).
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564. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA Apr. 28, 1992, art. 19(1). The constitution provides that Ghana follows the principles of international law. See id. art. 73. Ghana is
a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
565. 2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN] 2 arts. 6, 8, 20(2) (Greece). Greece has acceded to the
ICCPR and international treaties have the force of the law after ratification by Parliament. See
id. art. 36(3); Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310. Greek Law 4055/2012 aims to simplify the judicial process and ensures the access to justice. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic
Reports of States Parties Due in 2009: Greece, ¶ 131, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GRC/2 (2014).
566. CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA Dec. 19, 1973, art. 8(1). Grenada has acceded to the
ICCPR but does not have any provisions explaining the effect of international treaties. Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
567.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPJBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 12(1).

Guatemala has acceded to the ICCPR and follows the principles of international law. See id.
art. 149; Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
568. CONSTITUTION DE LA GUINtE May 7, 2010, art. 9(4) (Guinea). The constitution provides that international treaties are superior to domestic law. See id art. 151. Guinea is a
signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
569. CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA DA GUINt-BISSAU May 16, 1984, art. 42(1) (GuineaBissau). The constitution provides that international treaties shape the interpretation of fundamental rights. See id. art. 29. Guinea-Bissau is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
570.

CONSTITUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA ACT

Oct.

6, 1980, arts.

144(1), 144(8). The constitution provides that international treaties shall guide domestic legislation. See id. art. 39(2). Guyana is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
571. Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties: Haiti, ¶¶ 72-73, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/HTI/1 (2013). See also CONSTITUTION D'HATI May 9, 2011, arts. 24, 24.1, 24.3, 181
(Haiti); id art. 276 (international treaties abrogate any constitutional provision inconsistent
with the terms of the international treaty). Haiti has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
572. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS Jan. 11, 1982, art. 90. The
constitution provides that international treaties have the force of domestic laws once ratified.
See id. art. 16. Honduras is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
573.

MAGYARORSZAG

ALAPTORVtNYE

[THE

FUNDAMENTAL

LAW

OF

HUNGARY],

ALAPTORVtNY, art. XXVIII(1). The constitution provides that international laws will have
the same force as domestic laws while domestic law will conform to international norms. See
id. art. Q(2)-(3). Hungary is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.

574. STJ6RNARSKRA LYDVELDISINS ISLANDS Jun. 17, 1944, art. 70 (Ice.). Iceland is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR but has no constitutional provisions explaining the effect
of international treaties. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
575. India Const. art. 21. The constitution holds international treaties to the same status
as domestic laws. See id. art. 253. India has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.

476

576.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 382,

¶

206.

[60:2

See also REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

LEGISLATION NUMBER 39 OF 1999 CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 17 (outlining a right to a

hearing). Indonesia has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
The constitution subjects international treaties to future regulation by domestic law. UNDANGUNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN Aug. 18, 1945, art.
577.

11(3)

(Indon.).

ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO THE

CONSTITUTION] 1989, art. 34. The constitution provides that international treaties must be
approved by the legislature before going into effect. See id. art. 77. Iran is a signatory to and
has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

.

578. Articles 19(3), 19(4), 19(5) Dustir Jumh. tiryat al-'Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005. The constitution respects the obligations outlined in international
treaties. Id. art. 8. Iraq is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
579. CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937, arts. 38(1), 40. The constitution provides that international treaties must be ratified before they go into effect. See id. art. 29(6). Ireland is a
signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
580. §62(A), Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 386. Israel is a signatory to and has
ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
581. Art. 24 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.). The constitution conforms to recognized principles of international law. Id art. 10(1). Italy is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
582. CONSTITUTION OF JAMAICA July 25, 1962, art. 16(1). Jamaica is a signatory to and
has ratified the ICCPR and does not have any provisions explaining the effect of international
treaties. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
583. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO], arts. 31, 32, 37 (Japan). The constitution provides that
the country shall faithfully observe international treaties. See id art. 98(2). Japan is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
584. DUSTUR ALMAMLAKAT AL'URDUNIYAT ALHASHMY Jan. 11, 1952, art. 101. The constitution provides that treaties need to be ratified before coming into force. See id art. 33(2).
Jordan is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note

310.
585. QAZAQSTAN RESPYBLIKASYNYN KONSTITYTSIIASY Aug. 30, 1995, arts. 13, 77 (Kaz.).
The constitution provides that international instruments superior to domestic law. See id art.
4(3). Kazakhstan is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
586. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA Aug. 27, 2010, art. 50(1) (Kenya). The constitution incorporates international treaties into its domestic law. See id art. 21(4). Kenya has acceded to
the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.

Jul.

12,

1979, art. 10(1).

587.

CONSTITUTION OF KIRIBATI

588.

CHOSON MINJUJUI INMIN KONGHWAGUK

SAHOEJU I

HONBOP [CONSTITUTION] Dec.

27, 1972, art. 164 (guaranteeing the right to a defense) (N. Kor.). North Korea acceded to the
ICCPR but later attempted to withdraw. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310 n.8.
589. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 27(3) (S. Kor.). The constitution provides that international treaties have the same force as domestic laws. See id art. 6. The
Republic of Korea has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
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590. KUSHTETUTA E KosovEs Apr. 9, 2008, art. 31 (Kos.). Kosovo is not a party to the
ICCPR or the ECHR but its constitution guarantees the rights enshrined in such instruments
and gives international instruments priority over domestic law. Id art. 22.
591. AD-DISTOR AL-KUWAYTI Nov. 11, 1962, art. 34 (Kuwait). Kuwait has acceded to
the ICCPR and the constitution does not affect international treaties or agreements to which
Kuwait is a party. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
592.

KIRGIZ RESPUBLIKASININ KONSTITUTSIYASI Jun. 27, 2010, art. 40(1) (Kyrg).

The

constitution provifes that international treaties hold the same force as domestic laws. See id.
art. 6(3). Kyrgyzstan has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
593. LAW ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Eng.) (Laos), Jan. 08, 2012, art. 14.
LADTHATHAMMANUN [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 22, 1991, art. 96 (Laos). Laos is a signatory to
and has ratified the ICCPR but does not have a constitutional provision explaining the effect
of international treaties. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
594. LATVIJAS REPUBLIKAS SATVERSME Feb. 15, 1922, art. 92 (Lat.). The constitution
recognizes the rights enshrined in international instruments. Id. art. 89. See also Hum. Rts.
U.N. Doc.
Comm., Third Periodic Reprots of States Parties: Latvia, ¶¶ 375-76,
CCPR/C/LVA/3 (2012) (citing CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA, Jun.
20, 2018, art. 15; CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW (Latvia), Dec. 14, 2006, art. 1). Latvia has acceded
to the ICCPR and recognizes the rights enshrined in international instruments. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
595.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999: Lebanon,
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Sept. 16,
1983, art. 7 (Leb.)). The State Shura Council enshrined the right to a fair trial in its Decision
of 1 April 2014 (revoking decision that prevented lawyers from attending own client's interrogation). Id ¶ 93. The constitution provides that international treaties must be ratified before
entering into force. DUSTUR LUBNAN [CONSTITUTION], May 26, 1928, art. 52 (Leb.). Lebanon
has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

¶¶ 91-93, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/LBN/3 (2016) (citing

596. CONSTITUTION OF LESOTHO Apr. 2, 1993, art. 12(1). Lesotho has acceded to the
ICCPR but has no provisions explaining the effect of international instruments. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
597. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA Jan 6, 1986, art. 20(1). Liberia holds the
constitution as the supreme law of the land and treaties inconsistent with the constitution has
no legal effect. See id art. 2. Liberia is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
598.

AL'IIELAN ALDSTWRY ALMUAQAT ALLIYBII Feb. 7, 2011, art. 31 (Libya). The consti-

tution respects international instruments protecting human rights. See id art. 7. Libya has
acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
599. VERFASSUNG DES FORSTENTUMS LIECHTENSTEIN Oct. 5, 1921, art. 33(3). The constitution provides that the government make measures to put international treaties into effect.
See id art. 92(2). Liechtenstein has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra
note 310.

600. LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA Oct. 25, 1992, art. 31(2) (Lith.). The constitution provides that international treaties ratified are a constituent part of the law of the land.
Id art. 138(2). Lithuania has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note

310.
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601. LETZEBUERGER KONSTITUTIOUN Oct. 17, 1868, arts. 88, 89 (Lux.) The constitution
provides that any derogations of fundamental rights must be in conformity with international
treaties. Id. art. 32(4). Luxembourg is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
602.

CONSTITUTION DE LA QUATRIEME REPUBLIQUE Dec. 11, 2010, art. 13(6) (Madag.).

The constitution provides that international instruments are superior to domestic laws. See
id. art. 137(4). Madagascar is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
603. REPUBLIC OF MALAWI (CONSTITUTION) ACT May 18, 1994, arts. 42(2)(f), 43(1). The
constitution provides that international instruments are part of the law of the land. See id art.
211. Malawi has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
604. PERLEMBAGAAN PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA Sept. 16, 1963, art. 5(1), art. 8(1). See
also Goi Ching Ang v. Public Prosecutor, [1999] 1 MLJ 507 (later approved by Francis Antonysamy v. PP, [2005] 2 CLJ 481, emphasizing the need for a fair trial to ensure fairness and
the importance of a fair procedure).
605.

DHIVEHI RAAJJEYGE JUMHOORIYYAAGE QAANOON ASAASEE Aug. 7, 2008, art. 42(a)

(Maldives). The constitution provides that international treaties are taken into consideration
in court decisions. See id. art. 68. Maldives has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
606. CONSTITUTION DU REPUBLIQUE DU MALI Feb. 25, 1992, art. 9(4). The constitution
provides that international instruments are superior to domestic law. See id art. 116. Mali
has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
607. Hum. Rts. Comm., Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Malta, ¶ 213, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/MLT/2 (2012) (citing COSTITUZIONE DI MALTA Sept. 21, 1964, art. 39(1)-(2)).
The constitution provides that the legislature can enact laws that are in accordance with accepted international principles. See id art. 65(1). Malta has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
608.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MARSHALL ISLANDS May 1, 1979, art. II

§ 4.

The

constitution provides that treaties entered after the effective date of the constitution shall not,
of itself, have the force of law. See id art. V § 1(4). The Marshall Islands has acceded to the
ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
609. Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties: Mauritania, ¶¶ 147-48, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/MRT/I (2012) (citing DUSTUR JUMHURIAT MURITANIA AL'IISLAMIA Jul. 20,
1991, art. 13(2) (Mauritania); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 642 (Mauritania)). The constitution provides that international instruments are superior to domestic law. See DUSTUR
JUMHURIAT MURITANIA AL'IISLAMIA Jul. 20, 1991, art. 80 (Mauritania); Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
610. LA CONSTITUTION DE MAURICE Mar. 12, 1968, arts. 10(1), 10(8) (Mauritius). Mauritius has acceded to the ICCPR but has no provisions explaining the effect of international
instruments. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
611. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fifth Periodic Report: Mexico, ¶¶ 568-69, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/MEX/5 (2008) (citing FEDERAL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, arts. 86, 90 (Mex.)).
See also Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, arts. 17(2), 20, Diario
Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] 05-02-1917, nltimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.). The
constitution provides that human rights interpretation will give the greatest possible
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protection. See id. art. 1. Mexico has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
612.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Oct. 1, 1978, art. IV

§§

3,

5.
613. CONSTITUTIA REPUBLICII MOLDOVA Aug. 27, 1994, arts. 20, 26 (Article 20 details
access to justice and article 26 details a right to a defense). The constitution gives priority to
international instruments whenever there is a disagreement between domestic and international law. See id. art. 4(2). Moldova has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR,
supra note 310.
614.

CONSTITUTION DE LA PRINCIPAUTE DE MONACO Dec. 17, 1962, art. 19.

Hum. Rts.

Comm., supra note 420, ¶ 449, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MCO/2 (2007). The constitution provides
that international treaties have the force of law after ratification. Id art. 14. Monaco is a
signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
615. MONGOL ULSYN UNDSEN KHUULI Jan. 13, 1992, arts. 13, 14, 16(14) (Mong.). The
constitution provides that international treaties have the force of law after they are ratified.
See id art. 10(3). Mongolia is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
616. USTAV CRNE GORE Oct. 19, 2007, art. 32 (Montenegro). The constitution provides
that international instruments are superior to domestic legislation. See id art. 9. Montenegro
has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
617. DUSTUR ALMAMLAKAT ALMAGHRIBIA Jul. 29, 2011, arts. 118, 120 (Morocco). The
constitution provides that Morocco complies with ratified conventions. See id pmbl.. Morocco is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
618. CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA DE MOCAMBIQUE Jun. 11, 2004, arts. 62(1), 65(1)
(Mozam.). The constitution provides that ratified international instruments have the same
force as domestic laws. See id. art. 18(2). Mozambique has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
619.

PYIHTAUNGHCUSAMMATAMYANMARNINENGANTAW

HPWALHCAEEPONEAAHKYAYHKANUPADAY [CONSTITUTION] May 9, 2008, art. 375 (Myan.).
620. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA Feb. 9, 1990, art. 12(1)(a). The constitution provides that international instruments have the force of the law of the land. See id art.
144. Namibia has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

621. CONSTITUTION OF NAURU May 17, 1968, arts. 10(2), 10(9). Nauru is a signatory to
the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
622. EPALAKO SAMVIDHANA Sept. 20, 2015, art. 20(9) (Nepal). Nepal is committed to
implementing principles of international law. See id pmbl. Nepal has acceded to the ICCPR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
623. Gw. [CONSTITUTION], art. 17. The constitution provides that international instrument prevail in the case of conflict with domestic statutory law. See id art. 94. The Netherlands is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
624. BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990, arts. 25(a), 27(3) (N.Z.). New Zealand is a signatory to
and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
625.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA [Cn.] tit. IV, ch. I, art.

34(1), (2), LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley No. 854,
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Feb. 8, 2014, Reforma Parcial a la Constituci6n Politica de la Republica de Nicaragua, L.G.
Feb. 18, 2014. The constitition promotes rights enshrined in international instruments. See
id. art. 46. Nicaragua has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
626.

CONSTITUTION DE LA RPUBLIQUE DU NIGER Nov. 25, 2010, art. 20. Niger has ac-

ceded to the ICCPR and hold international treaties are superior to domestic law. See id art.
171; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
627. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA May 5, 1999, arts. 36(1), 36(4). The constitution respects
international treaty obligations. See id. art. 19(d). Nigeria has acceded to the ICCPR. Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
628.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA Nov. 18,

2010, art. 5. USTAV NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA Nov. 17, 1991, arts. 12, 13 (N. Maced.). The
constitiution provides that ratified international agreements form an integral part of the law of
North Macedonia. Id art 122. North Macedonia is a party to the ICCPR by virtue of being a
successor state of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote

310.
629. KONGERIKET NORGES GRUNNLOV May 17, 1814, art. 95 (Nor.). Norway is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and respects international treaties and treaties are not binding until ratification. See id arts. 26, 92; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
630.

ALNIZAM AL'ASASII LILDAWLA [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 06, 1996, arts. 22,25 (Oman).

631. Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 2011: Pakistan, ¶¶ 12425, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/PAK/1 (2015) (citing case law reaffirming the right to a fair trial:
Barkat Ali v. Additional Commissioner, (2004) MLD 1633 (Pak.); Muhammad Asghar Khan
v. Mirza Aslam Baig, (2013) PLD 1 (SC)). PAKISTAN CONST. art. 10A. Pakistan is a signatory
to and has ratified the ICCPR but does not have any constitutional provisions explaining the
effect of international treaties. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
632. UCHETEMEL A LLACH ER A BELUU ER A BELAU Apr. 02, 1999, art. IV § 7 (Palau).
Palau is a signatory to the ICCPR but has no explicit constitutional provisions explaining the
effect of international treaties. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
633. CONSTITUCI6N POL TICA DE LA REPuBLICA DE PANAMA Oct. 11, 1972, arts. 22(b), 32.
Panama is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note

310.
634.

CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA Aug. 15, 1975,

arts. 37(3), 37(11). Papua New Guinea has acceded to the ICCPR and courts can look to
international treaties when determining the existence of rights. See id arts. 39(3)(d), 39(3)(e);
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
635.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY Jun. 20, 1992, arts. 16, 17(2). Par-

aguay has acceded to the ICCPR but holds the constitution superior to international treaties.
See id art. 137(1); Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
636. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DEL PERI Oct. 31, 1993, arts. 139(3), 139(10) (Peru). Peru
is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and international treaties are part of the national
law once they are in force. See id art. 55; Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
637. CONST. (1987), art. III §§ 1, 16 (Phil.). PHILIPPINES' REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, r. 115 § 1(h). The Philippines is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310; CONST. (1987), art. II § 2.
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638. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fifth Periodic Report: Poland, ¶¶ 264, 268, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/POL/2004/5 (2004) (citing constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to a fair
trial in individual cases). CONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Jul. 16, 1997, art. 45(1)
(Pol.). Poland is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and its constitution provides that
international instruments are superior to domestic laws when reconciliation is not possible.
See id. art. 91(2); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
639. CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA Apr. 02, 1976, arts. 20(1), 32 (Port.).
Portugal is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and international treaties form an integral
part of Portugal's law. See id. art. 8(1); Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
640.

LAW NO. 10 OF 2003 PROMULGATING THE LAW ON JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, ch. 3, art.

15 (right to public trial in accordance with international fair trial standards). DASTOR QATAR
Jun. 4, 2004, art. 39 (Qatar). Qatar has acceded to the ICCPR and respects international charters and obligations. Id. art. 6; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
641. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA Jul. 1, 2010, art. 8.
CONSTITUTIA ROMXNIEI Dec. 08, 1991, arts. 21(3), 23, 24(1) (Rom.). Romania is a signatory
to and has ratified the ICCPR and international treaties form part of the domestic law. See id.
art. 11(2); Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
642.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Dec. 18, 2001, art.

11(1).

KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] arts. 47, 48, 49 (Russ.). Russia is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and international norms apply if there is a conflict with
domestic law. Id. rt. 15(4); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
643.

ITEGEKO NSHINGA RYA REPUBULIKA Y'U RWANDA May 26, 2003, art. 29. Rwanda

has acceded to the ICCPR and holds the constitution as the supreme law of the land. See id.
art. 95; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
644.

CONSTITUTION OF SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS 1983, Jun. 22, 1983, arts. 10(1),

10(8).
645. CONSTITUTION OF SAINT LUCIA 1978, Dec. 20, 1978, arts. 8(1), 8(8). Saint Lucia is
a signatory to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
646.

CONSTITUTION OF SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 1979, Jul. 26, 1979, arts.

8(1), 8(8). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
647. O LE FAAVAE O LE MALO TUTOATASI O SAMOA Oct. 28, 1960, art. 9(1). Samoa has
acceded to the ICCPR but has no provisions relating to the status of international treaties.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
648.

Hum. Rts. Comm., supranote 453,

¶ 122, U.N. Doc.

CCPR/C/SMR/2 (2007) (citing

DICHIARAZIONE DEI DIRITTI DEI CITTADINI E DEI PRINCIPI FONDAMENTALI DELL'ORDINAMENTO

SAMMARINESE Jul. 8, 1974, arts. 9, 15 (San Marino)). San Marino has acceded to the ICCPR.
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
649. CONSTITUIGAO DA REPUBLICA DEMOCRATICA DE SAO TOME E PRINCIPE Nov. 5, 1975,
art. 20. Sao Tome and Principe is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and holds international instruments are superior to domestic legislation. Id art. 13(3); Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
650.

LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (SAUDI ARABIA) Oct. 16, 2001, art. 3.
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CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU StNGAL Jan. 22, 2001, art. 9(4) (Sen.). Sene-

gal is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and holds international instruments are superior
to domestic law. See id. art. 98; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

652.

USTAV REPUBLIKE SRBIJE Sept. 30, 2006, arts. 32(1), 33(6) (Serb.). Serbia succeeded

the former Yugoslav Republic as a party to the ICCPR and international law shall form an
integral part of the Serbian legal system. See id. art. 16(2); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra
note 310.
653. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES Jun. 21, 1993, arts. 19(1), 19(7).
Seychelles has acceded to the ICCPR and interpretation of fundamental rights takes judicial
notice of international instruments. See id. art. 48(a); Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note

310.
654. THE CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE Oct. 1, 1991, arts. 23(1), 23(2). Sierra Leone
has acceded to the ICCPR but has no constitutional provisions relating to the status of international treaties. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
655. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Aug. 9, 1965, art. 9(1). The Singapore courts have recognised that the word "law" includes fundamental rules of natural justice:.

Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor (1979-1980) SLR(R) 710.
656. USTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY Sept. 1, 1992, arts. 46(1), 46(2) (Slovk.). The SloRepublic succeeded the former Yugoslav Republic as a party to the ICCPR and holds
international instruments are superior to domestic laws. See id art. 11; Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.

vak

657.

Hum. Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: Addendum: Slove-

nia, ¶¶ 41-42, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/Add.l (1993) (listing constitutional provisions implementing the right to a fair trial). USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE Dec. 23, 1991, arts. 22, 23,
24, 25 (Slovn.). Slovenia succeeded the former Yugoslav Republic as a party to the ICCPR
and domestic law must be in conformity with international law. See id. art. 8; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

31, 1978, arts. 10(1), 10(8).

658.

CONSTITUTION OF THE SOLOMON ISLANDS May

659.

DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA Aug.

1, 2012, arts.

33-34.

Somalia has acceded to the ICCPR and is bound by international treaty obligations. See id.
art. 140; Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
660. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 33-34. South Africa is a signatory to and has ratified the
ICCPR and its constitution provides that international instruments are binding unless they are
inconsistent with the constitution. See id. art. 202; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
661.

TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN 2011

Jul.

9,

2011, arts. 19(3), 20.
662. C.E. B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 24 (Spain). Spain is a signatory to and has
ratified the ICCPR and its constitution provides that ratified treaties form an integral part of
the law. See id. art. 96(1); Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
663. SRI LANKA ANDUKRAMA VYAVASTHAVA Sept. 7, 1978, § 13(3) (Sri. Lanka). Sri
Lanka acceded to the ICCPR and its constitution provides that no action shall be made in
contravention of such international instruments. See id. § 157; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
664. DUSTUR ALSUWDAN Aug. 17, 2019, art. 51(3) (Sudan). Sudan has acceded to the
ICCPR and its constitution provides that fundamental rights enshrined in international
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instruments are an integral part of the land. See id. art. 41(2); Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra
note 310.
665. GRONDWET VAN SURINAME March 30, 1987, art. 10. Suriname has acceded to the
ICCPR but its constitution provides that international agreements must be approved by the
National Assembly before entering into force. See id. art. 103; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,
supra note 310.
666. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND Jul. 25, 2005, art. 21(1), (10). Swaziland has acceded to the ICCPR and treaties enter into force after an enactment by Parliament.
See id. art. 238; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

667. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 2:9-11 (Swed.). Sweden is a signatory to and has ratified
the ICCPR and no domestic law can contravene Sweden's international treaty obligations and
guarantees. See id. 2:23; Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
668. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 29, 29a, 30(1) (Switz.). Switzerland has acceded to the ICCPR and its constitution provides that mandatory provisions of
international law may not be violated. See id. arts. 193(4), 194(2); Status of Treaties:ICCPR,
supra note 310.
669.

DUSTUR ALJUMHURIAT ALEARABIAT ALSUWRIA Feb. 15, 2012, art. 51(2). The Syrian

Arab Republic has acceded to the ICCPR but has no constitutional provisions regarding the
hierarchy laws. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
670.

MINGUO XIANFA, art. 8 (1947) (Taiwan).

671. KONSTITUTSIJAI UMHURII TOCIKISTON Nov. 06, 1994, arts. 19, 21 (Taj.). Tajikistan
incorporates the ICCPR by reference and has acceded to the ICCPR. See id art. 10; Status of
Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
672.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA Apr. 25, 1977, art. 13(6)(a).

Tanzania has acceded to the ICCPR and incorporates it by reference. Id art. 63(3)(e); Status
of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
673.

RATTHATHAMMANUN HAENG RATCHA-ANACHAK THAI Apr. 6, 2017, art. 25 (Thai.);

§ 8(1). Thailand is a
party to the ICCPR and incorporates it by reference. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note
see also

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE [THAILAND] Mar. 7, 1934,

310.
674.

CONSTITUI AO DA REPJBLICA DEMOCRATICA DE TIMOR-LESTE Mar. 22, 2002,

§§

26,

34(3). The constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR to which Timor-Leste has acceded to as a party. See id § 9; Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
675. CONSTITUTION TOGOLAISE DE LA QUATRItME REPUBLIQUE Sept. 27, 1992, art. 19(1)
(Togo). The constituton provides that international instruments hold superiority over domestic
laws. See id art. 140. Togo has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra
note 310.

676. CONSTITUTION OF TONGA Nov. 4, 1875, art. 10, 14. Tonga has acceded to the ICCPR
and incorporates the ICCPR by reference. See id art. 39; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra
note 310.
677.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Aug.

1,

1976,

§§

5(2)(e), 5(2)(f)(ii). Trinidad and Tobago has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
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678. DUSTUR TUNIS Jan. 26, 2014, arts. 29, 108 (Tunis.). The constitution provides that
international instruments are superior to laws and are inferior to constitution. See id. art. 20.
Tunisia has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
679. TORKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI Nov. 7, 1982, arts. 36, 37 (Turk.). The constitution provides that international instruments prevail over laws. See id. art. 90. Turkey has
acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.

680. TORKMENISTANYN KONSTITUSIYASY May 18, 1992, art. 34 (Turkm.). The constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR to which Turkmenistan is a party. See id. art. 9;
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
681. THE CONSTITUTION OF TUVALU May 1, 1986, art. 22(2). The ICCPR applies to Tuvalu by virtue of its being a territory of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310.
682. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Sept. 22, 1995, art. 28(1). The constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR to which Uganda is a party. Id. art. XXVIII(b).
Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310. Article 44 of the constitution sets out sets out
prohibitions on derogations of certain rights which includes the protections granted by the
right to a fair hearing. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Sept. 22, 1995, art. 44.
683. KONSTYTUTSIYA UKRAYINY Jun. 28, 1996, arts. 55, 129 (Ukr). The constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR, to which Ukraine is a signatory to and has ratified. See
id. art. 9; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
684.

DASTOR DAWLAT AL-IMARAT AL-'ARABTYA AL-MUTTAHIDA

Jul. 18, 1971, art. 28

(U.A.E.)
685. Human Rights Act c. 42 (U.K.) sch. 1, art. 6,¶ 1. The United Kingdom is a signatory
to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
686. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. The United States is a signatory to and has ratified the
ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supranote 310.
687.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY Nov. 27, 1966, art. 12.

Uruguay is a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR and its constitution provides that the
country combats social evils through international conventions. See id art. 46; Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.
688.

O'ZBEKISTON RESPUBLIKASI KONSTITUTSIYASI Dec. 8, 1992, arts. 26, 44 (Uzb.). The

constitution "recogniz[es] [the] priority of the generally accepted norms of the international
law. Id pmbl. Uzbekistan is a party to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note

310.
689. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU Jul. 30, 1980, art. 5(2)(a). Vanuatu is
a signatory to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
690.

ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS SUPPLEMENTO PER LE LEGGI E DISPOSIZIONI DELLO STATO

DELLA CITTA' DEL VATICANO Oct. 1, 2008, art. 3. (Vatican).
691.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Dec. 15, 1999, arts.

49(3), 257 (Venez.). The constitution provides that treaties have constitutional rank and prevail over domestic legislation relating to human rights. Id art. 23. Venezuela is a signatory
to and has ratified the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.
692. HItN PHAP NUtC CONG HOA XA HOI CHU NGHIA VIET NAM Nov. 28, 2013, art. 31(2)
(Viet.). Vietnam is a party to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supra note 310.
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693. Hum. Rts. Comm., Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Yemen, ¶ 182, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/YEM/5 (2009) (citing DUSTUR ALYAMAN May 16, 2001, arts. 49, 51 (Yemen)). The
constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR, to which Yemen acceded. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310; DUSTUR ALYAMAN MAY 16, 2001, art. 6.
694. CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA Aug. 08, 1991, arts. 18(1), 18(9). The constitution incorporates by reference the ICCPR, to which Zambia is a party. See id. art. 14; Status of Treaties:
ICCPR, supra note 310.
695. CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE May 22, 2013, arts. 68(1), 69(1), 69(2), 70. Zimbabwe
has acceded to the ICCPR. Status of Treaties: ICCPR, supra note 310.

696.

QANUN-I ASASI-i AFGHANISTAN

697.

KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKES SE SHQIPERISE Nov. 28, 1998, arts. 18(1), 42(2), 145(1),

Jan. 26, 2004, arts. 22, 116, 125 (Afg.).

147(1) (Alb.).
698.

DUSTUR ALJAZAYIR Feb. 23, 1989, arts. 156, 158, 165-66, 168 (Alg.).

699.

CONSTITUCI6 DEL PRINCIPAT D'ANDORRA Apr. 28, 1993, arts. 6(1), 10(1), 85(1)-(2),

89(1).
700. CONSTITUICAO DE ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010, arts. 175, 179(1).
701.

CONSTITUTION OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Nov. 1, 1981, art. 15(1), (8).

702.

Arts. 16, 114,

703.

HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYAN SAHMANADRUTYUN July 5, 1995, arts. 28, 63(1),

¶

6, CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).

164(1) (Arm.).
704. Australian Constitution s 72, ¶¶ 1-2; see also N. Australian AboriginalLegal Aid
Serv. Inc. v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 159-61 (Austl.).
705. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, as last
amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL I No. 102/2014, arts. 83, 87-88, 94(1),
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Geltendefassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnum-

mer=10000138

(Austria); BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ OBER DEN SCHUTZ DER PERSONLICHEN

FREIHEIT [THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ACT ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY]

BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 684/1988, as amended, art. 6(1) (Austria).
706.

AZERBAYCAN RESPUBLIKASININ

KONSTITUSIYASI

Nov. 12, 1995, arts. 7(III)-(IV),

8(IV), 25(I), 127, cls(I)-(IV) (Azer.).
707.

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS July 10,

1973, art. 20, (1),

(8).
708.

DUSTUR MAMLAKAT AL-BAHRAYN July 10, 1973, arts. 18, 104, (a)-(b) (Bahr.).

709.

GANAPRAJATANTRI BANLADE$ERA SAMBIDHANA Nov. 4, 1972, arts. 27, 35(3), 94(4),

116A (Bangl.).
710.
711.
(Belr.).

CONSTITUTION OF BARBADOS Nov. 22, 1966, art. 13(1), (8).
KANSTYTUCYJA RESPUBLIKI BIELARUS May 9, 1994, arts. 6, 22, 60(1), 110, 115(1)

712.

1994 CONST. (Belg.) arts. 10, 12, 146, 149, 15(1), 152.

713.

CONSTITUTION OF BELIZE

714.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU BENIN Dec. 11, 1990, arts. 26, 125-27.

Sept. 21, 1981, art. 6(l), (7).
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715. 'DRUK-GI CHA-THRIMS-CHEN-MO July 18, 2008, arts. 7(15), 9(5), 21(1), (15) (Bhutan).
716.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, art.s 12(1), 120(1), 178(1)-(2),

180(1), (3) (Bol.).
717. USTAV BOSNE I HERTCEGOVINE Dec. 14, 1995, ann. 1(7) (Bosn. &. Herz.) (incorporating by reference the ICCPR).
718.

CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966, art. 10, §§ 1, 9.

719.

CONSTITUI Ao FEDERAL [C.F.] arts. 2, 5(l)(XXXV), (XXXVII) (Braz.).

720. Supreme Court Act, 1963 (S 154/1963) c. 5, §§ 8(2), 10, 33(1) (Brunei); see Brunei
Darussalam v. Bolkiah, Civil Suit No. 31 of 2001 (Brunei) (citing Locabail Ltd v Bayfield
Props. Ltd [2000] QB 451 (Eng.) (adopting common law principles regarding recusal of
judges)).
721.

KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA Ju1y 13, 1991, arts. 6(2), 117(2) (Bulg.).

722.

CONSTITUTION DU BURKINA FASO June 2, 1991, arts. 4, 129-30.

723.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI June 7, 2018, arts. 23, 38, 214.

724.

RODTHATHOMMONOUNHNH

NEI PREAHREACHEANEACHAKR

KAMPOUCHEA Sept.

21,

1993, arts. 31, 128-29 (Cambodia).
725.
eroon).
726.

CONSTITUTION DE LA RtPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN June 2, 1972, art. 37,

§§ 2-3 (Cam-

Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11,

§

11(d)

(U.K.).
727. CONSTITUIGAO DA REPBLICA DA CABO VERDE Sept. 28, 1992, arts. 22, 221(3) (Cape
Verde).
728. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE Mar. 27, 2016, arts. 6, 107-08
(Cent. Afr. Rep.).
729.

CONSTITUTION DE LA RtPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Mar. 31, 1996, arts. 14, 146, 150, 155

(Chad).
730.

CONSTITUCI6N POLI TICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 19(3)(1), (5), 76, 79.

731. XIANFA arts. 33, 126 (1982) (China).
732.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 13, 228, 230.

733.

CONSTITUTION DE LA UNION DES COMORES July 30, 2018, arts. 2, 94-95 (Comoros).

734.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Feb. 18, 2006, arts. 12,

149 (Dem. Rep. Congo).
735. CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO Nov. 6, 2015, arts. 15, 168-69, 171
(Congo).
736.

CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE COSTA RICA Nov. 7, 1949, arts. 9, 33, 35, 42.

737.

CONSTITUTION IVOIRIENNE Nov. 8, 2017, arts. 139-41 (C6te d'Ivoire).

738.

USTAV REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE Dec. 22, 1990, arts. 14, 26, 29,¶ 1, 115 (Croat.).

739.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA Apr. 10, 2019, arts. 42, 94(d), 148, 150.

740.

SVNTAGMA TIS KYPRIAKS DIMOKRATIAS Aug. 16, 1960, art. 28(1), 30(2) (Cyprus).
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741. Ustavni zakon c. 1/1993 Sb., Ustava Ceskd Republiky [Constitution of the Czech
Republic], arts. 81, 82(1), 95(1).

§§

62, 64 (Den.).

742.

DANMARKS RIGES GRUNDLOV June 5, 1953,

743.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI Sept. 15, 1992, arts. 10(1), 71-73.

744.

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA Nov. 3, 1978,

745.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA June 13, 2015, arts. 39, 69(2), 151

§§

8(1), (8).

(Dom. Rep.).
746.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 11(2), 75,

76(7)(k), 168(1), 172.
747.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, arts. 53, 94.

748.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR Dec. 20, 1983, arts. 3, 16, 172.

749. CONSTITUCI6N DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL Feb. 26, 2012, arts. 13(l)(c), 89, 91-93 (Eq.
Guinea).
750.

K'IwAMI ERITIRA May 23, 1997, arts. 14(1), 48(2)-(4) (Eri.).

751.

EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS July 3, 1992, arts. 12, 146 (Est.).

752.

YE'ITIYOP'IYA FEDERALAWI DIMOKIRASIYAWI RIPEBILIKI HIGE MENIGISITI Aug. 21,

1995, arts. 17(1), 25, 78(1), 79(2)-(3) (Eth.).
753.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI Sept. 6,

754.

SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI June 11, 1999,

§§

2013, arts.

1(c), 15(1), 26, 97(3)-(4).

3, 6, 103 (Fin.).

755.

1958 CONST., arts. 1, 64 (Fr.).

756.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE GABONAISE Mar. 3, 1991, arts. 89,

757.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA Jan. 16, 1997, arts. 24(1), 33, 120,

90,

93 (Gabon).

(3)-(4).
758.

SAKARTVELOS K'ONSTITUTSIA Oct. 17, 1995 arts. 11(1), 59(1), 63(1) (Geor.).

759.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-inter-

net.de/englisch gg/index.html, arts. 3(1), 20(3), 97(1), 101(1).

Jan. 7, 1993, arts.

19(13),

760.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA

761.

2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] arts. 4(1), 87(l)-(2) (Greece).

762.

CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA Dec. 19, 1973, art. 8(1), (8).

763.

CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE LA REPBLICA DE GUATEMALA Jan. 14, 1986, arts. 4,203,

17(1),

127(1).

205, 207 (Guat.).
764.

CONSTITUTION DE LA GUINtE Apr. 19, 2010, arts. 1, 8, 107, 109-10 (Guinea).

765. CONSTITUIGAO DA REPUBLICA DA GUINt-BISSAU May 16, 1984, arts. 24, 120, 123
(Guinea-Bissau).
766.

CONSTITUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA ACT Oct. 6, 1980, arts.

122A, 144,¶¶ 1, 8, art. 149D(l).
767.

CONSTITUTION D'HAITI Mar. 10, 1987, arts. 18, 60, 187 (Haiti).

768.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS Jan.

61, 90, 303 (Hond.).

11,

1982, arts. 4,

60-
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ALAPTORVtNY Jan.

ALAPTORVtNYE

1, 2012, arts.

Q, § 26,

[THE

FUNDAMENTAL

LAW

[60:2

OF

HUNGARY],

§ 1, art. XXIV, § 1, XXVIII, § 1.
June 17, 1944, arts. 61, 65, 70, ¶1 (Ice.).

art. XV,

770.

STJ6RNARSKRA LYDVELDISINS ISLANDS

771.

India Const. Jan. 26, 1950, arts. 14, 50.

772.

UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN Aug. 18, 1945, arts.

24(1), 24B, 27(1), 28D(1)
773.

(Indon.).

ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO THE

CONSTITUTION] 1989, arts. 19, 156, 166.
774. Arts. 19, 87-88, Dustir Jumh.
Iraq] of 2005.
775.

atyat al-'Iraq

[The Constitution of the Republic of

CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND 1937 arts. 35(2), 40(1).

776. §§ 2, 6, 11, Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5748-1984, LSI 38 101 (1983-84),

as

amended (Isr.).

777. Arts. 3, 101, 104, 111(2) COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.).

§§

3(g), 16(1)-(2), 97, 103.

778.

CONSTITUTION OF JAMAICA July 25, 1962,

779.

NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] , arts. 14(1), 37(1), 76(3) (Japan).

780.

DUSTUR ALMAMLAKAT AL'URDUNIYAT ALHASHMY Jan.

1,

1952, arts. 6, 97-98, 101

(Jordan).
781. QAZAQSTAN RESPYBLIKASYNYN KONSTITYTSIIASY Aug. 30, 1995, arts. 14(1), 77(1),
79(1) (Kaz.).
782.

CONSTITUTION OF KENYA Aug. 27, 2010, arts. 27(1), 50(1), 160(1).

783.

CONSTITUTION OF KIRIBATI

784.

CHOSON MINJUJUI INMIN KONGHWAGUK SAHOEJUI HONBOP Dec. 27, 1972, arts.

Jul. 12, 1979, arts. 10(1), (8).

65, 160 (N. Kor.).
785.

DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] arts. 103, 106 (S. Kor.).

786. KUSHTETUTA E KosovEs Sept. 7, 1990, arts. 3(2), 31(2), 102(2)-(4), 104(6), 106(2),
107(1) (Kos.).
787.

AD-DISTOR AL-KUWAYTI Nov. 11, 1962, arts. 29, 162-63 (Kuwait).

788.

KIRGIZ RESPUBLIKASININ KONSTITUTSIYASI June 27, 2010, arts. 16, 94 (Kyrg).

789.

LADTHATHAMMANUN Aug. 14, 1991, arts. 35, 82 (Laos).

790.

LATVIJAS REPUBLIKAS SATVERSME Feb. 15, 1922, arts. 83, 91 (Lat.).

791.

DUSTUR LUBNAN May 23, 1926, arts. 7, 20 (Leb.).

792.

CONSTITUTION OF LESOTHO Apr. 2, 1993, arts. 6(1), (8), 19, 118.

793.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA Jan.

794.

AL'IIELAN ALDSTWRY ALMUAQAT ALLIYBII Feb. 8, 2011, arts. 6, 32, (Libya).

795.

LANDESVERFASSUNG

796.

LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA Oct. 25, 1992, arts. 29, 31,

6, 1986,

arts.

I

(c), 70.

[LV] Oct. 5, 1921, arts. 31(1), 95, (Liech.).

¶

2, art. 109

(Lith.).
797.

LETZEBUERGER KONSTITUTIOUN Oct. 17, 1868, arts. 10(1), 86, 91, 93, 110(2) (Lux.).

798.

CONSTITUTION DE LA QUATRIEME REPUBLIQUE Dec.

11,

2010, arts. 6, 108 (Madag.).
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CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI May

18, 1994, arts. 42(2)(f)(i),

2022]

799.

45(2)(g), 103(1).
800.

PERLEMBAGAAN PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA Sept. 16, 1963, arts. 8(1), 122B, 125(3),

(7).
801.

DHIVEHI RAAJJEYGE

JUMHOORIYYAAGE

QAANOON ASAASEE Aug. 7, 2008, arts. 20,

42(a)-(b), 141-42 (Maldives).
12,

1992, arts.

CONSTITUTION DU REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

803.

COSTITUZIONE DI MALTA Sept. 21, 1964, arts. 39(1)-(2).

2,

81

.

Jan.

802.

804. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS May 1, 1979, arts. II, §
12, art. VI, § 1. The Marshall Islands has also acceded to the ICCPR but does not have any
constitutional provisions explaining the effect of international treaties on its legal system. See
Status of Treaties:ICCPR, supranote 310.

805.
tania).

DUSTUR JUMHURIAT MURITANIA AL'IISLAMIA July 12, 1991,

arts. 1, 89-90 (Mauri-

1968, arts. 3(a), 10(1) (Mauritius).

806.

LA CONSTITUTION DE MAURICE Mar. 12,

807.

Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, arts. 17(1), (6), 49,

100(7), Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] 05-02-1917, nltimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014
(Mex.).
808.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA May 10, 1979, arts. IV,

§§ 3-4, art. XI, §§ 5, 11.
809.

CONSTITUTIA REPUBLICII MOLDOVA July 29, 1994, arts. 16, 116 (Mold.).

810.

CONSTITUTION DE LA PRINCIPAUT DE MONACO Dec. 17, 1962, arts. 6, 17, 88, ¶3.

811.

MONGOL ULSYN UNDSEN KHUULI Feb. 12, 1992, arts. 14(1), 47(2), 49(1) (Mong.).

812.

USTAV CRNE GORE Oct. 22, 2007, arts. 32, 118, ¶¶ 1-2 (Montenegro).

813.

DUSTUR ALMAMLAKAT ALMAGHRIBIA July 29, 2011,

814.

CONSTITUICAO DA REP[BLICA DE MOCAMBIQUE Dec. 21, 2004, arts. 217

815.

PYIHTAUNGHCUSAMMATAMYANMARNINENGANTAW

arts. 107-11 (Morocco).
(Mozam.).

HPWALHCAEEPONEAAHKYAYHKANUPADAY May 29, 2008, arts. 19, 21, cl. a, art. 347 (Myan.).
816.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA Mar. 21, 1990,

arts. 10(1), 12(l)(a),

78(2)-(3).

Jan. 31, 1968, arts.

817.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU

818.

NEPALAKO SAMVIDHANA Jan. 22, 2015, arts. 18(1), 20(9) (Nepal).

10(2), (9).

819. Gw. arts. 1, 117 (Neth.). The Netherlands has also ratified the ICCPR and the ECHR,
the provisions of which are binding on the Netherlands. See id. art. 93 (incorporating international law); Status of Treaties: ICCPR,supra note 310; Signatures andRatifications of European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 313.

820.

Bill of Rights Act 1990, art. 25(a) (N.Z.).

821.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. IV, ch. I, arts. 27,
34(8), tit. VIII, ch. I, art. 129, ch. V, art. 166, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 January
1987, as amended by Ley No. 854, Feb. 8, 2014, Reforma Parcial a la Constitucion Politica
de la Republica de Nicaragua, L.G. Feb. 18, 2014.
822.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER Nov. 25, 2010, arts. 10, 116, 118.
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36(1), 292.

823.

CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999),

824.

USTAV NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA Nov. 17, 1991, arts. 98 (N. Maced.).

825.

KONGERIKET NORGES GRUNNLOV [Const.] May 17, 1814, arts. 95, 98,

826.

ALNIZAM AL'ASASII LILDAWLA Nov. 6, 1996, art. 17, 59-61 (Oman).

827.

PAKISTAN CONST. art. 25, 175, 207, 209(7).

828.

UCHETEMEL A LLACH ER A BELUU ER A BELAU [CONST.] Jan. 1, 1981, arts. IV(5),

17(2)(a), (e),

X(14) (Palau); Republic of Palau Code of Judicial Conduct Mar.
829.

1,

¶ 1 (Nor.).

2011, pmbl.,

§ 2.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA Oct. 11, 1972, arts.

208,210-

12.
830.

CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA Sept. 16, 1975,

arts. 37(3), 55, 157.
831.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY June 20, 1992, arts. 16, 47(2), 248,

252-55, 256(2).
832.

CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DEL PERU Dec.

29, 1993, arts. 2(2), 139(2), 146, 150.

833.

CONST. (1987), arts. III,

834.

KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Oct. 17, 1997, arts. 32, 45(1), 173,

§ 14(2), art. VIII, §§ 3,7(3) (Phil.).

178(1), 180-81 (Pol.).
835.

CONSTITUICAO DA REP[BLICA PORTUGUESA Apr. 25, 1976, arts. 13, 203, 216 (Port.).

836.

DASTOR QATAR Apr. 29, 2003, arts. 35, 129-31.

837.

CONSTITUTIA ROMXNIEI Oct. 29, 2003, arts. 16(1), 124, 133(1) (Rom.).

838.

KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] arts. 19(1), 123(3), 124 (Russ.).

839.

ITEGEKO NSHINGA RYA REPUBULIKA Y'U RWANDA Dec. 24, 2015, arts. 15, 16, 150,

151(5).
840. CONSTITUTION OF SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS June 23, 1983, arts. 3, 10(1), (8)
(St. Kitts & Nevis).
841.

CONSTITUTION OF SAINT LUCIA Dec. 20, 1978, arts. 1, 8(1), (8).

842.

CONSTITUTION OF SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES Oct. 27, 1979, art. 8(1), (8).

843.

O LE FAAVAE O LE MALO TUTOATASI

O SAMOA Oct. 28,

844.

DICHIARAZIONE

CITTADINI

DELL'ORDINAMENTO
845.

DEI

DIRITTI DEI

SAMMARINESE

July 8, 1974, arts.

1960, arts. 9(1), 15(1).

E DEI

4(1),

PRINCIPI

FONDAMENTALI

15(3) (San Marino).

CONSTITUIGAO DA REPUBLICA DEMOCRATICA DE SAO TOME E PRINCIPE Nov. 5, 1975,

arts. 15(1), 121, 122(1) (Sao Tome & Principe).
846.

AL NIZAM AL ASASI LIL HUKM Jan. 31, 1992, arts. 8, 36, 46 (Saudi Arabia).

847.

CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL

848.

USTAV REPUBLIKE SRBIJE Nov. 8, 2006, art. 32(1) (Serb.).

849.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES June 18, 1993, arts. 27(1), 19(1),

Jan.

22, 2001,

pmbl., arts. 1, 88.

(7).
850.

CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE Oct. 1, 1991, art. 23, (1)-(2).

851.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Aug. 9, 1965, arts. 12, (1)-(2), art.

93, 95(3), 98.
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852.

USTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY Oct. 1, 1992, arts. 46(1), 47(3), 48(1) (Slovk.).

853.

USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE Dec. 23, 1991, arts. 14(2), 23, (Slovn.).

854.

CONSTITUTION OF SOLOMON ISLANDS July 7, 1978, arts. 10(1), (8), art. 14,(4), art.

16(8)(c).
1, 2012,

arts. 3(4),

856.

S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 34, 165(2), (4).

857.

TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN July 9,

2011 arts.

855.

DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA Aug.

34(2) (Som.).

124, 133, (1)-(2).
858.

C.E. B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 117(1) (Spain).

859.

SRI LAMKA ANDUKRAMA VYAVASTHAVA Sept. 7, 1978, arts. 12(1), 107-08, 110,

II1A-I 1 IC (Sri Lanka).
860.

DUSTUR ALSUWDAN Aug. 4, 2019 arts. 4, 8(5), 30(2) (Sudan).

861.

GRONDWET VAN SURINAME

862.

CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND July 26, 2005, arts. 14(1)(a), 23(1),

Sept. 30, 1987, art. 10.

10, 38(d).
863.

REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 1:9, 11:1, 11:3-4, 11:6-7 (Swed.).

864.

BUNDESVERFASSUNG

865.

DUSTUR ALJUMHURIAT ALEARABIAT ALSUWRIA Feb. 15, 2012, arts. 132, 133(2), 134

[BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 29(1), 30(1), 191c (Switz.).

(Syria).
866.

MINGUO XIANFA arts. 80-81 (1947) (Taiwan).

867.

KONSTITUTSIJAI

868.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC

UMHURII TOCIKISTON NOV. 6, 1994, arts. 19, 87 (Taj.).
OF TANZANIA

Apr.

25,

1977, art.

107A(2)(a), 107B.
869.

RATTHATHAMMANUN HAENG RATCHA-ANACHAK THAI Apr. 6, 2017,

870. CONSTITUICAO DA REPUBLICA
119, 121(2), (4) (Timor-Leste).
871.

§ 188(2)

DEMOCRATICA DE TIMOR-LESTE May

(Thai.).

20, 2002, §§

CONSTITUTION TOGOLAISE DE LA QUATRItME REPUBLIQUE Oct. 14, 1992 arts. 18,

19(1) (Togo).
872.

CONSTITUTION OF TONGA Nov. 4, 1875, art. 15.

873.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Aug. 1, 1976, arts. 4(b),

5(2)(f)(ii).
874.

DUSTUR TUNIS Jan. 26, 2014, arts. 102, 108(1), art. 109 (Tunis.).

875.

TQRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI Nov. 7, 1982, arts. 9-10, 138-40 (Turk.).

876.

TQRKMENISTANYN KONSTITUSIYASY May

877.

CONSTITUTION OF TUVALU Oct. 1, 1986, art. 22(2), (11)(b).

878.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Oct. 8, 1995, art. 28(1).

879.

KONSTYTUTSIYA UKRAYINY June 28, 1996, art. 129 (Ukr.).

880. DASTOR
(U.A.E.).

18, 1992, arts. 6, 98, 103(2) (Turkm.).

DAWLAT AL-IMARAT AL-'ARABIYA AL-MUTTAHIDA Dec. 2, 1971, art. 94
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881.

Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (UK) sch. 1, art. 6,¶ 1

882.

U.S. CONST. arts. II, § 4, III, § 1, amend. V, XIV, § 1.

883. CONSTITUCI6N
243, 246, 251-52.

884.

[60:2

1830, arts.

233,

O'ZBEKISTON RESPUBLIKASI KONSTITUTSIYASI Dec. 8, 1992, arts. 106, 108(5),

112

DE LA REPOBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY June 28,

(Uzb.).
885.

CONSTITUTION OF VANUATU July

886.

LEGGE 16 MARZO

2020,

DELLA CITTA DEL VATICANO, arts.
887.

30, 1980, art. 5(1)(k), (2)(a).

N. CCCLI SULL'ORDINAMENTO GIUDIZIARIO DELLO STATO

1, 2, 3(2) (Vatican).

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Dec. 15, 1999, art.

49(3) (Venez.).
888.

HItN PHAP NUkJC CONG HOA XA HQI CHU NGHIA VIET NAM Jan.

103(2) (Viet.).
889.

DUSTUR ALYAMAN May 16, 1991, arts. 149-51 (Yemen).

890.

CONST. OF ZAMBIA (1996) arts. 18(1), (9), 26(1)(c), 122-23.

891.

CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE Mar. 16,

2013,

art.

69(1)-(2).

1, 2014,

arts. 31(2),

